Conceptualising private fintech platforms as financial statecraft and recentralisation in China

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the role of China’s private fintech business in Singapore’s emerging digital banking and payment sector by proposing a research framework that synthesises platform political economy, financial statecraft, and recentralisation. This research addresses the research puzzle of why the private fintech platforms have been granted an essential position in China’s plan to roll out the e-CNY as the party-state has intensified its regulatory and legal control over the private fintech sector. Drawing from the analysed documentary and interview data, this research demonstrates that Alibaba, Ant Group, and Tencent can be seen as a form of CCP financial statecraft to help achieve its foreign policy goals because they are established ‘fintech platforms’.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• private fintech platforms
• e-CNY
• financial statecraft
• recentralisation

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the interviewees for their insights, and to Ms. Lin and Mr. Feng for their research assistance. The author also greatly appreciates the research grants provided by National Science and Technology Council (Taiwan) and National Taiwan University.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For instance, Alibaba set up its SilkRoad headquarters in Xi’an in 2018 (Xinhua 2018).

2 According to Arner et al. (2016, p. 1305–6), China’s private internet banks exemplify what they call ‘FinTech 3.0’ developed by new start-ups rather than traditional banks. In addition, according to the Hurun Report (2020), WeBank is listed as one of the top 10 most valuable fintech companies in China. Thus, internet banks like MYBank and WeBank are categorised as a form of fintech in the Hurun Report.

3 Cross-border e-CNY and CIPS are developed in parallel to facilitate the internationalisation of renminbi (Bansal and Singn 2021, China National Association of Finance Companies 2022, CITIC Securities 2022). China needs to develop cross-border e-CNY because the number of direct participants of CIPS is still far fewer than that of SWIFT, and the cross-border e-CNY can create more incentives for China’s trade partners to use renminbi because it enables more efficient settlements (Bansal and Singn 2021, p. 13, CITIC Securities 2022). Bansal and Singn (2021, p. 16, 21) even note that, CIPS is a ‘past effort’ to internationalise the renminbi, while ‘the digital yuan could prove to be China’s most effective and noteworthy attack on U.S. hegemony’. In addition, only banks can participate in CIPS, while both banks and digital payment companies can participate in cross-border CBDC schemes (Bansal and Singn 2021, p. 14–5).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by National Science and Technology Council (Taiwan) under grant number 110-2410-H-002-004-MY2 (approval number of Research Ethics Committee of National Taiwan University: 202010HS015; approval date of a waiver of informed consent documents: March 1, 2021); National Taiwan University under grant number 109 L7358 and 110L7304 (the grant originator did not require ethics committee approval).

Notes on contributors

Chiu-Wan Liu

Chiu-Wan Liu is an Assistant Professor in the Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University. Her research focuses on developments in China’s fintech sector and digital currency, along with the promulgation of fintech regulations, and fintech politics in China.