Telling physical education teacher education tales through pedagogical case studies

Abstract

This paper analyses two pedagogical case studies (PCS) from a multidisciplinary perspective to highlight the problems of theoretical knowledge in tertiary physical education teacher education (PETE) programmes, school-based physical education (PE) practice and continuous professional learning (CPL) in PE. We argue that a critical view of tertiary PETE and PE teacher educator CPL practice or practices is particularly important if PETE programmes want to develop future PE and current teacher practitioners who are transformative agents. In setting up the pedagogical case study accounts, we recall common conversations about the bodies of knowledge in tertiary PETE programmes that have been positioned as problematic. The accounts highlight the existence of an artificial divide between PE educators as theory generators and both pre-service PE teachers and school-based PE practitioners as theory appliers. We suggest that part of the reason why this divide exists can be attributed to a general misunderstanding of theoretical and practical knowledge that have been wrongly compartmentalised into ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, and hence erroneously taught as isolated entities without any connection or direct link with each other, or the former considered to be less relevant and perhaps even irrelevant in practice.

Keywords:

• Physical education teacher education (PETE)
• Teaching
• Pedagogy
• Physical education (PE)
• Knowledge
• Pedagogical case studies (PCS)
• Continuous professional learning (CPL)

Notes

1. We have limited our critique to two forms of knowledge specifically for this paper, but it is important to point out that it is not possible to give a full account of all forms of knowledge here. Knowledge can be classified in many different ways and sometimes depends on the author. For instance, White (1982) outlines three broad conceptual classes of knowledge: ‘knowing how A X's’, ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing by acquaintance’. An alternative example can be found in Maritain (1995) who distinguishes three divisions of knowledge: sense knowledge, philosophical knowledge and spiritual knowledge.

2. The term ‘intellectualist’ or ‘intellectualism’ is a notoriously allusive concept that transcends a mere devotion to intellectual pursuits. In this case, we use the term to highlight that to the intellectualist, reason is the ultimate criterion of knowledge and that intentional action is a consequence of conscious reasoning. See for example Ryle (1949).