Abstract
This article argues that deliberate and unintentional external influences play both direct and indirect roles in advancing non-liberal democratic political rule. Specifically, it identifies four key external factors whereby Russia has strengthened Central Asia's authoritarian rule: the diffusion of ideas and norms; the growing use of economic and cultural power; the minimal but strategic use of hard power; and the development of regional organizations. The article shows how Russia has consolidated and further entrenched authoritarianism by mapping its impact on the strength of Central Asia's regimes−its management of political contestation, use of coercion, containment of civil society, and degree of legitimacy. Through ‘regional authoritarian learning’, Russia has also strengthened its own autocracy. The conditions conducive to the advance of authoritarianism include the ‘receptivity’ of ideas and practices, the provision of benefits (financial or legitimacy), and perceived threats to regime survival.
Acknowledgements
My thanks go to Peter Burnell as well as Oliver Schlumberger, Wolfgang Merkel, and the anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. The first draft of this paper was presented at the World International Studies Conference, University of Ljubljana, 25 July 2008.
Notes
Post-Soviet Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
‘Sovereign democracy’ was rejected by Medvedev, in an interview for the popular journal Ekspert (24 July 2006) as ‘a far from ideal term’. Medvedev noted that ‘when qualifying additions are made to the word “democracy” this leaves one with a strange after-taste. It suggests that what is actually meant is some other, non-traditional democracy.’
See, for example, statements at Uzbekistan's official government info source http://www.gov.uz/en/news.scm?topicId=123&pager.offset=90 [accessed 20 July 2008].