Thinking diaspora diplomacy after Russia’s war in Ukraine

ABSTRACT

Reflecting upon the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for the theorization of ‘diaspora diplomacy’, this Provocation uses the concept to frame the conflict and the ensuing power plays. The extent of global community involvement requires the existing diaspora diplomacy definition to account for ‘quadratic nexus’ configuration of ‘home’ and ‘host’ country, respective diasporas and international actor engagement in diaspora diplomacy practice. In reviewing the conflict, and the current response, four themes emerge as central to the ‘quadratic nexus’ configuration and deserving further attention: the politics of labelling, the dynamics of engagement, third-party diasporas and diaspora identities in diaspora diplomacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Diaspora diplomacy
• Ukraine
• Russia
• assemblages

Russian President Vladimir Putin in his essay On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians claimed that ‘Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole’ (Russian Federation, 2021). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky retorted that the brotherhood is more akin to the relationship of the Biblical figure Cain, who killed his brother Abel (RFE/RL, 2021). Notably, both messages were conveyed to the international audience. Thus began the struggle of labelling, constructing conflicting identities and engaging population in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict which evolved into a full-scale war at the beginning of 2022. At one level, this reality is not especially new or surprising; the role of diasporas as progenitors of interstate conflict has long been recognized and exploited. Brubaker suggests the term ‘triadic nexus’ to describe the relationship between a country of residence, a diaspora and an external homeland laying claim to a population across national borders (Brubaker, 1996, p. 5). However, as particularly evident in this conflict, both the Russian and Ukrainian states, and the respective diasporas, have sought to evolve the ‘triadic’ configuration to include the global community. As such, the ‘triadic’ has expanded to a ‘quadratic nexus’ of relations in diaspora diplomacy involving Russia, Ukraine, their respective diasporas and international actors in different assemblages. The inclusion of the global community as actors in diaspora assemblages is presenting to existing scholarship new analytical and normative challenges.

Diaspora diplomacy

Diaspora diplomacy, a facet of diplomatic scholarship (see Gonzalez III, 2012; Ho & McConnell, 2017; Jovenir, 2013; Rana, 2011, pp. 94–111; Stone & Douglas, 2018; Tomiczek, 2011; Torrealba, 2017; Trent, 2012) proves difficult to define. Diaspora diplomacy research has focused on the interconnections of diplomacy and diaspora, including the boundaries of diasporas in international relations, diaspora as a task of diplomacy, state-driven initiatives involving diasporas, diasporas in diplomatic negotiations, diasporas capacities to lobby foreign policy and domestic agendas and so forth (See Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Barston, 2019; Gamlen, 2018; Newland, 2010; Rana, 2011). Ho and McConnell (2017:, p. 250) theorize the term diaspora diplomacy ‘as diaspora assemblages composed of states, non-state and other international actors that function as constituent components of assemblages’. The practice of diplomacy they conceptualize as ‘the management of relations between groups, and how this is articulated through practices of communication and representation’ (Ho & McConnell, 2017, p. 238). As such, diaspora diplomacy is a broad concept involving a variety of actors in different power structures, working towards aims that can extend beyond the borders of the ‘home’ country and the communication and representation aspects associated with the process. Further, these aims can conflict with interests of other assemblages, and the power plays between nations, regions and/or populations involved serve to elevate diaspora diplomacy to the international arena.

The concept of diaspora diplomacy assumes meaning only in given historical and geographical contexts and is always emergent and in a process of structuration. I argue that the attempts to utilize the diaspora to speak to the global community, as well as the variegated entanglements of international actors in diaspora diplomacy assemblages, in this conflict is serving to populate the concept with new meaning and constitute a key moment in its formation. The extent to which the global community has been embroiled in and is responding to the conflict requires the widening of the diaspora diplomacy definition, as there are no longer just ‘diaspora assemblages’ but global assemblages involved in the process of diaspora diplomacy. Below, I will reflect on four aspects of the conflict pertinent to diaspora diplomacy, involving the global community, that require further in-depth investigation: the politics of labelling, the dynamics of engagement, third-party diasporas and diaspora identities in diaspora diplomacy.

Labelling, engagement, third-party diasporas and diaspora identities

The Russian state is framing the current war as having everything to do with its diaspora in Ukraine. The assertion made is that Russian speakers in Ukraine were ‘subjected to genocide’ and that a ‘special operation’ was needed to protect them (Fisher, 2022). Is this something new – no. Most recently, this justification of acting on behalf of ethnic co-nationals in the ‘near abroad’ was used for Russian troop involvement in the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Toal, 2017). The worrying element is that this pattern is repeating itself, and that the ‘Putin doctrine’, outlining Russia’s intentions to protect the rights of Russians everywhere, has asserted the right to use military force (Russian Federation, 2014). The labelling of certain populations outside of Russian borders as co-ethnics, in a sense justifies aggression domestically because in external homeland relations with the diaspora ‘shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 5). On the other hand, the humanitarian intervention argument, on behalf of the diaspora, attempts to justify Russia’s action to the rest of the global community (Milanovic, 2022).

Understanding exactly the population, the Russia state is laying claim to is difficult, as is understanding Russian speaker identity and identification in Ukraine. There is the unresolved question of ‘beached diasporas’ for whom ‘the borders of the Soviet Union receded, rather than because they dispersed from their homeland’ (Laitin, 1998, p. 29). Some identify Ukraine as their homeland, some identify Russia and some identify themselves as Soviet. Self-identified Russians in Ukraine made up 17 percent in 2001 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2001). The Russian-speaking population is concentrated in the eastern Ukraine, with the majority in the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, where only 27 percent consider Ukrainian their native language (Kapinos, 2018). However, there is often a discrepancy in data between reported mother tongue and self-identified ethnicity. In the same eastern region of Ukraine, during the 2001 census, 58 percent self-identified as ethnic Ukrainian in Luhansk and 57 percent in Donetsk (Yekelchyk, 2015, p. 21). O’Loughlin and Toal (2020, p. 304) have argued that Ukrainian identities are fluid and contextual. The bi-lingual Ukraine posed no major source of contention, surveys reveal the majority of the population, 67 percent, believe that there is no problem between Ukrainian, and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine (Rating Group Ukraine, 2022). Nonetheless, since 2014 two pro-Russian separatist republics have existed in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. The Republics have claimed to want referendums on independence from Ukraine and the right to join Russia (Ukrainska Pravda, 2014).

The extent of how many Russian speakers in Ukraine welcome Russia’s interference on their behalf, especially in the Donbas region, remains unknown. Data from 2014 suggests that the population of Crimea, with the exception of the Tatar minority, are ‘pro-Russia’ and welcome Russia’s involvement in the region (O’Loughlin & Toal, 2019). The 2014 survey data from Donetsk and Luhansk showed a small percentage, 19 percent, supporting Russian troop introduction into Ukraine (O’Loughlin & Toal, 2020, p. 309). The most recent poll conducted in Ukraine, without participants from Crimea and Donbas, suggests that 2 percent of Ukrainians believe that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking citizens (Rating Group Ukraine, 2022). The reality is that this might be irrelevant, as the pre-text of aiding ethnic co-nationals abroad has helped the Russian state frame the conflict for the Russian-speaking audience and justify the war (Dougherty, 2022). According to media reports, there even appears to be significant support for the Russian invasion among the 3 million-strong Ukrainian diaspora in Russia (Vorobyov, 2022).

The above demonstrates how labelling of diaspora populations has been used by the Russian state to try to justify invasion to the global community but also to garner support for the war domestically. However, not much research exists on how assemblages are involved in the process of labelling and claiming, why this is done in the first place, the effect this has domestically and globally, and the power dynamics of assemblages. There is need to bring together scholarship on diaspora diplomacy and diaspora politics, where Adamson (2019, p. 215) argues that diasporas should be viewed as the constructs of political entrepreneurs who engage in transnational mobilization activities to achieve a strategic end goal. In this case, an important role in the assemblage is played by the media, with the support the media can generate for the labelling and claiming initiatives, which in turn shapes further action. Additionally, Russia has used orchestrated social media campaigns, such as ‘#IStandWithPutin, to demonstrate support for the conflict abroad (Conger & Raj, 2022). However, in Russia, the media is not a free agent, and as such, reveals the need to further investigate the power relations in assemblages.

Further, very little research exists on the actual dynamics of diaspora diplomacy engagement, of how diaspora are activated and engaged, by whom, through what mediums, in what assemblage constellations, and for what purpose, and understanding why some diasporas are predisposed to such engagement. Exception to this is the work of Brinkerhoff (2019) who distinguishes public diplomacy from diaspora diplomacy specifically because of the diaspora identity issues that make diaspora susceptible targets of engagement. According to Coolican (2021, p. 9), ‘The structure and policies of the Putin regime have created a network of institutions specifically created to help enact the political potential of the Russian diaspora, through the means of hard, soft, and sharp power’. Currently, however, very little research in diaspora diplomacy has gone into understanding exactly how external populations, once claimed, are mobilized and engaged and what this means for the international community. There is need to answer the call issued by King and Melvin (1999, p. 109) ‘analysts must determine under what circumstances transborder nations cease to be the purview of poets and pamphleteers and become instead the concern of foreign and defense ministries.’

On the Ukrainian side, what is new in relation to the dynamics of diaspora diplomacy is the means of appealing to the diaspora, the level at which the calls to action have been made directly to the transnational population by the country of origins highest officials, the content of the appeal and the global platform used. In a televised appeal, Zelensky asked the diaspora ‘Everyone who can come back to Ukraine, please come back to defend Ukraine’ (Bosotti, 2022). Then, when addressing the Canadian parliament, he included a direct message to the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Mazurenko, 2022). In another example, the Ukrainian Defense Minister called upon the diaspora to share information about what is happening in Ukraine in their countries of residence in a bid to influence the popular opinion of citizens and directly influence their host country governments (Gijs, 2022). The above illustrates recent developments in diaspora diplomacy directly involving the global community, new methods of creating assemblages, of communicating and managing relations and utilizing diaspora diplomacy to illicit.

The need to study the dynamics of engagement and structuration of diaspora identities is also apparent when analysing the response. Diaspora altruism, mobilization, and stronger identification with the country of origin in times of conflict is nothing new. However, there are new diaspora diplomacy facets to the response, the already mentioned involvement of the global community and also specifically the involvement of third-party diasporas. For example, the response to the conflict has seen fundraisers headed by Hollywood stars of Ukrainian heritage that engage the global community (Sottile, 2022), the efforts of Ukrainian IT diaspora to form an assemblage of sector-specific specialists from around the world (Dave & Dastin, 2022), the means of crucial skills and knowledge transfers to Ukraine involving the Ukrainian diaspora and third-party diasporas (Kestler-D'Amours, 2022). When Zelensky issued the call for the diaspora to return, over half a million Ukrainian citizens returned to Ukraine to take up arms (Ukrinform, 2022). Further, the call has been answered by 20,000 volunteers, from 52 countries, with no Ukrainian ethnic roots (Abend, 2022). Third-party participants in the diaspora diplomacy assemblages have previously been termed the ‘affinity diaspora’, ‘who have a different national or ethnic identity to a nation state but who feel some special affinity or affection for that nation state and who act on its behalf’ (Ancien et al., 2009, p. 8). In elevating and recognizing the ‘affinity diaspora’ as a diaspora diplomacy assemblage member within the international arena, some states have had to enact specific legislation to facilitate their participation (Reuters, 2022). As such, within this conflict we see new diaspora diplomacy assemblages being created and gaining legal standing, in which the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian diaspora, allied country governments and third-party diasporas are coming together against the Russian state.

The process of diaspora diplomacy also has a bearing on identities internationally. The Russian state labelling and acting on behalf of Russian speakers abroad has activated, or intensified, the fear of what Mylonas (2012, p. 188) has termed the non-core group and its relationship with a hostile external power. What does it mean in the context of Russia having the second largest transnationally dispersed population with eleven million Russians residing outside of Russia (United Nations, 2021)? A recent study found that the ‘perception of Russia as a threat in Latvia is closely linked to seeing Russians and poor ethnic relations in Latvia as a threat’ (Pupcenoks et al., 2022). In post-Soviet countries, where the proportion of Russian speakers is high and social integration lacking, the fear of Russian diaspora diplomacy undertakings will ultimately reflect on Russian speakers and suspect their participation in Russia’s diaspora diplomacy assemblage. What is the relationship of diaspora diplomacy with identity issues, can diaspora diplomacy assemblages have an impact on social integration efforts, or because of distrust and perceived affiliation with the hostile country, are social integration efforts likely to stall? How are Russian speaker identities affected by the diaspora diplomacy process globally? Of having assemblages, involving their countries of residence, formed against Russia?

What must also be kept in mind is the ‘inevitable diversity between groups of people who are referred to variously (often interchangeably) as (ethnic) Russians, Russian speakers and Russophones’ (Cheskin & Kachuyevski, 2019, p. 2). A recent initiative by the ballet legend Baryshnikov brings the issue of diaspora diplomacy and structuration of diaspora identities into focus. Baryshnikov, with other prominent Russians, launched the fundraising platform for Ukraine called ‘True Russia’ (TrueRussia, 2022). This is a bottom-up diaspora diplomacy attempt at forming an assemblage of Russian speakers presenting an alternate Russian identity in the global community. The above identity issues associated with the conflict and the involvement of the global community illustrate the need to link diaspora diplomacy scholarship, and the various assemblages of actors involved, to contextual and relational positioning and identity scholarship.

Conclusion

Russia’s war in Ukraine is proving to be a key moment for the elevation of the concept of diaspora diplomacy to the global stage. As both countries try to engage the global community in the diaspora diplomacy process, the term is being refreshed, renewed and imbued with new meaning. As we emerge from this war, the analysis of causes, consequences, implications and future trajectories are bound to be scrutinized through the diaspora diplomacy lens. As such, this Provocation aimed to explore in more detail how the current scholarship on diaspora diplomacy can frame Russia’s war in Ukraine, the existing shortcomings, and through the conflict response to illustrate how diaspora diplomacy definition and research has to expand to accommodate global community involvement in the ‘quadratic’ configuration involving ‘home’ country, ‘host’ country, respective diasporas and international actors in diaspora diplomacy practice.

I have extracted from the above reflections four themes emerging as central to the international community involvement in the ‘quadratic’ nexus of diaspora diplomacy and requiring further study:

• the politics of labelling – understanding why and how diaspora diplomacy assemblages work to label and claim populations, the issues surrounding the construction of such identities to meet strategic goals, assemblage actors and power relations involved in garnering support as a result of the process of labelling and the ensuing effect;

• the dynamics of engagement – understanding the structures, policies and methods of creating and engaging assemblages, the constellations of actors involved, the communication strategies and visions, new methods of engagement, individual predisposition to engagement and the implications for the global community;

• third-party diasporas – elaborating and expanding upon the term ‘affinity diaspora’ to include third-party diaspora participation as assemblage actors, understanding the extent of participation, the emotional response, legal norms and grounds for recognition internationally, and the power structure created by third-party diaspora involvement;

• diaspora identities – the diversity of identities involved in diaspora diplomacy, the resulting assemblages with global involvement and recognition, the influence of such assemblages on identities and integration, as well as the impact of the conflict in shaping and altering identities, and bottom-up diaspora diplomacy attempts at forming and presenting alternate identification.

The raised questions of labelling, the dynamics of engagement, third-party diasporas and structuration of diaspora identities through diaspora diplomacy highlight the applicability of assemblages to the understanding of diaspora diplomacy. However, as this conflict has shown, there are shortcomings in the scholarship and the concept of assemblages needs to expand to take into account the role allocated to the global community in the process of diaspora diplomacy in the ‘quadratic nexus’ configuration, linking it with research on diaspora politics, identity, positioning, and integration concepts, as well as understanding of the structures and processes of assemblage formation. This historical event will have long-lasting implications for the understanding of diaspora diplomacy, as we begin to untangle how Russia’s war in Ukraine was constituted by diaspora diplomacy, and how diaspora diplomacy constituted by this particular event.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by European Regional Development Fund: [Grant Number Nr. 1.1.1.2/VIAA/1/16/013 / Nr. 1.1.1.2/16/I/001].

Notes on contributors

Ieva Birka

Ieva Birka is a Senior Researcher at the University of Latvia, Faculty of Social Sciences and Advanced Social and Political Research Institute. She is the author and co-author of several publications focusing on issues of migration, social integration, feelings of belonging, dual citizenship, and diaspora diplomacy.