Illiberal conservatism, civilisationalist ethnocentrism, and paternalist populism in Orbán's Hungary

ABSTRACT

The paper argues for an ideology-centred interpretation of the Orbán regime. Those regimes are considered ideology-centred that promote a particular worldview through discourse, consequential policies and the allocation of resources. In addition to demonstrating that Hungary after 2010 satisfies these criteria, I identify three principal ideological modules of the regime: illiberal conservatism, civilisationist ethnocentrism, and paternalist populism.

KEYWORDS:

• Illiberalism
• Hungary
• autocratization
• political ideologies
• populism

Introduction

This article addresses two questions. First, is the Orbán-regime ideological? Second, if it is, what are the fundamental characteristics of its ideology? These are relevant questions not only for understanding, and predicting, the behaviour of the country's authorities but also for making sense of the recent wave of de-democratization. The alarming trend towards autocratic structures across the world tends to be interpreted either in the context of macro-social phenomena (increase of inequalities, tensions of globalisation, the polarization-inducing changes in communication technologies, etc.) or with a reference to a few strongmen's desire for power- and wealth-accumulation (Lewis, 2022). If ideological strategies are (also) central to the development of autocratic regimes, then liberal democracies need to prepare for a sustained intellectual challenge.

The case of Hungary stands out for two reasons. First, the attitude towards ‘Orbánism’ became a factor in several European electoral campaigns, especially in proximate countries such as Czechia, Slovenia, Italy, Austria, Poland and Slovakia. The behaviour of the Hungarian government is widely seen to pose a challenge to the foreign policy decision-making of the European Union,¹ and high-ranking politicians talk about the dangers of the Hungarian model ‘creeping into the US’.²

Second, Hungary is a hard case for those who emphasise the role of ideas in contemporary politics. The Orbán-regime is particularly often analysed through the lens of opportunism, clientelism and cynicism. In contrast, I argue that the discourse and behaviour of the regime make ideological interpretations not only possible but also necessary. The government invests unusually large efforts in establishing an elaborate worldview, there is a close correspondence between rhetoric and policies on several key ideological dimensions, and the official value-commitments manifest themselves in various rules and practices that shape the lives of individuals within the borders of Hungary, and often also outside of it. Furthermore, I argue that the three principal ideological modules of the regime are illiberal conservatism, civilisationist ethnocentrism, and paternalist populism. I elaborate these concepts and I survey the real-life consequences of the regime's ideological template.

Finally, the article also contributes to the discussion on the role and measurement of ideologies in the operation of political regimes. I propose a set of standards for estimating the role of ideology. To make the case for the relevance of ideology in the analysed context I discuss governmental actions both in the domestic and the international arena and I link these actions to the discursive strategy of Viktor Orbán, his closest associates, and his party, Fidesz. The correspondence of words and actions will be illustrated with quotes from major speeches, programmatic statements, and signature policies, while the societal demand will be captured with survey results.

In the following sections, first, I contrast ideational and cynical approaches to the Orbán regime. Then I address the issue of temporal consistency, and I explain why Fidesz appears to be an authentic actor in the eyes of its supporters. In the third section, I describe the efforts invested into the development of a radical ideological discourse and into the establishment of appropriate international intellectual networks. In the fourth part, I review policies that have both the explicit goal and the potential to shape the values for generations and/or are maintained for ideological reasons, despite their relative unpopularity. Finally, I turn to the issue of what ideological labels best fit the regime, and how the state-society relations have changed in accordance with Orbán's ideological agenda.

Values and/or greed

A number of scholars explicitly caution against ideological interpretations of post-2010 Hungary (Magyar & Madlovics, 2020; Muller, 2020; Scheppele, 2022, etc.), portraying Viktor Orbán as a quintessentially opportunistic leader whose efforts are aimed at consolidating his personalistic rule. No observer denies the regime's reliance on nationalist, right-wing, populist and conservative slogans, but the importance of ideological goals is frequently questioned.

The perhaps most doubted aspect of the regime is its ‘Christian’ commitment (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). According to Olivier Roy, for example, ‘In Hungary, what you have is a populist party who claims to be Christian’ (Coakley, 2021). But for many observers even the ‘populist’ label is underserved. Kim Lane Scheppele (2019), for example, concludes that ‘populism may not be what some of the populists are claiming at all. Instead, what we may find beneath the surface is the drive for power, plain and simple’. … ‘In Orbán's world, power is all that matters’ (Scheppele, 2019, pp. 299–330).

In these accounts the ideological rhetoric is primarily a smokescreen. In another piece, Scheppele (2022) suggests that Orbán wages ‘culture wars’ to distract the defenders of democracy from realising that Hungary is moving towards autocracy. In line with this argument, Jan-Werner Muller (2020) warns against taking seriously the value-references of politicians like Orbán. Concerning the departure of Fidesz from the European Peoples Party (EPP), for example, he argued that

Orbán's posturing has seduced conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic. But the image he is projecting is false advertising. It would be a mistake to think that the Fidesz-EPP conflict is mainly about political principles; it is about power, plain and simple. … The sad, sordid truth is that Orbán and his ilk are trying to wage an EU-wide culture war because they have found this to be an effective way to distract domestic and international attention from the kleptocratic autocracies they have created.

Many of these interpretations rely on Bálint Magyar's account of Hungary as a ‘mafia-state’. In more recent works of Magyar, co-authored with Bálint Madlovics, ideological discourse is acknowledged as playing an important role, but only for stigmatising potential challengers and as reputation-laundering. The authors argue that the repeated references to ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national interest’ in the rhetoric of the Orbán regime may create ‘the appearance of a constant vision about society's proper functioning, as if the actor indeed had an ideology that motivates him’ (ibid., pp. 576–577). But we can dismiss this vision because it doesn't predict actual behaviour (ibid., p. 577).

To underline their point, Magyar and Madlovics contrast Hungary with Poland. The latter country, according to the authors, is led by puritan politicians who are ready to sacrifice their popularity if values are at stake, while the Hungarian government adjusts its policies to opinion polls and international bargains, thus never risking the loss of power for ideological reasons. The regime disregards Christian teachings (e.g. solidarity, mercy, humane treatment of the weak) whenever they are inconvenient. According to Magyar and Madlovics even Orbán's anti-liberalism is fake, otherwise he would not make deals with foreign businessmen (ibid., pp. 586–593).

The trajectory of Fidesz strengthens the scepticism against taking seriously its ideological commitments: the original liberal, anti-Russian, and Europhile position was gradually replaced with anti-liberal, pro-Russian, and Euroskeptic orientation. Additionally, Fidesz itself identifies as a pragmatic political force that is driven by pure common sense (Orbán, 2018a, 2021b).

Ironically, both Orbán and his most ardent critics agree on the fundamentally non-ideological character of the regime.

When does ideology matter?

Next to offering an analysis of the Hungarian and other, post-communist ‘patronal regimes’, Magyar and Madlovics (2020) also developed a set of guidelines for differentiating between ideology-driven and ideology-applying regimes. In the former category ideational templates predict the actions of the authorities, whereas in the latter the function of ideologies is to provide ‘cover’ for the real ambitions of the rulers: to concentrate power and wealth.

Magyar and Madlovics consider a political actor to be ideology-driven

if (1) the fundamental character or the defining/constituting elements of his actions can be derived from his communicated ideological panels, (2) he varies his ideological positions rarely and (3) any varying is followed by a change in his actions accordingly (value coherence). (p. 575)

Communist dictatorships are, for example, ideology-driven because ‘the main features of the regime follow from the basic tenets of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism’ (ibid., p. 87).

Ideology-driven actors also make compromises, but they ‘are willing to pay a political price for insisting on certain policies’ (ibid., p. 575). In contrast, ideology-applying politicians pick tenets for strategic reasons. Contradictory positions and double standards are the giveaways of such a mentality.

The Magyar-Madlovics model is in line with the literature on ideologies that emphasises coherence and consistence (Gerring, 1997). While accepting the fundamental thrust of the model, I propose to modify it in four aspects.

First, it is important not to understand consistency in a rigid manner.³ For a regime (or for a politician who rules across many years) adaptability is key. Stalin's Soviet Union, for example, underwent many U-turns on central issues such as collectivisation, religion, orientation to Germany, etc., yet it is rightly considered to be an ideological regime.

It is particularly important not to expect compliance with textbook criteria of particular ideologies. The expectations of external observers (academics) of what a proper socialist, conservative, or Christian should say and do are of limited relevance. Tomás de Torquemada, Dietrich Boenhoffer, Girolamo Savonarola and António de Oliveira Salazar were all Christian actors, even if they embodied very different interpretations of Christianity. Novel combinations of tenets may necessitate the introduction of new ideological labels, but not the denial of the role of ideology.

The second point is that the voter–party linkage needs to be taken more seriously. Magyar and Madlovics allow for the possibility that (some of) the voters are ideologically driven, but they consider the actions of the political elite (supply side) to be autonomous from the logic of the voters (demand side). This is not entirely plausible, however, ideology-driven voters need to receive specific public goods and symbolic actions in return for their support, and this demand, in itself, constrains what elites can do. Therefore, one needs to investigate the role of ideological objectives in the party–voter linkage and to find out whether the political actors can sustain a discourse that is perceived as authentic for such voters. The image of authenticity requires either continuity in positions or a value-coherent explanation for the policy changes.

Third, the investment into the development of ideology-production needs to be taken into consideration. The build-up of a hegemonic ideology (Gramsci) needs time, money, institutions of dissemination and socialisation, and international networking. The maintenance of a radical ideology requires even more commitment and readiness to face the sanctions coming from the mainstream. The more effort is devoted to such purposes, the larger the role of ideology in shaping the regime.

Finally, one needs to emphasise consequentiality as much as consistency. The relevant questions to ask are: Do the signature policies and the discourse of the regime promote a particular worldview? Does the allocation of resources advantage a well-defined set of values? Does the regime steer the new generations towards what John Rawls (2005) called a ‘comprehensive doctrine’: a set of moral, political and metaphysical ideas about personal virtues and about the way society ought to be arranged?

Below I will demonstrate that according to these criteria the Hungarian regime is ideological.

Continuity and authenticity

Let's start the analysis of the role of ideology by asking the question whether one can speak of continuity, consistency and authenticity in Fidesz's ideological offer. The starting point of such an analysis must be that Fidesz is one of the most successful parties in Europe, even if the post-2010 elections are disregarded. The party has been supported by at least one third of the population since 1998. Given the turbulent Eastern European context, this achievement is truly exceptional.

The party can count on the continuous support of masses of active citizens partly because it occupies the same, nationalist-conservative-clerical corner of the ideological space for almost 30 years now. While still nominally liberal,⁴ Fidesz adopted a Christian-nationalist rhetoric and began to emphasise family-values already in mid-1990s, demanding that the state differentiates between churches and supports only those who ‘do not contradict our values on the issues of family and nation’ (Orbán, 2006, p. 132).⁵ The interest in supporting Hungarian-speakers living in neighbouring countries is present from the very beginning of the party's career. The famous Romanian summer camp where Orbán regularly delivers his most important speeches was launched in 1990. The alliance with the historical churches dates to 1996.

As mentioned in the introduction, there was a glaring U-turn in the party's trajectory, the move from a Western (pro-European) orientation towards an Eastern (pro-Russia, China, Central Asia, etc.) alliance. Fidesz was able to maintain the image of authenticity (though losing some of its original supporters) by claiming that it was the world that changed. The West became weak and betrayed its traditional values, while the ascendant East represents classical Western values: hard work, traditional family, national sovereignty. Therefore, value-consistency demands a shift from Western to Eastern orientation. While the West has begun to disintegrate under the influence of the growing immigrant population, the Russian leaders have turned to traditionalist values. Therefore, Orthodoxy became the ‘best hope’ and ‘the most important reserve’ for Christians in the West to regain their religious footing.⁶

Robust, radical ideological discourse, extensive ideological infrastructure

The second issue to examine is whether the regime developed a distinct, elaborate ideological discourse and whether it has created an institutional infrastructure to achieve ideological hegemony. The answer to this question is even clearer than to the previous one. Orbán developed a particularly radical ideological message across the last decades. He advertises Hungary as a bastion against transgender operations, critical race theory, leftist cancel culture, woke demands in higher education, aggressive homosexual propaganda, multiculturalism, and the expansion of Islam. There is no leading politician today whose discourse is as much dominated by radical right-wing references as Orbán's. He is among the very few office-holders openly advocating the ‘Great Replacement’-theory (Political Capital, 2022) or recommending racist literature such as Jean Raspail's infamous The Camp of the Saints.

The message is disseminated through a wide range of journals, media-outlets, and educational institutions owned or sponsored by the state. The school curricula, imposed on all public schools, reflects a nationalist-conservative understanding of the world, the state-sponsorship of culture leaves only marginal room for dissident artists, and a series of state-run exhibitions and publicly financed movies help to codify a historical memory that is at odds with academic accounts but is in line with the party's worldview (Oktatói Hálózat, 2020).

A vast array of publicly financed think-tanks and foundations was established to help the elaboration of illiberal narratives: Center for Fundamental Rights, twenty-first Century Institute, Danube Institute, Safe Society Foundation, Veritas Institute, Századvég Foundation, House of Terror, and many others. The newest, and best endowed, institution is the Mathias Corvinus College (MCC). This organisation was established by a close associate of Orbán, and then it was elevated into the circle of state-sponsored but privately governed institutions, receiving more than €1.3 billion from the state. A €90 million one-time donation in 2020, financed from a special Coronavirus recovery fund (Lengyel, 2022), further helped the financial consolidation of the college that advertises itself as the ‘largest talent development institution and knowledge base in Central Europe’.⁷ Shortly afterwards the MCC bought Libri, the largest publishing and book-retail company in Hungary and established offices in Brussels (Preussen, 2022). This nominally private organisation is chaired, as of 2023, by a member of the government, and operates under tight partisan control.

The proselytising efforts go well beyond the country's borders. In 2021 the regime established the Hungarian Conservative, an English language bimonthly magazine that is available in airports across the world, and it became the sponsor of the European Conservative magazine, advertised as ‘Europe's leading conservative English-language journal of philosophy, politics, and the arts’.⁸

The party's and the government's international relations are adjusted to the regime's ideological profile. The departure from EPP was followed by an even closer cooperation with radical-right parties. Joining the most radical faction in the European Parliament, the Identity and Democracy (ID) bloc, was, so far, not possible, because, as acknowledged by Orbán, an alliance with ID's main member, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), would do much damage to the Hungarian-German governmental relations, but when the members of the ID met to formulate the alliance's position on European politics in June 2022,⁹ their guest speaker was Fidesz's minister of justice.¹⁰

In line with the missionary zeal, Orbán has built a veritable royal court out of intellectual dignitaries and influencers. After 2015 a pilgrimage to Budapest began from among those concerned about (the excesses of) cultural progressivism, including Rod Dreher, Patrick Deneen, Yoram Hazony, Geert Wilders, Roger Scruton, Douglas Murray, Jordan Peterson, Frank Furedi, John O'Sullivan, Christopher Rufo, Gladden Pappin, Tucker Carlson, Stephen Bannon, Eduardo Bolsonaro, Herbert Kickl, Vaclav Klaus, and many others (Chotiner, 2021; Rone, 2023). The organisations of Conservative Political Action Conferences (CPAC) in Budapest allowed the regime to cement the good relationships with the hard right in America.

Future-oriented, signature policies

After showing a considerable amount of continuity and investment into the ideological supply, let's consider the issue of consequentiality: the policies and the allocation of resources. Even at first sight, the number of ideologically-coloured policies introduced by Orbán's government that have long-lasting consequences abound. The citizenship law that resulted in more than one million new citizens, the church law that created a hierarchy among the churches, the fence erected around the southern borders, the rejection of virtually all asylum seekers from the MIddle East, the banning of the display of books about homosexual relations, or the lavish spending on family-support schemes are all ideologically interpretable and socially consequential policies.

Many of these policies can be traced back to the constitution introduced unilaterally by Fidesz in 2011. The so-called ‘Foundational Law’ had no pretence of being neutral in terms of world-views and values (Uitz, 2019), and later modifications further increased its ideological content. The document doesn't only exclude the possibility of same-sex marriage, but it also states that

Hungary shall protect the right of children to a self-identity corresponding to their sex at birth and shall ensure an upbringing for them that is in accordance with the values based on the constitutional identity and Christian culture of our country.

The government's measures and rhetoric have a tangible impact on the everyday lives of citizens. In line with the party's vision of an ideal society and as a result of the changes in the incentive-structures, the number of divorces has declined, the number of marriages has doubled, and the fertility rate has increased.¹¹ Giving birth can exempt one from paying back student-loans or from paying personal income tax.¹² Through linking various social citizenship rights to having children, the regime's pro-natalist policies have led to a redistribution of workload across social groups defined by sex, gender, and social status (Fodor, 2021a).

The churchification of social care and educational services has advanced in giant steps. The proportion of secondary schools governed by churches has increased from 10 to 25%. The clerical supervision of child protection-related services has increased from 7 to 75%. Virtually all activities concerning foster parents have been delegated to churches (Dobszay, 2022).

In many segments of the economy the ratio of domestic and local capital has changed significantly after 2010. In the banking-, energy-, and media-sectors, for example, domestic ownership has increased by around 20%. The amount of Hungarian public funds spent on supporting the Hungarian diaspora has sky-rocketed. The Bethlen Foundation, the agency dedicated to supporting Hungarians abroad, spent 12 times more in 2020 than in 2011 (Előd & Czímer, 2021; Sipos, 2019). In 2020, the amount devoted to this purpose reached €383 million, and the Foundation is only one of the channels through which support arrives to the diaspora communities.

During the reign of the Orbán regime, the money spent on religion, culture and recreation more than tripled, vastly outspending any other European country.¹³ Recreation and, especially, sport, may not sound as very ideological fields, but they are tightly integrated with religion-politics and nation-building in post-2010 Hungary. The cult of sport (especially competitive sport, particularly football) is elevated to one of the defining markers of ‘Hungarianness’. A portion of the financial support given to assist Hungarians in neighbouring countries is dedicated to churches to build football pitches. The ‘spiritual unification’ of the nation happens largely through these two mediums, sport and religion.

One of the central criteria of ideology-driven systems, according to Magyar and Madlovics, is whether they launch ideologically-motivated policies even if such policies run counter to public opinion. The Orbán-regime meets even this standard, in several issue areas. While it is true that the Hungarian government didn't go as far as the Polish state in restricting abortion, he does maintain several unpopular policies. The flat-tax, the constraints on local governments and on the autonomy of schools, or the financial privileging of churches (Republikon, 2017), have all been unpopular. The fact that the majority has reservations against the voting rights of those who do not live in the country,¹⁴ and it is particularly against the lavish sponsorship of Hungarian sport clubs functioning abroad,¹⁵ has been disregarded by the government.

Of course, some of the ideologically interpretable gestures cited above may have had some returns in terms of power and wealth as well. The generous support of Hungarian institutions in the neighbouring countries, for example, contributed to Fidesz's electoral success among Hungarians living there. But this ‘investment’ never promised more than one or two extra seats in the legislature (László, 2016). Narrow office-focused rationality doesn't appear to be a satisfactory explanation.

The same claim can be made concerning foreign policies. The ‘Eastern opening’ – the affiliation with countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey – or membership of the Organization of Turkic States, have always been at odds with the voters’ preferences.¹⁶

Admittedly, governments can afford some unpopular policies, they only need the support of the relative majority of the voters. But the maintenance of these policies signifies that Orbán took risks in a way not taken by those fellow-autocratizers (in the region Andrej Babiš or Boyko Borissov) who pursued a moderate and non-ideological style.

This is even clearer on the international scene, where the government's non-conformist strategy led to a dramatic – and predictable – loss of allies. Manifestly provocative gestures like Orbán's insistence that Fidesz is to the right of the Brothers of Italy (Orbán, 2019),¹⁷ may have been factually correct, but they did not reflect office-seeking, pragmatic strategies.

The three pillars of the ideology

Those Christian middle-class activists (Greskovits, 2020) who sustained the party during the 8 years (2002–2010) in opposition, were promised a marked shift to the right, and Orbán delivered. As demonstrated above, while flip-flopping on specific issues, the party consistently offers a wide range of markedly right-wing authoritarian, well-advertised policies to its core voters. Not all ideological promises have materialised but a surprisingly big proportion of them have done so. The strengthening of conservative institutions, the marginalisation of foreign capital in specific economic sectors, or the increase of xenophobia through the governmental anti-foreigner campaigns (Barna & Koltai, 2019) will alter Hungarian society for decades.

After presenting evidence in favour of the ideological nature of the regime, I now turn to the characterisation of its ideology. I will do so with the help of three concepts: illiberal conservatism, civilisanionist ethnocentrism, and paternalist populism.

The focus on these concepts is not meant to question the relevance of other labels occasionally applied to Orbán's Hungary, e.g. ethno- or right-wing populism (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2020), neo- or national-conservativism (Buzogány & Varga, 2018; Szelényi & Csillag, 2015), ordonationalism (Geva, 2021), realism (Körösényi et al., 2020), etc. All these approaches capture some important aspects of the rhetoric and/or of the operation of the regime. The three concepts discussed below, however, correspond to the three principal questions that political actors with ideological ambitions need to address: what is a virtuous life, what is the nature of the represented community, and what is the relationship between citizens and the state? Illiberal conservatism answers the first, civilisanionist ethnocentrism the second, and paternalist populism the third question. I propose that these, inherently paradoxical but increasingly effective, configurations are central to the operation of the Orbán regime and may be relevant elsewhere too.

Illiberal conservatism, like most conservative traditions, promotes traditional family structures, social order, and religious (Christian) legacies. But this type of conservatism is not satisfied with the protection of inherited socio-cultural structures. In contrast to many versions of conservatism, it is hostile to checks and balances, state neutrality, rule of law, and influential civil society. It projects the hierarchical, male-centred nuclear family as the unit of the political society. It demands compliance with official cultural norms in return of public support and it expects educational institutions to defend traditionalist values. Illiberal conservatism divides society into hard-working, deserving, morally exemplary vs. underserving and unproductive groups and advocates the rechanneling of resources from the latter to the former.

Civilisationist ethnocentrism answers the question about the nature of the political community. It emphasises the benefits of organising the world around relatively small homogenous, ethno-cultural units, whose boundaries are defined by lineage and patriotic attitudes, not citizenship. These units are then expected to coalesce around civilisational values, more specifically in the defence of white Christian culture. This ideological construct combines the anti-globalist idea of national sovereignty with loyalty to the culturally similar nations that are ready to defend themselves against migration and cosmopolitanism. In Europe, following Brubaker (2017), the current version of civilisationism implies, among other things, identitarian Christianism, a pro-Israel position, and the portrayal of Islam as a threat to individual freedoms.

Paternalist populism primarily addresses the interaction between the people, the elites, and the state. Populism, in itself, is either not an ideology or an extremely simple one (Freeden, 1998). Due to its opposition to elite privileges, ossified structures, and sociopolitical hierarchies some scholars appreciate its emancipatory, progressive potential (Mouffe, 2018). Another group of academics, equate populism with anti-pluralism (Muller, 2014) or with democratic illiberalism (Pappas, 2016). A middle way is to conceptualises populism as the rejection of elite-led political structures in favour of majoritarian modes of governance and as the glorification of the will of the people (Mudde, 2004).

Paternalism, on the other hand, regards the state as the guardian and the educator of citizens and sees the various national authorities and spiritual leaders linked to the state as a legitimate elite. It is characterised by the endorsement of a redistributive government engaged in social transformation programmes with a long-time horizon. It emphasises the duties of the citizens and the subordination of local and partial social institutions (schools, churches, cultural bodies, etc.) to centrally endorsed guidelines.

Consequently, the combination of paternalism and populism stands for qualified people-centrism and qualified anti-elitism: not all elites are bad, and the people are not necessarily perfect. This construct is populist because its representatives speak on behalf of the people against the corrupt international elites, but the bottom-up logic of ideal-typical populism is overshadowed by the top-down organising role of the wise, native leadership. Paternalist populism considers elections as a crucial source of legitimisation, but one that needs to be complemented with elite-controlled representative channels (Enyedi, 2016).

All three ideological modules carry internal tensions, as they integrate different normative goals. Illiberal conservatism must reconcile the tension between the support for traditional social structures and the fact that some of these social structures express non-conservative values. Civilisationist ethnocentrism requires the balance between the interests of the smaller (ethnic, national) and the larger (cultural, civilisational) foci of identification. Paternalist populism must find the common ground between the popular will and the ‘aristocratic’ management of the imperfect demos. And there can also be tensions between the three modules. If, for example, the emphasis is on illiberal conservatism, then feminism must be a target of criticism. If, however, civilisationist ethnocentrism is in the forefront, then feminism, and in general equality between men and women, can emerge as the hallmark of the superiority of Western culture.

In the world of twenty-first century illiberal politics these three ideological constructs are typically subordinated to a generic culture-war frame, within which the most important organising principle is the position towards progressive, cosmopolitan and universalistic reforms (Enyedi, 2023). Goals such as the protection of children against ‘homosexual propaganda’ or the support of native, economically active, married heterosexual couples bring all the three modules together, just as the opposition to universal norms. Illiberal conservativism and paternalist populism overlap in their reliance on the state, though the actual goals of state intervention are defined by conservatism, and not by populism.

Most of the Hungarian policies discussed above can be easily linked to one of the three modules, in some instances to all three. In the closing part of the analysis, I highlight some of the specificities in the application of these constructs in Hungary.

Illiberal conservatism in Hungary

Unusually among political actors, in 2014 Orbán adopted the illiberal label. The audacious identification was well grounded. From the end of the 1990s, the principal target of Orbán's criticism was modern liberalism. This criticism was later extended to liberal democracy:

Liberal democracy is in favor of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, this is an illiberal concept. (Orbán, 2018b)

Elsewhere he elaborated further that

 … liberal democracy doesn't strengthen families: it maintains that there are many varieties of family, there are many varieties of lifestyle, and we mustn't make distinctions between them – in fact, if possible, they should be granted equal status in the eyes of the law. One of the consequences of this is that we are living through a period of demographic decline. I think that in terms of Christian culture we also have problems, because liberal democracy doesn't recognize the existence of an outstanding, leading culture of determinative power. (Orbán, 2018c)

One of the ideologues of the regime added that

[n]ot all illiberals are Christian-democrats, but all Christian-democrats are illiberals; illiberals so conceived protect their homeland, preserve national culture, oppose external interventions, as well as empire-building aspirations, aim at protecting Christian liberty, i.e. at preserving all that liberals abandon, forget, and disdain. (Fodor, 2021b, p. 242)

The Hungarian version of illiberal conservatism seems to be particularly concerned with strength.¹⁸ In Orbán's words:

I might say that the most dangerous combination known in history is to be both rich and weak. There is no combination more dangerous than this. It is only a matter of time before someone comes along, notices your weakness, and takes what you have.¹⁹

The argument runs that the universalist leftists and liberals have undermined the capacity of the communities to defend themselves, but luckily the next decades will belong to the right.²⁰ Körösényi et al. (2020, p. 131) argue that Orbán approaches conservative ideas through a realist lens, justifying them from the point of view of survival, stability, and sovereignty. In contrast to other versions of conservatism, this approach includes appreciating social units, like the family, primarily in terms of their contribution to the biological survival of the community.

After 2010 the generous benefits to married, employed, couples with children (including tax exemptions or grants to buy houses and cars), and the parallel withdrawal of state benefits from the unemployed or the disabled, together with the general discourse of ‘workfare-’ or ‘work-based-’ (as opposed to welfare-) society, created a sharp distinction between deserving and undeserving citizens, in line with the logic of illiberal conservatism. The welfare-decisions of the Orbán-government amounted to a reallocation of resources to groups considered hard-working and deserving (Szikra, 2020). The media-campaigns against sexual minorities and the imposition of centrally defined cultural codes on educational institutions and on state-dependent media further enhanced the illiberal nature of the regime's conservatism.

The active engagement with education and academia indicates the ambition of the government to solidify its cultural hegemony and to steer new generations towards an illiberal worldview. (The various excesses in this policy area, such as the occasional arbitrary selection of national research grant winners, or the delegation of party loyalists to the board of the universities led to the suspension of Hungary from the EU's research infrastructures in 2022.) The government is equally active in organising religious life. Symbolically, the lead bishop of the Calvinist church is the former key minister of the Orbán-government. In order to make possible his nomination to the clerical office, the rules of the selection of bishops had to be altered.²¹

Civilisationist ethnocentrism in Hungary

In line with the underlying principles of ethnocentrism, the regime considers ethnic homogeneity, and homogeneity in general, as major assets²² (Orbán, 2017). The ethnocentric discourse has a postcolonial character (‘we won't be a colony’ is a major slogan of the regime), directed primarily against Brussels, but also against Washington, DC. According to Orbán, ‘conflicts in Europe were not caused by nationalisms, but by empire-building aspirations which did not respect national identities’ (Orbán, 2018a).

Cooperation between culturally similar nations is welcome, and even some mixing is allowed. But those who represent different cultures must be kept out. In his 2022 speech, Orbán predicted that Hungarian border guards will soon need to stop non-Christian EU citizens wanting to come to Hungary, while they will need to provide shelter to those Christians who no longer find a place within the European Union. He is ready to offer ‘a home to European citizens who do not want migrants, who do not want multiculturalism, who have not descended into LGBTQ lunacy’ (Orbán, 2022a).

The civilisation to be protected is sometimes called the West, but with the understanding that much of the current challenge to it comes from countries like Germany, France or the United States. When Argentina won against France in the 2022 World Cup the vice-president of Fidesz celebrated on Facebook with the comment ‘A white, Christian nation that represents European values became the world champion’,²³ in a clear contrast with France whose players had African background.

National and civilisational legacies are threatened not only by different cultures but also by the conspiracies of foreign-hearted groups motivated by greed and by hatred against organic cultures: the deep state (Washington and Brussels) and its mercenaries who masquerade as civic activists (Orbán, 2016).

As mentioned above, the logic of culture wars is a particularly powerful structuring principle of twenty-first century alliances. This means that traditional ethnic and civilisational boundaries need to be sometimes compromised. All those opposed to cultural progressivism, whether Muslim rulers, right-wing Evangelicals, conservative Catholics, old-fashioned anti-communists, nominally Communist officials (China) or ex-KGB agents (Russia) have a common cause. Next to various pragmatic arguments, the colourful composition of Hungary's friends is justified with the reference of this common opposition against the increasingly aggressive woke mentality. This also means, that the defence of white/Christian legacy and Christian solidarity is crucial when this legacy can be given a traditionalist interpretation and within the scope of territories controlled by Christians – but not outside of these scope conditions.

Paternalist populism in Hungary

In the Hungarian case the politics of paternalist populism is embedded in long-standing cultural dispositions. Surveys show a general acceptance of state resources and state guidance, even within the entrepreneurial class and among intellectuals (Rádai & Tóth, 2010). Based on World Values Survey, Bíró and his colleagues concluded that the ‘demand for paternalism is at the foundation of Hungarian society's value structure’ (Bíró, 2016, p. 14).

Accordingly, the fundamentally right-wing economic policy of the regime (flat-tax, curtailed employees’ rights, significant presence of foreign capital, reduction of unem­ployment insurance from 9 to 3 months, etc.) is complemented by various forms of state intervention, including caps on a wide range of prices (especially utilities and food), windfall taxes, large scale public works programmes, and the occasional nationalisation of private property. The financial discrimination of citizens whose lifestyle is not considered to be in line with the social norms, discussed above under the heading of illiberal conservatism, fits into the logic of paternalist populism too.²⁴

The exact political manifestation of paternalism has changed during the 12 years of the Orbán regime. In the first period the tendency was to extend the legal scope of the government. The legitimacy of decision-making stems from elections and from top-down ‘national consultations’ – other channels of political participation have been marginalised.

The second period continued with the transfer of rights and resources from local governments to the central government, but many of these resources and even rights were then passed over to para-public institutions, that is, institutions that have considerable public financing but where private actors play a central role in governance. The typical para-public bodies are foundations established by the government but given freedom to govern themselves. Since the board and the management of these bodies are selected on a political basis, these institutions can be even more openly partisan than the classical state institutions. Additionally, in contrast with the formal state, not even the victory of the opposition could put an end to this practice. Through a vast network of such organisations a veritable parallel state has emerged. The creation of these new institutions can be explained with naked power-logic, but they typically have an ideological function too, and this function may easily outlast the designers.

While Orbán is commonly considered populist, and with good reason, it is very important to add the ‘paternalist’ modifier to the adjective. The difference can be well illustrated with Hungary's 2011 constitution. Instead of simply giving room to the undefined will of the people, the text of the constitution presents a homogenous set of nationalist, Christian-conservative, and authoritarian values, and contains, in fact, multiple checks and balances. None of these counter-majoritarian institutions and mechanisms (the Budget Council, the National Bank, qualified majority for a large number of issue-areas, etc.) are effective if all authorities obey one leader, and therefore Orbán himself is not constrained by them. But, ironically, the legacy of his rule can easily be a multitude of veto points and various filters on the people's desires, in line with the paternalistic aspect of his ideology.

Conclusion

Politics is always about power, and politics is always about ideas. One cannot deny, for example, that the goal of power-accumulation was central to the actions of Napoleon or Henry VIII, even if they justified these actions by references to values, institutions, loyalties, and social goals. But through the Code Civil or through the Anglican church they left a distinctly ideological mark on history. Orbán's legacy will not be comparable in terms of significance, but it is very important to acknowledge the cultural-ideological layers to which his actions contribute.

It has become almost mandatory among observers to deny the role of ideology in the Orbán regime. For example, an article by Benedek (2021) lists all the steps Fidesz made in the effort to advance the anti-gender agenda: the ‘child-protection’ law that conflates LGBTQ+ people with paedophiles, the banning of gender studies degrees, the legislative reform that made same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the banning of changes to gender in official documents, the exclusion of same-sex couples from adoption, and the rejection of the Istanbul convention against violence against women. But then the author's conclusion, as expressed in the title of the article, is: ‘Opportunism Not Ideology’. The role of ideology is denied under the assumption that the policies and campaigns listed above are vote-winning moves and that they allow Fidesz to divert attention away from various scandals.

In contrast, this article suggests that if a regime has stated ideological objectives and if it implements them, then ideology is central to its functioning. While not denying Machiavellian motivations or the importance of the autocratic client-patron dynamics, the article showed the correspondence between the regime's signature policies and discourse. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated an unusually extensive investment in knowledge production and ideological justification and a systematic implementation of policies that advance certain world-views and harm others. These achievements are highlighted by Fidesz in its continuous communication with supporters. While Orbán has never appeared to be ready to give up on office for some policy-related goals and has never hesitated to turn against ideological allies if they challenged his rule, he took serious risks in building a radically anti-liberal coalition and has never reversed course in this project.

The recent democratic setbacks around the world are typically explained by social crises or by the role of idiosyncratic leaders and power-coalitions. The ideological layers receive less attention because recently emerged neo-authoritarian ideas are not organised into a spectacular, comprehensive structure like, for example, Communism. But they nevertheless motivate citizens and politicians, weaken the resilience of democratic culture and undermine the liberal democratic world order. They deserve attention.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council: [Grant Number 101060899].

Notes on contributors

Zsolt Enyedi

Zsolt Enyedi is Professor at the Political Science Department of Central European University and Senior Researcher at CEU’s Democracy Institute. He was the 2003 recipient of the Rudolf Wildenmann Prize and the 2004 winner of the Bibó Award. He held research fellowships at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Kellogg Institute (Notre Dame University), the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies, the European University Institute and Johns Hopkins University. Between 2016 and 2020 he served as the Pro-Rector of his university. In 2020–2021 he was Leverhulme Visiting Professor at the University of Oxford. His latest book, written with Fernando Casal Bertoa, entitled Party System Closure came out at Oxford University Press in 2021.

Notes

1 https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-Orbán-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/

2 https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearings?ContentRecord_id=7D0464CF-2BF9-436C-9E74-B4BD07593522, see also Marantz (2022) and Tharoor (2022).

3 Magyar and Madlovics demand ‘logically coherent and consistently applied’ ideological tenets (ibid., p. 576).

4 Note that Orbán began to use the ‘national liberal’ phrase already in 1993, distinguishing Fidesz from the main liberal party.

5 István Hegedűs, who was the Fidesz MP responsible for foreign relations left the party in 1994 because he could not accept the new strategy. But when he was asked whether Fidesz quit the liberal party family out of opportunism, he rejected the claim, confirming that the ideological turn to the right was, regrettably, genuine and profound (Hegedűs & Földvári, 2001).

6 https://www.theamericanconservative.com/viktor-Orbán-we-are-in-a-war-with-russia/ Concerning the emergence of the ‘post-West’ see Orbán (2022b). The importance of the economic ties to the European Union is acknowledged, but the West is considered as lost both in terms of demography and values.

7 https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/mcc_libri_group_acquisition_books_retail_publishing/

8 https://europeanconservative.com/

9 https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Antwerp-Declaration.pdf

10 https://europe-cities.com/2022/06/23/identity-and-democracy-draws-card-of-national-sovereignty-in-antwerp-declaration/

11 https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/observing-the-international-day-of-families-family-policy-in-hungary/

12 Mothers of four or more children and those who give birth before 30 are exempt from any personal income tax.

13 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Government_expenditure_on_recreation,_culture_and_religion#Evolution_of_general_government_expenditure_on_.27recreation.2C_culture_and_religion.27

14 According to 2011 data, the popular support for extending voting rights was as low as 15%. See: https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110801-a-median-felmerese-a-hataron-tuliak-valasztojogarol.html

15 According to 2017 data the majority opposed the government's generous donations to diaspora communities. See: https://24.hu/kozelet/2017/08/20/nem-tamogatjak-a-magyarok-a-hataron-tuliak-szavazati-jogat/

16 See public opinion data from 2017: https://index.hu/tudomany/2017/04/13/a_fideszesek_a_legnagyobb_oroszbaratok_de_a_tobbseg_szerint_nyugaton_a_helyunk/

17 https://miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-viktor-Orbán-at-the-atreju-2019-event-held-by-the-brothers-of-italy-party-fdi

18 In the 15 March 2022 speech, for example (Orbán, 2022b) the words ‘strength’ and ‘strong’ appear 21 times.

19 See http://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/viktor_Orbán_s_speech_at_the_14th_kotcse_civil_picnic

20 ‘ … in Europe, a new era has begun, and this will be a right-wing era’, see https://g7.hu/kozelet/20180802/ot-vizio-amely-kisertetkent-uldozi-Orbánt-tobb-mint-egy-evtizede/

21 https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-former-minister-zoltan-balog-bishop-elected-head-reformed-church/

22 See Euractiv.com's article: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/Orbán-calls-ethnic-homogeneity-a-key-to-success/

23 https://telex.hu/english/2022/12/19/hungarian-mp-szilard-nemeth-white-christian-european-values-won-the-world-cup

24 Or, to use a different but converging vocabulary, it expressive an étatist form of traditionalism (Szikra, 2020).