![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
One of the most pressing issues facing Arab societies, in view of the large-scale political transitions taking place in the Middle East, is the status of religion in the state. In this regard, Turkey, a Muslim democratic state, is often offered as a model to follow. The current piece demonstrates that despite the seeming appeal of the Turkish model, it is inadequate for Middle Eastern societies, in which religion plays a significant social role and is a core ingredient of individual and collective identity. This is because the foundations of the Turkish model were artificially imported from the Western experience, and forced from above onto the Turkish populace without much-needed contextual adjustment. This assertion is true not only for the original state-religion model in Turkey, but also for its modified present-day version, which bears to a large extent the burdens of the past. The article concludes by outlining some points that might serve emergent Arab democracies aiming to design a constructive and authentic model of religion and the state.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Henry Barkey and the reviewers of the manuscript for valuable comments.
Notes
A meeting with Saad Eddine Ibrahim at the Interuniversity Consortium for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, McGill University (Montreal, Canada), 21 March 2007.
An interview with Professor Attila Yayla (Ankara, Turkey), 12 May 2009.
The proportion of Turkey's population in urban centers increased from 18.5% in 1950 to 28.2% in 1965, 40.6% in 1980, and 59% in 1990. In Istanbul alone, the population grew from 2.77 million inhabitants in 1980 to 6.75 million 10 years later, most of them newcomers from rural regions (Shmuelevitz Citation1996, p. 163).
Between 1952 and 1959, the newspaper Milliyet alone reported more than 20 cases of raids and arrests among followers of religious orders, especially the Ticani, Nakshibandi and Nurcu. Given the harsh restrictions on the press during the second half of the 1950s, the actual number was probably much higher.
Speeches of Prime Minister Menderes (Milliyet, 17 January 1953 and 8 February 1953) and President Bayar (Milliyet, 8 July 1953, 9 June 1957) in support of secularism.
Milliyet, 28 January 1954.
Milliyet, 21 July 1953. See also Cizre-Sakallioğlu (Citation1996, p. 237).
Milliyet, 10 June 1966, 11 July 1966, and 10 March 1967.
Milliyet, 12 June 1966.
Milliyet, 7 September 1966.
Milliyet, 1 October 1975, 22 February 1978.
In December 1976, President Korutürk vetoed a bill that would have allowed graduates of religious Imam Hatip schools to enter military schools, Milliyet, 26 December 1976. Similarly, the President appealed to the Constitutional Court to cancel a legal amendment that would have dropped the charges against Erbakan (Milliyet, 30 March 1978).
For a detailed investigation of the Gülen movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (Citation2003).
The midnight memo said, in part: ‘It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are against those debates … and will display [their] position and attitudes when it becomes necessary. No one should doubt that.’