Constructing and Contesting a Gujarati-Hindu Ethno-religious Identity Through Development Programmes in an Indian Province

Abstract

Through a case study of Hindu nationalism in India, this paper explores how development programmes serve as the site of construction of, as well as contestation over, religious identity. The participation of low-caste Dalits and tribal Adivasis in the mass violence perpetrated against Muslims in the Indian province of Gujarat in 2002 conveyed the impression that Hindu nationalists had achieved one of their key objectives of creating “Hindu unity”. Cutting across social and status divisions in the local Hindu population, the Hindu nationalist party's constituency today includes its traditional upper-caste supporters, as well as lower castes. While “the other” in the Hindu nationalist conception of community included Dalits and Adivasis as well as Muslims and Christians until the mid-1980s, the recent “Hindu unity” agenda has seen the boundaries of “the other” closing in around Muslims and Christians only. Despite these developments, this paper argues, continuing attempts at the construction of a unified ethno-religious identity are circumscribed and complicated by processes of contestation. Through village-level research, it shows how government actors are involved in simultaneous processes of construction as well as contestation over a Gujarati-Hindu identity through development programmes.

Notes

¹ Dalit, literally meaning “downtrodden”, refers to India's former “untouchables”. Many Dalit communities have been given the status of Scheduled Castes (SCs). The British Government first prepared a “schedule” of socially deprived “untouchable” castes in 1935, to increase SC representation in legislatures, government employment and university placement. The term continues in use in the post-independence Indian Constitution and various laws.

² Adivasi, literally meaning “original inhabitant”, refers to India's indigenous communities. Many Adivasi communities are part of a list of indigenous tribal populations (Scheduled Tribes or STs) who are entitled to much the same compensatory treatment as SCs.

³ “Other Backward Castes” are those whose ritual rank and occupational status are above “untouchables” but who remain socially and economically depressed.

⁴ Administrative region, comprising several blocks of villages.

⁵ The integration of regional pride with Hindutva is also seen in other Indian states. For instance, Mumbai (ex-Bombay), the capital of Maharashtra province, saw violent protests in November–December 2003. These were led by the regional ally of the BJP—the Hindu supremacist Shiv Sena—against immigrants from Bihar “usurping” the jobs of Maharashtrians.

⁶ While campaigning for elections to the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly in 2006, for instance, the main opposition party promised supporters rice at Rupees2 per kilogram (approximately 0.02 GBP) if voted into office. Two weeks after this announcement, the incumbent Chief Minister promised all ration card-holders 10 kg of rice free of charge (Viswanathan, 2006).

⁷ The formal political arm of the Hindu Right, the BJP, lost the May 2004 national election. This has, to some extent, derailed the Hindutva agenda of making India a Hindu rashtra using the Indian government apparatus. However, the BJP is in power in Gujarat until 2007, and the socio-political and cultural arms of Hindutva continue to work towards their goals all over the country.

⁸ Term used by Corbridge & Harriss (2000).

⁹ At the turn of the 20^th Century, upper-caste Brahmins, Banias and Patidars numbered 5.75, 6.06 and 15.62%, respectively, of Gujarat's population (Bombay Gazetteers, 1899, in Sanghavi, 1996, p. 64). Since no caste-based censuses have been carried out in independent India, only approximate caste figures based on earlier censuses are available to us today.

¹⁰ For more on India's poverty alleviation policy, and different analytical perspectives for studying it, see Kohli (1987), Gaiha (1991), Vaidyanathan (1995), Hirway (2002) and Kozel et al. (2003).

¹¹ For Gujarat, the per capita monthly expenditure limit for being considered BPL for the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997–2002) was Rupees254, where GBP1 approximates Indian Rupees80 (Jha, 1997).

¹² In Gandhinagar district, traditionally, Rawals have been camel keepers and herders. Today, among the better-off Rawals, camels have been replaced by auto rickshaws, which are used for transporting goods and people between villages, and in the towns of the district.

¹³ The Parmars are involved in varied occupations in Gandhinagar. They may be landless labourers, petty traders and even government employees. Several members of this sub-caste are part of the emergent lower-caste Dalit middle class in Gujarat, having benefited from reservations in public jobs and education. In fact, one of Gandhinagar's seven VLWs is a Parmar, and 10 out of 182 members of the present Gujarat legislative assembly are Parmars.

¹⁴ Gait.

¹⁵ Scholars have looked at other contested experiences such as gender in the Hindutva project. See, for instance, Chhachhi (1989) and Sarkar (1993).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nikita Sud

Edward Simpson, Nandini Gooptu and Rochana Bajpai made several insightful comments on a draft of this paper, for which I am grateful. Thanks are also due to Achyut Yagnik for numerous conversations on Gujarat and its politics.