EU Politicisation and National Parliaments: Visibility of Choices and Better Aligned Ministers?

Abstract

Recently there have been calls for a politicisation of European Union (EU) decision-making. This study discusses how politicisation can be achieved and how it affects the way national parliaments fulfil their citizen- and government-related functions in EU decision-making. First, it is argued that politicisation requires legislative Commission proposals that polarise between centre-left and centre-right actors. By changing the incentive structure of national parties, such proposals help to overcome parties' reluctance to discuss European issues publicly and hence provide citizens with electoral alternatives in EU decision-making. Second, it is argued that the higher salience of polarising proposals also increases national parliaments' attention for, and hence control over, the processes on the European level. The plausibility of the arguments is evaluated empirically through a comparative case study of the discussions in Germany and Austria on probably one of the most politicised examples of day-to-day EU decision-making in recent years – the Services directive.

Keywords:

• National parliaments
• European Union
• politicisation
• democratic deficit
• Germany
• Austria
• Services directive

Note on Author

Eric Miklin is Assistant Professor of Austrian Politics in Comparative European Perspective in the Department of Political Science at the University of Salzburg, Austria, email: [email protected]

Notes

1. Another path to politicisation could be proposals that polarise on the EU dimension itself. However, there are two problems with this scenario. First, this would leave politicisation to Eurosceptic parties, which in most parliaments still hold a much smaller share of the seats than all centre-left or centre-right parties combined. Hence, it might be difficult for them to enforce broad debates on parliaments' broad pro-EU majorities. Second, from a normative viewpoint such politicisation restricts voters' choice to opt for or against further integration, but does not allow them to choose between different models of integration.

2. For principal-agent problems in Council decision-making, see also Miklin (2009).

3. Interviews were conducted with the assurance of the anonymity of the interviewee. References therefore follow the system ‘Interview number: line in transcript’ (for example, Int99:356). The full transcripts are accessible through the author.

4. In April 2005 the majority of FPÖ delegates (including all government representatives) left their party and joined the newly founded BZÖ. However, within the Nationalrat the parties still acted as a uniform parliamentary party.

5. For Schröder's full speech, see: http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/allemand/ansprachen_und_dokumente/2005/pressekonferenz_mit_staatsprasidenten_chirac_und_bundeskanzler_schroder_in_blomberg.33201.html (last accessed 18 December 2009).

6. After early elections in September 2005, a new government composed of CDU/CSU and SPD assumed power. Because of an internal conflict on the CoOP, this new government never took a clear position on the draft but rather waited for the revised draft coming from the EP.