Ideational Inconsistency and Institutional Incapacity: Why Financial Liberalisation in South Korea Went Horribly Wrong

Abstract

The financial crisis that struck South Korea with such ferocity in mid 1997 appeared to take many by surprise. Throughout the 1990s and up until the onset of the crisis, foreign lenders demonstrated their confidence in the Korean economy by literally pouring capital into the country, swelling foreign debt to unprecedented levels. Such confidence was bolstered by the affirmations of international credit rating agencies that attached positive ratings to the Korean economy right up until mid 1997. No one, it seemed, at home or abroad, believed that the Korean star that had risen so quickly and shone so brilliantly could fall as far and as fast as it did. However, barely had the dust settled behind the ‘electronic herd's’ mass exodus when tales of the ‘inherent instabilities’ of the Korean economy began to emerge. The Korean government bore the brunt of heaviest international criticism, its ‘interventionist’ financial policies widely blamed for distorting the market mechanism, leading to the misallocation of economic resources and ultimately precipitating the crisis. Such interpretations of Korea's crisis have, however, since been called into question on numerous grounds.