Dragomen and checkpoints

Abstract

Humanistic studies of translation have often taken for granted that translational activity produces cultural understanding, which in turn leads to deeper human sympathy. However, the history of military translation in the US occupation of Iraq suggests that this model is inadequate on a number of accounts, including the ways in which translation theory privileges literary translation over other translational activities. This essay surveys the development of Arabic–English translation within US military strategic thinking and the adjunct role played by militarised interpreters in the US occupation of Iraq. It then considers Arabic–English translation in terms of the lives of translators, as opposed to the textual products produced by their labour. It concludes by sketching the nineteenth-century history of the Levantine dragoman in order to draw resemblances with more recent histories of military translation.

Keywords:

• military translation
• Iraq war
• tarjama
• conflict studies
• postcolonial studies

Notes

1. Despite the promise of the title, Apter’s essay does not seriously explore the actual practices of translation at Israeli checkpoints, a topic which deserves study in its own right. Indeed, while the Israel military has a long history of developing networks of collaborators, it has historically avoided using them in public operations (see e.g. Cohen 2008). On the use of Druze translators within the Israeli Army, see Kanaaneh (2009).

2. According to St. Augustine, the 70 interpreters who produced the Septaguint translation Hebrew Bible were ‘so inspired by the Holy Spirit that many men spoke as if with the mouth of one’ (Augustine 1958, 49). In ‘Des tours de Babel’, Jacques Derrida writes: ‘The sacred surrenders itself to translation, which devotes itself to the sacred. The sacred would be nothing without translation, and translation would not take place without the sacred; the one and the other are inseparable’ (Derrida 2002, 133).

3. The notion that language is a weapon is often acknowledged by way of contorted ‘war-is-peace’ language, as in this statement from Representative Todd Akins before the US House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (2008a): ‘As we are seeing on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan today, the skills such as language and cultural awareness are key in reducing violence and establishing the rule of law. For example, the troop surge in Iraq would not have been successful without our troops’ effectiveness in implementing counterinsurgency tactics which, at their heart, require the force to understand and respond to the local populace’s concerns’.

4. These figures are based on conservative estimates: see e.g. ‘Lend Me Your Ears’ (2013).

5. The Cold War framework for thinking about language, translation and conflict was unmistakable. Commenting at a military–academic ‘conference’ on languages, Department of Defense Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu compared 9/11 to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, then went on: ‘The terrorist attacks of September 11th, the Global War on Terrorism, and the continued threat to our Homeland have defined the critical need to take action to improve the foreign language and cultural capabilities of the Nation. We must act now to improve the gathering and analysis of information, advance international diplomacy, and support military operations. We must act to retain our global market leadership and succeed against increasingly sophisticated competitors whose workforces possess potent combinations of professional skills, knowledge of other cultures, and multiple language proficiencies’ (U.S. Department of Defense, The National Language Conference 2005, ii).

6. The criticism came from within the Department of Defense and from without. For DoD administrators, the shortfall of linguists (across many languages) remained a vexing, massive problem even in late 2008 – that is, many years after the Department began its high-profile recruitment campaigns of linguists: ‘The Department appears to suffer from “unfilled needs” for linguists. On the “demand” side, the Department of Defense has identified approximately 33,000 billets that have been “coded” as requiring some degree of foreign language proficiency’ (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 2008b, 23). Also see the US Government Accountability Office Report (2009).

7. Consider the terms of one such job, advertised in 2007:

Our company, Aegis MEP, is currently hiring individuals fluent in Arabic and English for overseas linguist positions. This position pays from $144,820-$186,000 a year. It includes a full Aetna Global Benefits Package, full health insurance for you and your family, a 401 k retirement plan, and preferred status concerning future employment with our company… Requirements: Must be a U.S. citizen or a green card holder. Must be willing to obtain a security clearance. Must be proficient in reading, writing, listening and speaking in Arabic and English. Must be willing to travel overseas, in this case, Iraq. Duties: Provide operational contract linguist support to U.S. Army operations in Iraq. Provide general linguistic support for military operations and interpret during interviews, meetings, and conferences. Interpret and translate written and spoken communications. Transcribe and analyze communications. Perform document exploitation. Scan, research, and analyze foreign language documents for key information. Translate foreign language documents. Identify and extract information components meeting military information requirements. Provide input to reports.

(http://www.alliraqjobs.com/job-1064.html accessed 21 May 2015)

8. For this reason, a 2008 military order banning masks caused panic among the ranks of Iraqi translators (see e.g. Londoño 2008).

9. Again, the rhetoric is one of linguistic and cultural mastery, based explicitly on models developed during the Cold War: ‘Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is also critical to prevail in the long war and to meet 21st century challenges. The Department [of Defense] must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from the strategic to the tactical. The Department must foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War’ (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 78).

10. A photo from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report shows the back of an Arab-American translator with the following caption: ‘The U.S. Army is harnessing the diversity of American society by recruiting heritage speakers of priority languages to serve as translators and interpreters’ (U.S. Department of Defense 2006, 11).

11. This commercial, along with other recruitment advertisement materials, can be found at: http://www.allied-media.com/Arab-American/Arabic_linguist_recruiting_services.html (visited 21 May 2015).

12. See, for example, the posts of ‘Sam’ from Baghdad, whose blog ‘Interpreters [sic] Life in Iraq War’ is filled with stories of friendship (http://interps-life.blogspot.com, accessed 21 May 2015); and ‘Iraqi Translator’s Life in Iraq and His Experiance [sic] With U.S. Army and Iraqi People’ (http://iraqi-translator.blogspot.com, accessed 21 May 2015);

13. On the tangled accounts of translators such as Ellious Bocthor, Youhanna Chiftichi, Elias Pharaon, Lotfi Nemr, Gabriel Taouïl and Rufa’il Zakhur, the 1801 evacuation of the ‘Egyptian Legation’ and the 1815 massacre of Marseilles’ Egyptian community, see Coller (2011), 46–139. On the Egyptian ‘mamelouks’ of Napoleonic France, see Grigsby (2002).

14. This story can be found in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry 1804–1812.

15. See Edward Said’s comments on Bernard Lewis’s etymological method regarding ‘revolution’ (thawra) and its root (th-w-r) in Arabic, which Lewis associates with ‘excitement’, ‘sedition’ and a ‘camel rising up’: Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 314–5.

16. Compare Ajami’s discussion of the Egyptian intellectual Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (213), based on unnamed original Arabic sources, with identical language from an interview conducted by Ayman Bakr and myself: ‘Silencing is at the Heart of my Case’, Middle East Report (November-December 1993), 27–29.

17. During March and April 2003, reports began to surface in the mainstream US press that American GIs were egregiously failing to prevent the widespread looting of Iraqi state ministries and museums, with the notable exception of course of the petroleum ministry, which was immediately secured by US troops and never allowed to be looted. US soldiers were accused at the time as encouraging the looting of some buildings closely associated with Baathist rule, and were even quoted in news sources as telling Iraqis who were looting the national museum, ‘Go in Ali Babas, it’s yours!’ See e.g. Sommerfeld (2003).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Elliott Colla

Elliott Colla is Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.