Abstract
This article examines how and why India, the world's largest democracy, remains sceptical about the idea of promoting its own political order abroad. It first lays down the historical background of India's long abstinence from promoting democracy and describes the country's more recent shift in foreign policies towards greater (though still cautious and selective) support for international democracy promotion. On a conceptual level and as a thought experiment, the article then compares in what ways three prominent schools of thought in international relations (neo-realism, neo-institutionalist liberalism, and social constructivism) are capable of contributing to an explanation of Indian reticence in democracy promotion. While they emphasize different aspects and dimensions of India's hesitance to engage in democracy promotion, all three contribute analytically to such an explanation.
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Oliver Schlumberger, Peter Burnell, Anindya Saha and two anonymous referees for detailed and insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. Any errors or inaccuracies remain my responsibility.
Notes
Of course, nowadays we may also need to take account of the increasing prominence of contrary views from China, Russia and the governments of a number of other countries like Cuba, Iran and Venezuela, as explored in the articles in this issue by Schlumberger, Bader et al. and Jackson.
In terms of economic policy, to be sure, Nehru was supportive of a mixed economy which combined elements of the command economy of the former USSR as well as elements of the free market.