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ABSTRACT
We test three criteria for recording data about the formation of a new government and the allocation of its portfolios using the case of Israel. We then analyse Gamson’s Law and compare our results to the conclusions of four other datasets. With regard to theory, we suggest that studies (1) include cases in which MPs leave the government and take their seats with them, (2) include the number of seats of the support parties in the total number of the government and (3) count portfolios rather than ministers. From the empirical perspective, following these procedures produces different conclusions than previous studies regarding Israel. The formateur’s bonus is substantial and the direct election of the prime minister increased it. Furthermore, large parties hold more portfolios than small parties, and when we exclude support parties from the dataset this tendency increases.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Osnat Akirav is a senior lecturer in Political Science at the Western Galilee College, Israel, the head of the department of political science and the head of the research Galilee institute at the Western Galilee College. Her specialisation is in legislative studies, setting the agenda, candidate selection methods, local government, gender and politics, minorities and politics, research methods and Israeli political system. She served 10 years as a local council representative. She initiated the establishment of the Galilee Research Institute and she nominated as the head of the research institute in 2019. In 2010 and in 2015 she received a prize for outstanding teaching in political science from the American Political Science Association and in 2012 she received Edmond Safra award for outstanding achievement and excellence. In 2012 and 2016 she received a prize for best article from the Israeli Political Science Association. In 2015, 2018 and 2019 she received a prize for excellent researcher from the Western Galilee College. In 2019 she was elected as the vice president of the Israeli Political Science Association.
Notes
1 Bucur and Rasch’s primary source for the coding of Israeli governments was the Knesset. They cross-checked their information with these other sources, but when in doubt, or in case of disagreement among these sources, they opted for the Knesset data.
2 Some or many of the discrepancies between datasets have to do with the sources used. Woldendorp et al. (Citation2000) used Keesing’s information, so if Keesing missed something, they missed it as well.
3 Note that these are two different definitions. Woldendorp et al. (Citation2000, p. 10) refer to a sitting government, while Muller and Strom’s (Citation2000, p. 12) definition refers to a government change.
4 Bucur and Rasch did not code ministerial reshuffles as new governments regardless of how many ministers entered or left the cabinet or changed posts, unless these movements triggered a change in the composition of the cabinet’s parties.
5 The Transition Law of 1949 and The Basic Law: The Government of 1968, 1992 and 2001.
6 When investiture and no-confidence votes could be passed with the support of a simple majority of legislators.
7 When prime ministers were directly elected, the formal requirement for an investiture vote was removed, and the threshold for a successful no-confidence vote was raised to an absolute majority of legislators.
8 There was a reversion to the simple majority investiture vote, while maintaining the absolute majority threshold for no-confidence motions.
9 To deal with the first variable, we assigned the value of 0 to the years 1948-1996, 2003–2016 and 1 to the years 1996-2003. With regard to the second variable, we assigned the value of 1 to the years 1948–1996 in which a simple majority was needed in order to pass a vote of no confidence. We assigned the value of 2 to the years 1996–2003 in which an absolute majority was needed in order to dissolve the parliament immediately. Finally, we assigned the value of 3 to the years 2003–2016 in which an absolute majority was required and a semi-constructive vote was included, after which the parliament remained in office and there was no mandatory requirement for new elections.
10 For more information, see Appendix 2.
11 This is a significant difference that has the potential to alter our understanding of how cabinet payoffs are divided. However, one can ask, what difference does the focus on portfolios instead of ministers make in terms of the share of cabinet payoffs that the parties receive?
12 This is probably due to the coding of some cabinet reshuffles as a new government.
13 It is important to note that not all cabinet reshuffles involve changes in the party composition.