The Participation of Subnational Governments in the Council of the EU: Some Evidence from Spain

Abstract

By 2004 Spanish subnational governments are allowed to participate in some formal meetings of the Council of the European Union as well as in its working groups. For proponents of the multi-level governance approach, a regional presence in the Council provides evidence in support of enhanced subnational participation in EU policy making. For intergovernmentalists, on the contrary, the Spanish case demonstrates that central government still maintains a crucial gatekeeper position since it formally regulates the main aspects of subnational participation. By presenting the results of a case study on the formal participation of the Spanish regions in the Council, the paper agrees that, even in a context of Europeanization, the central state still ultimately retains some veto powers. Nevertheless, the article takes issue with the argument that subnational participation is mainly formal and lacks substantive value. The article provides evidence, on the contrary, that the definition of the joint common position reinforces intrastate relations in EU policy making with a positive net effect for subnational governments.

Keywords:

• Multi-level governance
• Europeanization
• European Union
• regionalism
• subnational governments
• Spanish autonomous communities

Acknowledgements

The author is particularly grateful to the anonymous referees of the journal for their helpful comments and suggestions to improve the original version. Special thanks go to Serafino Abate and John Etherington for their last comments. The research was financed under the EUREGES Project (CSO2008-05628) (2008-2011): ‘The participation of the Autonomous Communities in the European Union’, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.

Notes

The Conference on Affairs Related with the European Communities (CARCE) has been re-labelled recently into Conference on Affairs Related with the European Union (CARUE) as a consequence of the modifications of the foundational treaties of the EU. In the paper I will maintain the original definition: CARCE.

Although with some differences, in the interviews I usually considered high-level ministerial and regional functionaries as well as more technical staff who specifically participated in the Council's more informal working groups. Observers and experts of the Spanish case, especially from constitutional and legal backgrounds, were also included.

The innovative contribution of scholars of MLG was meant “to draw attention precisely to the fact that the relevant levels of the EU game were not only the national and the supranational (as in the famous two level theorization by Putnam (1988) so eagerly utilized by liberal-intergovermentalism proponents), but there were other levels which mattered as well” (Piattoni, 2009: 166).

For a review of Europeanization, see Featherstone and Radaelli (2003).

The 1978 Constitution provided a process of extensive decentralization of powers. One of the most relevant results was the quasi-constitutional nature of regional statutes in order to preserve regional autonomy from the central state's interference.

All in all, the result was a mixed map of the 17 autonomous communities (ACs) or autonomies sharing: regions with a clear cultural identity (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country), historical regions (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, the Canary Islands, Valencia, Navarra, Extremadura, and the Balearic Islands), improvised macro-regions (Castile-Leon, Castile La Mancha) and regionalized provinces (Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia) (Morata and Popartan, 2008).

For an analysis of the typologies of asymmetries which affect the Spanish state in a comparative perspective, see Requejo and Nagel (2009).

According to the classification, foreign affairs, defence, co-ordination of economic activity and defence of competition are some examples of exclusive competencies that belong to the central state. On the contrary, agriculture, transport, urban planning, social services and tourism all belong to the exclusive power of regions. Commercial law and labour legislation are examples of executive competencies.

It is worthy to underline that the Spanish Senate (Senado)—being one of the anomalies of Spanish federalism—cannot be considered fully as a chamber of regional representation as in the case of the German Bundestag. The Senado, on the contrary, is usually conceived as weak channel of representation of regional interests that are usually debated in the lower chamber (Congreso) of the Spanish parliament (Cortes Generales).

On the contrary, what is expressly prohibited is the right of federation among the ACs.

Data on sectorial conferences are from the Spanish Ministry of Public Administration which regularly published annual reports.

A new horizontal agreement has been introduced very recently. Starting from 2010, the Conference of the Governments of the Autonomous Communities (Conferencia de los Gobiernos de las Comunidades Autónomas) was established by transforming the previous Meetings between the Autonomous Communities for the development of the Statutes of Autonomy (Encuentros entre Comunidades Autónomas para el desarrollo de los Estatutos de Autonomía) that had been held since year 2008. This forum, now a regional conference of governments, was established with the initial aim of promoting increased co-ordination among the six ACs that had reformed their Statutes. After eight meetings, in 2010 the ACs have finally decided to widen the participation to all ACs. After more than 30 years of the State of the Autonomies, the new Conference represents a forum of an unprecedented horizontal collaboration between the ACs.

I thank Xavier Ballart for the reference to Kincaid.

Chaired by the Secretary of State for the EU, the CIAUE was created by virtue of Royal Decree 2367/96, of November 18, and succeeded the Comisión Interministerial para Asuntos Económicos relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas (Interministerial Commission on Economic Affairs related with the European Communities), created in 1985. In the case of discrepancies with the Administration that could not be resolved in the CIAUE, the issue is dealt with by the Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Asuntos Económicos (Government Commission for Economic Affairs) and, if necessary, the Council of Ministers (Consejo de Estado, 2008).

The CARCE also has two supporting bodies; on the one hand, the Comisión de Coordinadores (Commission of Coordinators), formed by members of all administrations that are General Directors or equivalent; on the other hand, the Grupos de Trabajo (Working Groups), which are constituted within the Commission to prepare specific questions and that are made up of specialist experts. The REPER's Autonomic Councillors are members of the Commission of Coordinators, and also have the right to attend the Plenary Conference.

I do not consider here ACs' participation in the Comité de Representantes Permanentes (Committee of Permanent Representatives—COREPER). I only remark that, although the CARCE Agreements state that the ACs should be present in the COREPER, ACs do not attend the COREPER either directly or through the REPER representatives.

It is also worth mentioning here the reinforced role of parliaments in the monitoring of the subsidiarity principle as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, the ‘early-warning mechanism’ assignes to the national legislatures the right to monitor whether initiatives for EU laws comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Under this mechanism a national parliament can, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, send the EU institutions (primarily the Commission) a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the legislative initiative does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. When doing this the national parliament should, where appropriate, consult regional parliaments with legislative powers.

In 2010, certain working groups of the Competitiveness configuration—such as Consumer Affairs and Gambling—were opened up to subnational participation.

The conditions are the following: the argument has to affect ACs' competences; a joint common position must be reached; the head of the Spanish delegation must consider the intervention to be opportune (which is not always the case).

The posición comun (joint or common position) is usually a written text, elaborated by the ACs, which condenses the regional position to be translated to central state government in those issues which will be negotatied in the Council and which may have a relevance for regional governments.

From our interviews with regional representatives in Brussels.

There is some empirical evidence that procedures for the definition of the joint common position vary according to the issue debated in the Council. While, for example, in agriculture and environment ACs have developed some more formal collective mechanisms for the joint common position, in education and culture, on the contrary, the process is played on a much more informal ground.

Capacity is here intended as “the ability to perform and sustain appropriate tasks effectively and efficiently” (Hildebrand and Grindle, 1994: 15). According to North (1992), administrative capacity relates to personal capacity, as any administration is staffed with civil servants and, therefore, it is their capacity that ultimately determines service delivery.

The specific nature of the Spanish party system(s) (“electoral Spain(s)”, Valles, 1991), is responsible for the lack of a dense set of horizontal relations between ACs. Political bargaining in the national arena, in many cases, inhibits the aggregate defence of regional interests versus the central state. Usually, ACs ruled by the same political party as the central government prefer partisan to regional alignment.

Interview with the regional representative who participated in the Education working group (Council Configuration: Education, Youth and Culture).