Sanctions under the EU Generalised System of Preferences and foreign policy: coherence by accident?

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between the European Union's withdrawal of trade benefits for developing countries under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and its sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Our expectation is that GSP withdrawals and CFSP sanctions will not cohere. However, our research reveals that GSP suspension has been coherent with CFSP sanctions when the latter exist prior to the decision-making process on GSP sanctions and when the International Labour Organisation has set up a Commission of Inquiry condemning the country, as with Myanmar/Burma and Belarus. The presence of separate institutional frameworks explains the GSP suspension towards Sri Lanka in the absence of CFSP sanctions.

Keywords:

• EU trade
• sanctions
• development
• GSP
• Myanmar/Burma
• Belarus

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Alasdair Young, Lorand Bartels, Maurizio Carbone, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article; Alan Winters, Ann Van Aaken, Tony Heron, and Gabriel Siles-Brügge for their input and Stefanie Proost for providing access to her interview material.

Notes

1 The historical name of Burma and the official name of Myanmar are used interchangeably throughout the article.

2 Throughout the article, we refer to the ‘EU’ even when the former European (Economic) Community is meant.

3 Council Regulation No. 3281/94 of 24 March 1997.

4 In addition to the eight fundamental ILO Conventions: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; and International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

5 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; Convention on Biological Diversity; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; Kyoto Protocol; UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances; UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; and UN Convention against Corruption.

6 The 2008 GSP reform did no alter the conditionality system.

7 This summary is based on art 11 Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992. The Lisbon Treaty subsumes these objectives into an expanded list (art 21). However, the withdrawal cases discussed here were considered in the pre-Lisbon era.

8 See Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, Art 19(10).

9 See Council Regulation No. 552/97 of 24 March 1997 (supra fn 2).

10 See Common Position 2004/848/CFSP and Common Position 2004/661/CFSP.

11 See Council Regulation No. 2342/2003 of 29 December 2003.

12 The list is not exhaustive as no official record exists.

13 98/606/CFSP, 26 October 1998.

14 An ILO Commission of Inquiry was also created for Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe is not a GSP beneficiary.

15 Answer to the question by Bernard Poignant (Parti Socialiste Européen (PSE)) to the Commission, 21 February 2002 (E-0384).

16 Interview material collected by Stefanie Proost.