After happiness1

 1. The author is grateful to Warwick Tie and Glyn Daly for their feedback and encouragement.

Abstract

Happiness, as a goal of good government, is one of the founding concepts of modern political and economic theory, and it has enjoyed a resurgence of interest among sociologists, psychologists and economists recently, resulting in various prescriptions for public policy. The utilitarian concept of happiness that is deployed by this literature is examined here for its ideological implications. This is contrasted with the pessimistic views about happiness deriving from the psychoanalytic theories of Freud, Lacan and Žižek. Thus, an ideological role of happiness in the political ‘organisation of enjoyment’ is suggested. The present paper outlines problems with both the utilitarian and the psychoanalytic views, but they both contribute to this inquiry into the political uses of happiness in an age of advanced consumer capitalism. While utilitarian happiness research has sought to establish itself on an ‘objective’ scientific basis, and to question some assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, its political uses emerge as a renewal of an ideological discourse that is well adapted to third-way governance.

Notes

 1. The author is grateful to Warwick Tie and Glyn Daly for their feedback and encouragement.

 2. Richard Rorty, ‘Hope and the future’, Peace Review, 14, 2002, pp. 149–155.

 3. S. Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 2002), p. 60.

 4. S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (London: Picador, 1988), p. 29.

 5. While the ideal of happiness (like liberty and equality) may be spoken of as universal, it is worth noting, by contrast, the class analysis of happiness by Ilouz: ‘The sociology of domination should … enquire about the social distribution of the moral resources that are available to the self to achieve the prevailing forms of eudaimonia’. E. Ilouz, ‘Who will care for the caretaker's daughter? Toward a sociology of happiness in the era of reflexive modernity’, Theory, Culture & Society, 14, 1997, pp. 31–66.

 6. P. Anderson, ‘The river of time’, New Left Review, 26, 2004, pp. 67–77, p. 71.

 7. A. Wierzbicka, ‘“Happiness” in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective’, Dædalus, 133, 2004, pp. 34–43.

 8. R. Layard, Happiness: Lessons From a New Science (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 12.

 9. D.G. Myers, Psychology (New York: Worth, 2004), p. 522.

10. Z. Bauman, Society under Siege (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).

11. D.M. McMahon, Happiness: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

12. See for example, R. Inglehart and H.-D. Klingemann, ‘Genes, culture, democracy, and happiness,’ in E. Diener and E.M. Suh (Eds) Culture and Subjective Well-being (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 165–184.

13. ‘Appropriate public policies can increase the average level of subjective well-being’, R.A. Easterlin, ‘Towards a better theory of happiness,’ conference abstract for The Paradoxes of Happiness in Economics, 21–23 March 2003, University of Milano-Bicocca.

14. J. Avery, Progress, Poverty and Population: Re-reading Condorcet, Godwin and Malthus (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

15. J. Bentham, ‘An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation’, in M. Warnock (Ed.), Utilitarianism (Glasgow: Collins, 1962), pp. 33–77, p. 33.

16. One example of the logical problems of utilitarianism is that it leaps from a (superficially) reasonable observation about human behaviour (people seek out pleasure and happiness, and they avoid pain) to the use of this as an evaluative moral principle (our actions can be judged by the extent to which they maximize happiness).

17. This leads, however, to a tautology: A person's preference determines his choice. He chose it. Therefore, he prefers it and is better off for having it. The same circular logic allows marketers who track television ratings to claim that the most sensationalist and attention-grabbing ‘reality’ shows are ‘simply providing the market with what it prefers’ (thus attempting to close down ‘élitist’ arguments about programme ‘quality’).

18. C. Fourier, The Theory of Four Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 95.

19. K. Marx, ‘Contribution to the critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law’, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works: Volume 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), pp. 174–175.

20. B. Plé, ‘Auguste Comte on positivism and happiness’, Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(4), 2000, pp. 423–445.

21. Sir W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1942), p. 171.

22. K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, 4th edn (Auckland: Penguin, 1991), p. 271.

23. M. Argyle, The Psychology of Happiness (Hove: Routledge, 2001); E. Diener and M.E.P. Seligman, ‘Beyond money: Toward an economy of well-being’, Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 2004, pp. 1–31; R.A. Easterlin (Ed.), Happiness in Economics (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002); R.H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Money and Happiness in an Era of Excess (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); B.S. Frey and A. Stutzer, ‘What can economists learn from happiness research?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 2002, pp. 402–435; R.E. Lane, The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); A.J. Oswald, ‘Happiness and economic performance’, The Economic Journal, 107, 1997, pp. 1815–1831; L. Bruni and P.L. Porta, Economics and Happiness: Framing the Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Layard, op cit, Ref. 8.

24. For example: D. Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); P. Martin, Making People Happy: The Nature of Happiness and Its Origins in Childhood (London: Fourth Estate, 2005); D. Nettle, Happiness: The Science Behind Your Smile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); J.F. Schumaker, Happiness: Understanding an Endangered State of Mind (Auckland: Penguin, 2006); N. White, A Brief History of Happiness (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); Layard, op cit, Ref. 8.

25. Beginning with the seminal paper of R.A. Easterlin, ‘Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence’, in I.P.A. David and M.W. Reder (Eds), Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 89–125.

26. B. Cooper, C. García-Peñalosa and P. Funk, ‘Status effects and negative utility growth’, The Economic Journal, 111, 2001, pp. 642–665.

27. B.S. Frey and A. Stutzer, ‘Economic consequences of mispredicting utility,’ (Unpublished paper, University of Zurich, 2004).

28. T. Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

29. B. Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less (New York: Harper Collins, 2004).

30. T. Kasser, The High Price of Materialism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

31. Layard, op cit, Ref. 8, p. 4.

32. For a vigorous attack on the latter claim, see Wierzbicka, op cit, Ref 7.

33. A conference on this theme at the University of Milano-Bicocca in 2003, and at which some of the authors cited in this section presented papers, had the title ‘The Paradoxes of Happiness in Economics’.

34. S. Freud, ‘Civilization and its discontents (1930),’ in S. Freud, Civilization, Society and Religion: Pelican Freud Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 245–340, p. 271.

35. Freud, ‘Civilization and its discontents (1930),’ in S. Freud, Civilization, Society and Religion: Pelican Freud Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 306.

36. Freud, ‘Civilization and its discontents (1930),’ in S. Freud, Civilization, Society and Religion: Pelican Freud Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 313–314.

37. The term etho-politics here is borrowed from N. Rose, ‘The politics of life itself’, Theory, Culture and Society, 18, 2001, pp. 1–30.

38. S. Freud, ‘Group psychology and the analysis of the ego (1921),’ in S. Freud, Civilization, Society and Religion: Pelican Freud Library (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp. 93–178, pp. 152–153.

39. S. Freud, Totem and Taboo (London: Ark, 1983), pp. 141–143.

40. Freud, Totem and Taboo (London: Ark, 1983), p. 143.

41. Žižek, op cit, Ref. 3, pp. 58–60.

42. J. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (London: Routledge, 2001).

43. S. Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London: Verso, 2002), p. 240.

44. S. Žižek, The Fragile Absolute—Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000), p. 135.

45. Lacan, op cit, Ref. 42, p. 255.

46. S. Žižek, op cit, Ref. 43, pp. 253–254.

47. S. Žižek, ‘Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead’, New Left Review, 1(183), 1990, pp. 50–62, p. 60.

48. S. Žižek, op cit, Ref 43, p. 204.

49. New Economics Foundation, A Well-Being Manifesto for a Flourishing Society (London: New Economics Foundation, 2004).

50. Žižek, op cit, Ref. 47; G. Daly, ‘Ideology and its paradoxes: dimensions of fantasy and enjoyment’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4, 1999, pp. 219–238; J. Glynos, ‘The grip of ideology: a Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 6, 2001, pp. 191–214.

51. See the website of the Second International Conference on Gross National Happiness (2005), which features speakers from Bhutan: http://www.gpiatlantic.org/conference/index.htm.

52. Argyle, op cit, Ref. 23.

53. R.A. Easterlin, ‘Explaining happiness’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100, 2003, pp. 11176–11183. See pp. 11181–11182.

54. A. Robinson, ‘The politics of lack’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, 2004, pp. 259–269, p. 268.

55. R. Rorty, ‘Religion in the public square: A reconsideration’, Journal of Religious Ethics, 91, 2003, pp. 141–149.

56. Lane, op cit, Ref. 23.

57. Frank, op cit, Ref. 23.

58. New Economics Foundation, The Politics of Happiness: A NEF Discussion Paper (London: New Economics Foundation, 2003).

59. A good example of social indicators is that provided by the New Zealand Government's Social Report, see: http://www.socialreport.msd.govt.nz/.

60. J. Norberg, ‘The scientist's pursuit of happiness’, Policy, 21, 2005, pp. 9–13.

61. The most rigorous argument found so far is: R. Veenhoven, ‘Happiness as a public policy aim: The greatest happiness principle,’ in P.A. Linley and S. Joseph (Eds), Positive Psychology in Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2004), pp. 658–678.

62. ‘[Gross national happiness] is not a question of individual happiness or of happiness in any immediate sense. The “Happiness” that we are considering as the objective of GNH means the removal of obstacles, the condition in which negativity is diminished, not the immediate satisfaction of the individual as such’. M. Mancall, ‘Gross national happiness and development: An essay,’ in K. Ura and K. Galay (Eds), Gross National Happiness and Development (Thimpu: Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2004), pp. 1–54, p. 27.

63. N. Donovan and D. Halpern, Life-Satisfaction: The State of Knowledge and the Implications for Governments (London: Strategy Unit, 2002), p. 4.

64. NEF, op cit, Ref. 49.

65. R. Veenhoven, ‘Well-being in the welfare state: Level not higher, distribution not more equitable’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 2, 2000, pp. 91–125.

66. Norberg, op cit, Ref. 60.

67. R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin, 1999), p. xxix.

68. Freud, op cit, Ref. 34, p. 271, italics added.