Brazil’s strategic diplomacy for maritime security and safety

ABSTRACT

Even though Brazil adopted new diplomatic priorities since 2019, the maritime security and safety agenda has remained rather stable under the Blue Amazon paradigm. We examine the global, regional, and domestic systems within which Brazil's maritime security and safety are embedded. While Brazil has no regional enemies, the ‘2019 black August' oil spill, polluting vast parts of the country’s coastline, may be considered a tipping point since it led Brazilian authorities to revisit how the issue is framed on the national agenda. Applying the strategic diplomacy policy framework, we suggest three entry points for Brasilia to navigate in the near future, including the nexi between maritime security and safety, international and regional cooperation efforts, and the governance of Antarctica. They are all inextricably connected andkey to Brazilian diplomacy, economy and geopolitics.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategic diplomacy
• Brazil
• Blue Amazon
• ZPCSA
• Antarctica

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The Blue Amazon, as explained below, corresponds to Brazilian jurisdictional waters.

2 https://unfccc.int/cop25. Notably the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. https://www.ipcc.ch/2019/09/25/srocc-press-release/. Consulted on December 15, 2020.

3 Terrorism, piracy and trafficking are more on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) security agenda, while environmental stability, navigation and health are treated as safety issues in the IMO Maritime Safety Committee.

4 This refers to future exploitation of marine resources in the high seas.

5 For example, see the concepts of ‘ecosystem vitality’ and ‘environmental health’ discussed in the Environmental Performance Index. https://epi.envirocenter.yale.edu/. Consulted on May 15, 2021.

6 The PROSUB Programme is one of the most ambitious and expensive federal Programmes in Brazilian military history.

7 Although in June 2021 National Geographic stated that there are five oceans, there is no consensus about that yet.

8 According to the NOAA:

The maritime zones recognised under international law include internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the continental shelf, the high seas and the Area. The breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and EEZ (and in some cases the continental shelf) is measured from the baseline determined in accordance with customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_maritime.html. Consulted on June 01, 2021.

9 There are others such as nuclear testing, against which Brazil had a strong diplomatic voice during the negotiation of the 2017 United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, but it does not affect Brazilian security directly. In other words, it was more of a diplomatic move related to global security than a military demand directly concerning Brazil.

10 Política Naval (2019) https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/all/modules/politica_naval/book.html. Consulted on May 2, 2021.

11 Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (A/CONF.232/2019/6).

12 The European Union and Brazil announced a fiber-optic cable with a capacity of 40 terabytes/second for 2020.http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2019-01/brazil-europe-be-linkednew-subsea-cable. Consulted on 27 December 2020.

13 Huge reservoirs of water are already plotted in the high seas and Antarctica. But they are not economically viable yet. If the situation changes in the future, multilateral regulation on water exploitation will be necessary. Currently, Antarctica is legally protected from external threats, that is, contamination from visitors.

14 Security and safety correspond to the concept of “segurança” in Brazil and issues concerning threats, risks, accidents, crimes are not treated separately. BEIRÃO, A. and PEREIRA, A. (2014). Reflexões sobre a Convenção do Direito do Mar. Brasilia, FUNAG.

15 The Navy has five main activities: maritime power, participation of society and defence, naval power, national interests, science, technology and innovation. Priority areas are South America, the South Atlantic, the African Coast and Antarctica. They are called the strategic surroundings (“entorno estratégico”). Política Naval (2019) pages 9–12. https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/all/modules/politica_naval/book.html. Consulted on January 2, 2020.

16 Grupo de Acompanhamento e Avaliação. Composed by the Navy, National Oil Agency (ANP) and the Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). The Navy is coordinating the collaboration with 75 researchers. Diretoria-Geral de Desenvolvimento Nuclear e Tecnológico da Marinha (DGDNTM). 

https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/default/files/nota_a_imprensa_09dez_comunidade_cientifica.pdf. Consulted on December 15, 2020.

17 IBAMA. Updated on November 20, 2019. Available at: 

http://www.ibama.gov.br/phocadownload/emergenciasambientais/2019/manchasdeoleo/2019-11- 29_LOCALIDADES_AFETADAS.pdf . According to the Navy, this corresponds to around 4,000 km of the Brazilian coastal area.https://www.marinha.mil.br/manchasdeoleo.

18 Nota à Imprensa, Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Navy, November 01, 2019. 2 pages.

19 Translated from the original: “Assim, a “Amazônia Azul”, representa um conceito político-estratégico que abrange os espaços oceânicos e ribeirinhos nos destinos do Brasil, orientando o desenvolvimento nacional e inserindo o Brasil na vanguarda da preservação e uso sustentável dos mares e rios.” https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia_azul/amazonia-azul.html Consulted on 27 December, 2020.

20 One key issue for Brazil is the impact of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides on rivers and the coastal zone. This issue totally escapes the Navy’s scope of action.

21 https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia_azul/ consulted on 3 December, 2020.

22 Plano de Levantamento da Plataforma Continental Brasileira. https://www.marinha.mil.br/secirm/leplac. Consulted on 03 December, 2020.

23 Mercosur is primarily a regional trade bloc, with intrabloc trade flows around US$ 44,9 billion in 2018. Brazil was the president in 2019, promoting the concepts of pragmatism and open regionalism. http://www.mercosul.gov.br/presidencia-pro-tempore-brasileira. Consulted on December 29, 2019. In 2021, Mercosur is paralised.

24 The illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) is estimated at around 15% of world catches, corresponding to 10–20 billion euros per year. 

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6036. Consulted on September 15, 2019.

25 ECLAC and Mercosur are more diplomatic and trade-oriented. ATCO is very fragile now and the 2008 UNASUL was emptied when left-wing presidents lost national elections and PROSUL was created in 2019, in the context of the Venezuelan crisis.

26 The South Atlantic Zone for Peace and Security (ZPCAS) was created by the UNGA Resolution in 1986 (A/RES/41/11 ), having 21 African member states along with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. http://www.defesanet.com.br/africa/noticia/23964/ZOPACAS---30-anos-e-suas-potencialidades-nofuturo-/. Consulted on December 3, 2020.

27 Política Naval (2019) https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/all/modules/politica_naval/book.html. Consulted on January 2, 2020.

28 Noteworthy, there were several joint military activities in the recent past. Although they are relevant, they are usually limited to military priorities.

29 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay.

30 The Brazilian military employ the concept of « defence diplomacy » to describe their international role in the UN peacekeeping operations. Although it could be interpreted as a power projection strategy, Brazilian officers prefer to mention only the effort to stabilise conflicting regions.

31 Other important facts are that former Minister of Foreign Affairs during Lula’s term, Celso Amorim, became the Minister of Defence. Moreover, Minister Jungmann’s chief of cabinet was ambassador Alessandro Candeas. Then the latter became the director of the division of disarmament and sensitive technologies (DDS) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://dds.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/). Consulted on September 15, 2019.

32 South American Antarctic Cooperation. (Reunión de Administradores de Programas Antárticos Latinoamericanos). Website: www.rapal.org.ar.

33 There is no clear definition of what « substantial » means. In terms of quality, South American scientific output may be considered relevant and connected to other research centres notably in the US and Europe, but in terms of quantity and national funding, it is not the case.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by CAPES and CNPq.

Notes on contributors

Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau

Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau is an associate professor at the University of Brasília, Brazil.

Jorge Gomes do Cravo Barros

Jorge Gomes do Cravo Barros is a geologist and former Professor at the University of Brasilia, Brazil.