The Greater Altai initiative: Cross-border cooperation on Russia's Southern periphery

Abstract

President Putin's strategy of centralizing power in the Russian Federation has particular implications for Russia's border regions which have been pursuing engagement with neighbouring states. Altai krai and Altai Republic – two Russian border regions in southwest Siberia – are participating in a regionalism initiative with the contiguous regions of China, Kazakhstan and Mongolia. This multi-lateral regional alliance between sub-national administrations aims at coordinating policy on economic development in the sub-region of the Altai Mountains. The prospects of the Greater Altai initiative hinge largely on political and economic support from the Russian federal authorities.

Keywords:

• Regionalism
• Russia
• federalism
• cross-border cooperation
• economic integration
• Russian foreign policy
• China
• Kazakhstan
• Mongolia

Notes

1. The most developed is Euroregio(n) Karelia which comprises the Russian Republic of Karelia, and contiguous regions of Finland.

2. That is, planning for facilities or infrastructure in the border zone and harmonizing plans for the socio-economic development of the sub-region.

3. Its name in Russian Nash Dom Altai evokes the memory of the 1990s political party Nash Dom Rossiya (Our Home Russia) although the Altai project is not connected to the party.

4. In Altai Republic, in 2002, 75% of the population lived in rural locations, 10.5% were unemployed and the average monthly salary was just over $100. In Altai krai, the indicators were slightly better by virtue of a greater urban population: 3.5% were unemployed and the average monthly salary was $150. The average monthly salary in the Russian Federation was $181 in 2003.

5. Kirkow and Hill/Gaddy emphasize the role of geography in the trade dynamics of Siberian regions. Distance from major cities and transport hubs is a constraint on their economic development.

6. These ethnic groups are part of the Turkic group and were even part of a single administrative-territorial unit in the 6th century – the Turkic Kaganat. See Paksoy, 1995.

7. Altaiinter.org, 16 August 2004. Total trade between Russia and China was $22bn in 2003.

8. Altay Daily Review, 19 May 2004.

9. According to a March 2003 report, Russian Economy – Trends and Perspectives, by the Institute for Economy in Transition, Moscow, citing Goskomstat. www.iet.ru.

10. ‘Regiony nauchat torgovat' s sosedyami’, Strana.ru 30 March 2005.

11. These zones focused less on production and more on facilitating trade by granting preferential tax terms and exemption from tax duties.

12. There were also political disagreements: the Altai krai governor opposed it but the legislative branch – the Altai krai regional soviet – attempted to ignore the executive branch and negotiate directly with Moscow to establish the FEZ. Finally, there was administrative confusion as to whether the representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in the krai was responsible for quotas and export licences or the krai administration's foreign economic department (Kirkow 1994: 1174).

13. Ethnic Germans accounted for approximately 60% of the district's population in 1993 and 4% of the krai's total population.

14. The SEZ in Magadan and Kaliningrad as well as the FEZ in Kalmykia and Altai (amongst others) came to resemble offshore zones but in a domestic setting. Russian companies invested there, got tax breaks but hid their profits (Kuznetsova 2000). None of them attracted significant foreign investment.

15. As part of its strategy to diversify energy exports (previously only to Russia) Kazakhstan has signed energy deals with China, and a new pipeline is planned to export Kazakh oil eastwards to new markets. However, in pursuit of these economic goals, Kazakhstan is seen to have made concessions to China: it has acquiesced to pressure to return Uighur refugees to China (in tacit acceptance of Chinese repression of the Uighurs) and has granted long-term leases to Han Chinese in northeast Kazakhstan for agricultural development (with the food produced to be exported to China).

16. The Chinese strategy is to make Xinjiang a transportation and communications link (roads, railways, pipelines and fibre-optic cables) between China, via Kazakhstan and Russia, to Western Europe.

17. Montsame, Mongolian News Agency, 9 July 2004.

18. Instead, the Avantis cross-border project on the German-Dutch border established a common set of rules for the setting-up and running of companies in their business park; it is within the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion in which border regions from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands participate.

19. The organization evolved from the customs union, established in October 2000, between the Commonwealth of Independent States in an effort to hold together the trade ties of the Soviet economic space and was renamed the Eurasian Economic Community in May 2001. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (plus Belarus) are the members.

20. In the 1990s, Mongolia had rebuffed Russia in favour of economic partnerships with states in East Asia.

21. China and Russia signed two border agreements in 1991 and 1994 delimiting the eastern and western sections of their common border but two sections remained under discussion until 2004.

22. Kazakh president Narsultan Nazerbayev said the Kazakh-Russian accord would spur on trade and facilitate business and community contacts (Interfax 12 January 2005). A statement released on the final Chinese–Russian border accord foresaw ‘new favourable conditions for joint actions in environmental protection, utilization of natural resources, shipping, economic cooperation, and security and stability in the border areas’.

23. Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, ‘Current Issues in the International Activity of the Russian Federation’, Moscow, 22 January 2003. Available online at www.in.mid.ru.

24. Ibid.

25. Drachevsky's work in Siberia was a relatively successful achievement compared with some of the other federal districts – only the plenipotentiaries of the Southern and Central federal districts resolved more discrepancies, but still under 80%; Kommersant Vlast, 6 February 2001.

26. Gazeta.ru 15 February 2001 quoting the regional legislature's press secretary.

27. Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, two predominantly Muslim regions, claimed the right to conduct international affairs and announced, in contravention of Russian foreign policy, their de jure recognition of the Turkish state of North Cyprus, amongst other policies.

28. Another on local self-government was passed in September 2003.

29. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Convention between Territorial Communities or Authorities (Madrid Convention), drawn up under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1980.

30. There are links to all of these relevant legislative acts on the site: www.altaiinter.org/legislation.

31. One of the problematical aspects of the Council of Our Common Home Altai is the status of the Chinese representatives. The Kazakh, Mongolian and Russian regions have nominated as their authorized representatives the chairs from their regional legislative bodies, whereas the Chinese authorized representative is the head of the Science and Technology Committee for Xinjiang. The choice of representative does not necessarily indicate that cooperation with the neighbouring states is a low priority for China but rather reflects the governance of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The Uighurs are Muslims with ethnic and linguistic ties to other Altain peoples. They have been sidelined from Xinjiang's economy and political system as a result of Beijing's increasingly tight control over the region and by means of in-migration of Han Chinese. It is the largest province in China, rich in oil and gas, home to the national nuclear testing site, as well as being a buffer to India.

32. The Kazakh central government authorities are wary of deeper integration. Astana is concerned that the north-east regions of Kazakhstan which have been historically populated by ethnic Russians might one day seek to secede from Kazakhstan and be annexed to the Russian Federation. The Kazakh government is encouraging ethnic Kazakhs to live in these provinces to redress the demographic balance. Kazakhs, rather than Russians, dominate all the positions of power in the regional and local administrations as well as police, border and customs authorities.

33. Mongolia's support for the Altai project is to a large measure explained by Ulan Bator's desire for new transport links to other markets and access to raw materials. If its record as the most consistent ‘Yes-man’ of proposals within the Tumen project is anything to go by, Mongolia will continue to promote the Greater Altai project as part of its aspiration to be a land-bridge between inland and maritime states.

34. The pro-president party, United Russia is extending its influence in the regional legislatures to ensure this scenario; Pravda.ru 29 September 2004.

35. Yevdokimov obideli re na shutka, gazeta.ru 31 March 2005.

36. Pravda 29 September 2004.

37. President Putin interviewed by Russian TV journalists, 18 November 2004, transcript in full on www.kremlin.ru.

38. The Social Patrol analytical group in Altai krai, 25 February 2005 on http://news.barnaul-altai.ru/mnenie).

39. http://:news.barnaul-altai.ru/mnenie, 25 February 2005.