Abstract
This paper argues that, in order to understand economic crises, we need to approach them in a multifaceted way and pay attention to the extra-economic elements. Economic crises, far from being irrevocably identifiable through objective indicators, are subject of multiple interpretations. Consequently, we need to pay attention to the perceptions of those key actors involved in taking decisions and study the policy-making processes during crises in the context of states as contradictory and never-fixed institutional arrangements with possibly contradictory territorial projects. The economic crisis in Spain and, more specifically, in the Basque Country during the 1980s is presented in this paper as a case study in which these research challenges are addressed.
Notes
1. As part of my doctoral research work, I conducted over 20 interviews with key policy-makers in the fields of economic development and spatial planning at the local level (municipalities and provinces) and the regional level in the Basque Country between 2001 and 2002. In the interviews, I asked the interviewees to give a free narrative description of the economic crisis in the Basque Country from their personal experience.
2. During Francoism, regions did not have any political autonomy; thus all the economic policy decisions were made by the central government or by the provincial branches.
3. Bizkaia, Araba and Gipuzkoa (or Vizcaya, Alava and Guipuzcoa in Spanish) are the provinces that now constitute the Basque Autonomous Community (see ). Navarra, which during Francoism was (as the rest) a province, has now been constituted as an Autonomous Community in itself. There are historical links between these four provinces and part of Navarra is Basque-speaking.
4. Altos Hornos de Bizkaia (AHV) was the biggest steel company in the Basque Country and the most emblematic factory in Bilbao. It was finally replaced in 1996 by a small and modern steel plant owned by a transnational firm.