Ties that Bind? Engaging Emotions, Governmentality and Neoliberalism: Introduction to the Special Issue

Abstract

This introduction to the special issue on “Emotions, Governmentality and Neoliberalism” situates the theme inside the recent International Relations literature devoted to emotions and affect. This literature misses an engagement with governmentality, notably because Michel Foucault's prime concern with practical rationalities, such as “the conduct of conduct” in the case of governmentality, led to an assumption that these were devoid of emotional dimensions. Paying attention to governmentality allows us to examine how emotions and rationality actually intermingle, notably by putting the body at the centre of analysis in ways that do not make it the locus of a pre-social “affect.” All six contributions to the special issue are then individually discussed around the three key dimensions they all seek to address and emphasise: (1) the ways in which emotions partake in relations of power, sometimes to the point where individuals can become emotionally attached to regimes of power that hurt them; (2) the ways in which neoliberal processes are concomitant with the enclosure and valorisation of certain subjective/emotional dispositions; and, finally (3) the ways in which emotions can challenge or exceed existing relations of power.

Despite the fact that we are far from being able to identify an emotional or affective turn in International Relations (IR), there has been a renewed interest in the subject in recent years, to the point that “articles on the topic are increasingly less likely to begin by noting that the study of emotions is a recent occurrence in IR and there is more work to be done.”¹ Indeed, most conventional works that consider emotions as a key variable in explaining state behaviour² or even geopolitics³ now coexist alongside more critical scholarship—ranging from constructivist⁴ to feminist,⁵ poststructuralist⁶ and postcolonial works⁷—that examine how emotions come about and imbue political life. Parallel to this renewed engagement with emotions, scholars began to address the issue of affect and its relevance in world politics.⁸ Affect is here seen as preceding cognition, as being experienced as a physical intensity. This double engagement certainly reflects the difference that many scholars make between the two terms, following the famous distinction proposed by cultural scholar Brian Massumi:

An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression that it has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or recognizable, and is thus resistant to critique.⁹

This flourishing scholarship is certainly not limited to IR. In fact, several scholars have pointed to an emotional or an affective turn in disciplines as varied as sociology, geography and anthropology, if not the whole of social sciences. While several factors can explain this renewed engagement, Ruth Leys draws our attention to the fact that it appears to be closely tied to broader epistemological anxieties, along with a sense that our world has been increasingly falling into the grip of (global) governmentality.¹⁰ Governmentality, as Michel Foucault explained, refers to the conduct of conduct, to “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculation, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.”¹¹

This understanding of the rationalisation of life, argues Leys, leads contemporary scholars to carefully characterise emotions and affect as non-rationality, thus in effect reproducing the very dichotomy between emotion and rationality they sought to question in the first place. From Nigel Thrift to William Connelly and Brian Massumi, she claims that what

motivates these scholars is the desire to contest a certain account of how, in their view, political argument and rationality have been thought to operate. These theorists are gripped by the notion that most philosophers and critics in the past (Kantians, neo-Kantians, Habermasians) have overvalued the role of reason and rationality in politics, ethics, and aesthetics, with the result that they have given too flat or “unlayered” or disembodied an account of the ways in which people actually form their political opinions and judgments.¹²

But Foucault's prime concern with practical rationalities, such as “the conduct of conduct” in the case of governmentality, does not mean that they are devoid of emotional dimensions. Advanced capitalism, for instance, is characterised by a level of symbolic production that not only results in a dematerialisation of labour, but also increasingly relies on highly emotional components, ranging from consumption desire to workforce management. Feelings as varied as love, anxiety, anger and desire are integral to neoliberal processes, though not in unproblematic and monolithic ways.¹³ Whereas some accounts decry capitalism's hold on the emotional realm, as the commodified search for soul mates through the use of online dating sites or Starbucks' promotion of fair trade coffee appear to suggest, others counter that emotions in fact might represent the privileged site of resistance to market rationality. Again, such binary perspectives, as human geographer Nancy Ettlinger critically points out, often reflect an ontological discursive commitment to consider emotions as either integral to capitalism or as belonging to a sphere of resistance distinct from it.¹⁴

Governmentality and Emotions

Paying attention to governmentality allows us to examine how emotions and rationality actually intermingle, notably by putting the body at the centre of analysis in ways that do not make it the locus of a pre-social “affect.” In fact, we need to be wary of drawing too sharp a distinction between emotions and affect. Keeping this distinction implicitly reproduces an assumption that “a model of human subjectivity exists, one that pits the self against social norms and ‘true feeling’ against convention, thus reproducing the divide between experience and expression (ruled by norms or ‘discourse’).”¹⁵ In other words, to paraphrase Scheer, insisting on the distinction between affect and emotions leads to an unintended understanding that expressions of emotions is the proper domain of social scientific studies, leaving “the body” as a proper stable and ahistorical site of affect that needs to be understood through the “natural sciences,” such as neurosciences.

Whereas Foucault himself did not engage much with emotions, his thorough engagement with the body entails that they do have a bearing on the ways in which we should conceive of governmentality and its workings. Emotions can certainly be seen as yet another instrumental way through which practical rationalities can be enacted or as an effect of specific power/knowledge relations subjected to historical and social variations. Understood in this way, emotions are usually only noted in passing in works relying on governmentality as a key framework as either technologies of government “imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects,”¹⁶ or as socially conditioned desired states (of happiness, wisdom, etc.) individually attainable through technologies of the self.¹⁷ While relevant, these readings tend to overemphasise the rationality of emotional expression, deployment and management. Even more, they often neglect the important role of emotional excess in management practices, as well as the discrepancy between actual emotional practices and discourses of emotional management.¹⁸

As Monique Scheer insists, we need to forego a linear understanding of emotions whereby they are seen as triggered responses to an event or a situation: “The claim that emotions ‘happen to’ the subject splits mind from body, locating the subject in the mind. On this reading, the emotions are viewed as outside the subject and thus acquire a sort of autonomy.”¹⁹ Emotions are not free-floating forces, but they are also not something “we” possess:

Emotions are not a property—that is, something that I or we have. Rather, the surface of bodies “surfaces” as an effect of the impressions left by others. Emotions produce the very surfaces and boundaries by which specific kinds of objects can be delineated. In this respect the objects of emotions “circulate”. As they move through the circulations of objects such objects become “sticky” or saturated with effect, as sites of personal and social tension or contestation, as emotions are “made”. Emotions are thus a form of world-making, which allow us to address the question of how subjects come to embody both meaning and belonging.²⁰

Not only are emotions central to subjectification and meaning-making, but they also cannot be dissociated from the materiality of bodies, whose very signification or “readability” hangs on emotional meaning. Because bodies are always situated, sexualised and racialised, they do not feel the same way—to ourselves, but also to others. For instance, specific emotions give a certain materiality to some bodies and not others, as Judith Butler's reflections on which bodies are grievable or not in war made clear.²¹ Therefore, emotions cannot be uncoupled from relations of power that characterise and permeate the social field.

As John Protevi and others have argued, the body is central to Foucault's work, be it as an object of knowledge, a target of power or a matter of concern in technologies of the self.²² It is precisely because emotions are central to the intelligibility of bodies, and vice versa, that they should be seen as central to the very phenomenon of the art of governing Foucault was concerned with. Therefore, when engaging with key notions such as governmentality, we need to keep in mind that emotions like happiness or self-esteem are not simply a by-product or consequence of subjectification processes. The latter “also operate at the level of affect, through the material production of specific modes of experience.”²³

Neoliberalism as a Regime of Emotional Governance

Despite not sharing a commitment to a singular theorisation of emotions here, all contributors nonetheless take seriously Sara Ahmed's insight that emotions should be understood as economic in themselves, as they circulate between individual and collective subjects to create, secure and challenge specific bodies and social hierarchies.²⁴

As a result, whereas contributors like William Walters or Anne-Marie D'Aoust engage in discussions about the signification of specific emotions such as courage or love, others like Nicholas Kiersey or Nadine Voelkner prefer to speak of affective economies or even of emotional states, as does Luis Lobo-Guerrero.

Still, each contribution acknowledges the different dimensions and tensions inherent to discussions about such complex and loaded notions as “governmentality,” “emotions” and “neoliberalism.” Three dimensions especially stand out for all contributors. Each seeks to address and emphasise: (1) the ways in which emotions partake in relations of power, sometimes to the point where individuals can become emotionally attached to regimes of power that disadvantage or even hurt them; (2) the ways in which neoliberal processes are concomitant with the enclosure and valorisation of certain subjective/emotional dispositions; and, finally, (3) the ways in which emotions can challenge or exceed existing relations of power.

Whereas the contributors to this special issue all examine connections between emotions, governmentality and neoliberalism, they do not understand the implications of this specific node in the same way, nor do they take their analyses in the same direction. Such variation in their theoretical inclinations and lines of inquiry is not fortuitous. For one thing, they reflect the richness of current governmentality studies, characterised by a refusal to see governmentality as being a fully formed theoretical edifice that only calls for testing or deployment in different settings. In that sense, all the authors here use Foucault's insights on governmentality as a springboard to inquiry, rather than a carefully established map to be followed.

However, and perhaps more importantly, these different trajectories reflect different contemporary ways of taking up Foucault's ambitious challenge to simultaneously take down, through his reflections on governmentality, “two ‘cold monsters’ at the same time: the economy and the state.”²⁵ Ute Tellmann points out that Foucault's own project ends up being more successful at undoing “the cold monster of the state” than providing a careful analytics “of the malleable forms of temporality, spatiality and valuation inherent in the economic.”²⁶ She insists that, when engaging with governmentality, we should pay as much attention to making “visible the market's own ‘machine of seeing’”²⁷ as to questioning how the political ends up being conceived of as a form of economic ordering.

Nicholas Kiersey, Wanda Vrasti and Jean Michel Montsion (this issue) take this injunction seriously, and point to the fact that the market's own “machine of seeing” is inextricably linked to a machine of feeling as well. All three locate their intervention in an attempt to reconcile Foucault's notions of governmentality with Marxist criticisms of neoliberalism.²⁸ Here, their engagement with neoliberalism is not limited to a way of doing things in a maximised economy; it also encompasses an economic-political understanding of the term that reflects a specific development in the capitalist system. Neoliberalism monetises forms of sociality, communication, language and affect which were there all along; it uses these to reproduce its logic and produce value. From there, they ask to what extent these modes of subjectivity challenge or strengthen neoliberal economic practices. How do affective economies participate in the consolidation of various apparatuses of security? What are the sociological and political processes sustaining this new form of political economy? If neoliberalism directly taps into emotional realms such as care and compassion, what forms can resistance or emancipatory practices take, and how can they be envisioned?

Neoliberalism, argues Graham Burchell, concerns people “at the very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active freedom.”²⁹ Contesting and resisting regimes of power thus becomes even more difficult when we link them to our own sense of freedom and well-being, both emotional and physical. Through the examination of two different instances of transnational voluntarism, Vrasti and Montsion convincingly show us that emotional and capital flows are in fact aligned, and that voluntarism, far from being a selfless virtue, is congruent with neoliberalism's double injunction of market rationality and social responsibility. The idea that emotions are central to the reproduction of labour inside capitalism is not new in itself. Some authors have pointed out that Marx acknowledges emotions, notably in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and that “[e]motionality, including alienation, estrangement, and disenchantment with the world, translates into the economic practices that reduce individuals to being defined in monetary, labour-value terms.”³⁰ But Vrasti and Montsion make the case that it is the intensity and visibility (this issue) of this reproductive process that has changed, and that needs to be addressed. Drawing from the experiences of Chinese international students volunteering in Canada, and Western students volunteering in Ghana, Vrasti and Montsion's ethnographic accounts show that voluntarism is more than personal emotional fulfilment. It is first and foremost a way to acquire much-needed emotional competencies to succeed inside global capitalism. “Being a volunteer,” they insist, “is not just about feeling responsible (read: “giving back”) to the community so much as about becoming a subject responsible for its own skills and assets” (this issue). In an ironic twist, voluntarism might thus not help to change the world as we know it, and challenge different relations of power, as much as help sustain social relations in ways that are congruent with the ethos of neoliberal capital.

If Vrasti and Montsion explore how a specific emotional economy might help to sustain neoliberal regimes of power and make them work on a daily basis, Kiersey, for his part, demonstrates how this emotional economy is central when such regimes come into crisis. Turning his attention to popular culture and reinvestment strategies in Ireland following the 2008 economic crisis, Kiersey details how strategies of keeping the Irish economy afloat are explicitly built on a self-conscious turn towards affective labour and affective subjectivation, the cornerstone of which remains “the ability to make people like you as much as, if not more than, the product you are trying to sell” (this issue). Popular Irish TV shows such as Retail Therapy and Dragon's Den are exemplary of this shift. Building on the work of autonomist Marxists and scholars of governmentality, Kiersey's piece highlights how changes in capitalism are concomitant with technologies of the self, as successful entrepreneurs depicted and praised in Dragon's Den and Retail Therapy display appropriate affective dispositions towards clients, the goods they produce, but also the national economic market. Building on Foucault's concept of governmentality and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's discussions of affective labour, Kiersey invites us to reconsider how power relations play out in an economy characterised by the hegemony of immaterial and emotional labour: “By virtue of the way capitalism extracts surplus today, through the production of knowledge, desires and affects, the question of power is not simply a question of the production of this or that type of subjectivity, but rather a question of the real and intense ways in which the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy have become immanent through the hegemony of immaterial labour” (this issue).

Vrasti and Montsion and Kiersey's contributions highlight the development of a specific affective economy integral to social relations required by neoliberalism, envisioned as both an ideological and an economic framework. Through their respective case studies, they illustrate how this affective economy becomes a central feature of neoliberalism understood as governmentality: an art of governing.³¹ Here, neoliberalism is first and foremost understood as practices, as a mode of rationalisation that produces regimes of truth. To understand how emotions become entangled in neoliberal projects and rationalities, we must turn to specific policy projects and examine how they mobilise emotions to achieve certain ends.

Nadine Voelkner's study of anti-trafficking policies in the Hau Giang province in Vietnam presents a case of the governmentalisation of shame, as women and children identified in villages at risk of trafficking become targeted as a population requiring intervention on the part of the government, the community and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These women become equated with victims of trafficking, as both are said to result in unruly migration flows stemming from years of neoliberal economic policies and discourses of proper femininity and risk. This governmentalisation of shame also enables the government to reinvigorate a discourse on socialism and good citizenship. This renewed nationalism is specifically tied to the female body, argues Voelkner, and develops in reaction to neoliberal policies: “Vietnamese gender presents a subject through which the government and society are constituting traditions of the national Self in the face of capitalist integration” (this issue). Discourses of respectability and shame fuelled by NGOs such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) create new forms of governance where the state's ideal of femininity becomes channelled at the commune level, where NGOs train women to be good, risk-conscious, self-governing moral subjects. The state's activities become more concerned with “a probalistic ethos of riskiness” characteristic of liberal governmentality.³²

Accounting for Contestations, Resistance and Excess

Such accounts of emotional attachment to regimes of power, along with the increasingly complex techniques of government deployed in the name of security, appear to open the window to a bleak horizon with limited possibilities of resistance and contestation. Granting that Foucault's work has first and foremost been espoused by scholars keen to examine the intricacies of power and securitisation processes, William Walters nevertheless insists that it has more to offer to the study of contentious politics than is currently acknowledged. Openness to resistance and contestation is thus central to Walters', Lobo-Guerrero's and D'Aoust's engagement with neoliberalism and governmentality. Foucault's concept of parrhēsia, Walters suggests, might help us to recast the centrality of emotions like courage in contestation practices of securitisation processes taking place inside neoliberal governance. Through a detailed analysis of the photojournalism of Noor Behram, who documented drones strikes in Pakistan, Walters examines how understanding the workings of “parrhesiastic exposure” can help us obtain a better analysis of contestation and subversion of power. Emotionality, far from being ancillary to such exposure from courageous lone individuals entangled in complex networks, is central to them, both in its unfolding and success: “Because they speak frankly and courageously, their words might strike a chord with the sovereign or with the demos. As a consequence, there is always the hope in parrhēsia that this frank speech will have a positive impact on the affairs of the community, and their act will be met with a certain respect rather than punishment” (this issue; emphasis added).

Foucault speaks of parrhēsia as “an attitude, a manner of being,” and talks of “parrhesiastic games.” While he casts parrhesiastic acts as games, such a presentation is clearly meant to emphasise the importance of the relations between actors involved in them, rather than their playfulness and their emotional, imaginative dimensions. Yet, if we follow Luis Lobo-Guerrero, both might end up being most central to the risk assessment practices of life insurance, along with their contestation. Life insurance and its promises, argues Lobo-Guerrero, are far from innocent practices: “They are entrenched within political imaginaries of protection, imaginaries that entail institutionalised ways of understanding what it means to promote and safeguard a way of life. They are embedded within a very particular capitalist appreciation of economics in which insurance operates as a technology of financial reparation by means of creating markets of security” (this issue). Life insurance creates value on previously dreaded events, and creates a moral economy where individuals adjust their conduct in an economy of security where practices aimed at rendering life safe are valued and encouraged. But rather than simply detailing how life insurance partakes in governmentality, Lobo-Guerrero wonders what gets sacrificed by insurers in the process of ascribing “value” to life, and how this excess of valuing process can be seen as a source of resistance inside governmentality. The excess to this valuing process, he suggests, defies the imaginative capacities of insurers, the ones that precisely make life meaningful as capital. Turning to Code 46, a science-fiction movie where insurance has taken over, Lobo-Guerrero details how the excess that challenges the security and risk-free existence of the insured life has a deep emotional quality to it, as a drive that “represents a space of freedom, a space of wild uncertainty, of passionate existence where anything is possible, where anything could potentially be achieved, where the magical stands a chance” (this issue). This passionate call for hope has some Deleuzian echoes to it, and speaks to affect as a life-force, a possibility.

Investigating the role of love in relation to governmentality, D'Aoust suggests that while love should be accounted for in the governmentality of marriage migrants in Europe, it cannot be seen as simply being yet another domain colonised by the cold forces of neoliberal rationality. She makes the case for understanding love as both an object of governmental calculations in projects of immobility, and a movement that participates in projects of mobility. “Love,” she explains, “is movement—an idea translated in the very idea of emotional transports. … [W]hen it comes to marriage migration and family reunification more generally, love becomes transport, a way of travelling: love moves people across borders” (this issue). In that sense, it partakes in, while also challenging, orderly and rationalised circulation. Through an examination of different migration management practices, D'Aoust rejects an essentialist ontological understanding of love, favouring instead the idea of love as a technology. Looking at the different ways in which technologies of love are being used and deployed to contain and discipline marriage migrants, she draws attention to the excess that such uses entail, and which should be accounted for if we want to understand potential forms of resistance against this affective governance. “Technologies of love,” she reminds us, “are no different from other technological artiefacts: the movement they bring about and try to foster, the relations they establish, do not always work as anticipated” (this issue). Such excess is important to account for, as it testifies to the fact that emotional governance is never complete. It allows for new forms of unanticipated openness and possible forms of resistance inside the rationalised framework of border management.

Whereas all contributors' initial empirical work has led them to consider the connections between emotions, governmentality and neoliberalism, their respective insights certainly do not exhaust all possible configurations and entanglements of emotions and rationality in the conduct of conduct. A deep concern for thinking critically about the present, and for resisting the thwarting of our political imagination when faced with governmental processes, unquestionably animated all contributors. In that sense, they are still struggling with the same epistemological concerns that gave the initial impulse to the affect literature: how can we understand emotions in relation to rationality, if we admit that both are intermingled,³³ and how do we resist the over-rationalisation of life? It may well be, therefore, that, more than an embrace of an “emotional turn” in IR, it is an embrace of the complexities of a politics of hope that we should strive for.

About the Author

Anne-Marie D'Aoust is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. Her recent publications on marriage migration have appeared in International Political Sociology and in Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud's Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Her other projects include issues of language and the sociology of the discipline of IR, and an investigation of “Security and Its Publics,” carried out in collaboration with William Walters.

Notes

1. B. Sasley, “Emotions in International Relations”, E-International Relations, 12 June 2013, available: <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/emotions-in-international-relations/> (accessed 17 September 2013).

2. N.C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 116–156; J. Mercer, “Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion and International Politics”, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2006), pp. 288–303; B.E. Sasley, “Theorizing State Emotions”, International Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2011), pp. 452–476.

3. Dominic Moisi, The Geopolitics of Emotions: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation and Hope Are Reshaping the World (London: Bodley Head, 2009).

4. B.J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Janice Bialley Mattern, “Emotional Practices in World Politics”, in E. Adler and V. Pouliot (eds.), The Practice Turn in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 63–86.

5. Rachel Pain, “Globalized Fear? Toward an Emotional Geopolitics”, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2009), pp. 466–486; R. Soreanu, “Feminist Scholarship in International Relations and the Politics of Disciplinary Emotion”, Millennium—Journal of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2008), pp. 123–151; M. Zalewski, “Theorizing Emotion: Affective Borders in Homeland”, Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013), pp. 133–135.

6. R. Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2001), pp. 509–533; R. Bleiker and E. Hutchison, “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 34, Supp. S1 (2008), pp. 115–135.

7. L.H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

8. A.G. Ross, Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflicts (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

9. B. Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect”, Cultural Critique, Vol. 31 (1995), p. 88. My emphasis.

10. For different takes on the “global” nature of governmentality, see W. Larner and W. Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); M. Doucet and M. de Larrinaga (eds.), Security and Global Governmentality: Globalization, Governance and the State (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008); N. Kiersey, “World State or Global Governmentality? Constitutive Power and Resistance in a Post-Imperial World”, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2008), pp. 357–374; J. Joseph, “Poverty Reduction and the New Global Governmentality”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 35, No 1 (2010), pp. 29–51.

11. M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, trans. G. Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 108.

12. R. Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2011), p. 436.

13. For an overview, see W. Vrasti, “‘Caring Capitalism’ and the Duplicity of Critique”, Theory and Event, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2011), <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/toc/tae.14.4.html>.

14. N. Ettlinger, “Whose Capitalism? Mean Discourse and/or Actions of the Heart”, Emotion, Space and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2009), pp. 92–107.

15. M. Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieusian Approach to Understanding Emotion”, History and Theory, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2012), p. 196.

16. N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 52.

17. As Foucault explained, technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect, by their own means, or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies, and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being so as to transform themselves, in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality.” M. Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”, in L.H. Martin, H. Gutman and P.H. Hutton (eds.), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 18.

18. But for a different take on governmentality and love as a specific emotion, see A.M. D'Aoust, “In the Name of Love: Marriage Migration, Governmentality and Technologies of Love”, International Political Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2013), pp. 258–274.

19. Scheer, op. cit., pp. 206–207.

20. K. Fierke, Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 93.

21. See J. Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London and New York: Verso, 2004); and J. Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London and New York: Verso, 2009).

22. J. Protevi, “Body”, in L. Lawlor and J. Nale (eds.), The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

23. L. Dawney, “The Interruption: Investigating Subjectification and Affect”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2013), p. 632.

24. See S. Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotions (New York: Routledge, 2004); and S. Ahmed, “Affective Economies”, Social Text, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2004), pp. 117–139.

25. U. Tellmann, “Foucault and the Invisible Economy”, Foucault Studies, No. 6 (2009), p. 6.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 14 and p. 22.

28. On such attempts, see notably T. Lemke, “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique”, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2002), pp. 49–64; C. Barnett, “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’”, Geoforum, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2005), pp. 7–12; J. Weidner, “Governmentality, Capitalism, and Subjectivity”, Global Society, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2009), pp. 387–411; S. Legrand, “Le marxisme oublié de Foucault”, Actuel Marx, No. 36 (2004), pp. 27–43; and J. Joseph, The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

29. G. Burchell, “Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self”, in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 30. Emphasis in original.

30. N.K. Denzin, On Understanding Emotion (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009 [1984]), 2nd edition, p. 32. For a recent re-reading of Marx's work attuned to the role of emotions in his theory of human nature, see L. Frank Weyher, “Re-reading Sociology via the Emotions: Karl Marx's Theory of Human Nature and Estrangement”, Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2012), pp. 341–362.

31. For a short overview of the distinction between neoliberal policy, ideology and governmentality, see W. Larner, “Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality”, Studies in Political Economy, Vol. 63 (2000), pp. 5–25.

32. W. Walters, Governmentality: Critical Encounters (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 35.

33. See for instance M.T. Pham, “Emotion and Rationality: A Critical Review and Interpretation of Empirical Evidence”, Review of General Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155–178.