State Repression and Religious Conflict: The Perils of the State Clampdown on the Shi’a Minority in Nigeria

Abstract

In Nigeria, there is an increasing population of the followers of Shi’a Islam, which is largely promoted by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Given its anti-state ideology and anarchical conducts, there have been a series of clashes between the Shi’a group and the Nigerian state. Since December 2015, the government both at the national and state levels began a coercive repression of the IMN following a clash that led to the death of over 500 members of the group. This paper analyses the ongoing state repression of the Shi’a Muslims in Nigeria. It argues that the increasingly violent actions by the state against the group are a recipe for a large-scale conflict, which may assume the following dimensions: a new wave of religious terrorism (after Boko Haram), a Sunni-Shi’a conflict, and international proxy wars in Nigeria. The paper concludes that a practicable way to stem the imminent violence is for the government to establish a dialogue with the group on how to ensure its compliance with the state laws and not totally outlaw it.

Notes

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5. It is difficult to state the exact population figure of the Shi’a Muslims in Nigeria for two main reasons: first, data on religious population is officially avoided in Nigeria because of the history of politicisation of the population census, and how this has contributed to ethno-religious conflicts; second, there are contradictory claims as to the number of the Shi’a Muslims in Nigeria. The IMN itself is inconsistent about its population. The leadership of the group put the figure at three to four million, and recently at 20 million. While IMN is more popular, the population of the other Shi’a Muslims under different movements are also not usually taken into consideration. For more, see Jacob Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian intelligence activities in Nigeria”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 10, pp. 13–18. Umar Shu’aibu “The Genocide of Members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria”, 23 December 2015, http://imnig.org/genocide-members-islamic-movement-nigeria-0 (accessed 21 January 2017).

6. There is a controversy regarding the accurate figure of the number of deaths recorded in the killings. While the IMN claims that that over 1000 of its members were killed (see Umar Shu'aibu “The Genocide of Members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria”), the government claimed that it buried only 347 members of the group in a mass grave. I choose the number 500 to take a middle course (see Premium Times, “Kaduna Govt. Says 347 Shiites Killed by Nigerian Troops Given Secret Mass Burial”, 11 April 2016, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/201615-kaduna-govt-says-347-shiites-killed-by-nigerian-troops-given-secret-mass-burial.html (accessed 18 November 2016).

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27. Ibid., p.14.

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29. Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria”.

30. Ibid.

31. http://www.islamicmovement.org/.

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33. Cited in Hassan, An Introduction to Islamic Movements and Modes of Thought in Nigeria, p. 25.

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36. Press TV, “Shiism Is Growing in Africa/Nigeria”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSqJBWbDzuk&t=410s (accessed 20 November 2016); Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria”, p. 14.

37. See Jacob Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian intelligence activities in Nigeria”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 10, pp. 13–18. Umar Shu’aibu, “The Genocide of Members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria”, 23 Decembe 2015, http://imnig.org/genocide-members-islamic-movement-nigeria-0 (accessed 21 January 2017).

38. Ibid.

39. Jonathan Hill, Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization? Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010; Hassan, An Introduction to Islamic Movements and Modes of Thought in Nigeria.

40. Nigerian Tribune, “Our Decision on Shiite in Order—El-Rufai”, 4 December 2016, http://tribuneonlineng.com/decision-shiite-order-el-rufai/ (accessed 22 November 2016).

41. Ibid.

42. Loimeier, “Nigeria: The Quest for a Viable Religious Option”, p. 57

43. Loimeier, “Nigeria: The Quest for a Viable Religious Option”.

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45. Loimeier, “Nigeria: The Quest for a Viable Religious Option”, p. 58.

46. Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria”, p. 15.

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48. Freezak, “A Catalogue of Genocide of the Nigerian Army against the Islamic Movement”, 9 July 2016, http://www.islamicmovement.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2741:genocide-in-zaria&catid=41:frontpage (accessed 12 November 2016).

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50. On 5 December 2016, the Kaduna state government released a White Paper on the IMN and officially labelled it an insurgent group with absolute loyalty to its leader El-Zakzaky. The government further exonerated the Nigerian military for its operation against the group in December 2015 arguing that the rule of engagement was observed in the matter.

51. Islamic Movement of Nigeria, “Government Responsible for Acts of Arson, Butchery, Murder and Unwarranted Arrests of IMN Members”, 13 October 2016, http://imnig.org/government-responsible-acts-arson-butchery-murder-and-unwarranted-arrests-imn-members-yesterday (accessed 20 November 2016).

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56. Hill, “Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?”

57. Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998, p. 200.

58. BBC, “Sheikh Zakzaky: Why Nigeria Could Fear an Attack on Iran”, 8 May 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17908704 (accessed 22 November 2016).

59. Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria”.

60. Ibid., p. 18.

61. Cited in Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, p. 199.

62. Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, is one of the sons of the popular Imam Abubakar Gumi who was a major figure behind the creation of the influential Sunni groups Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Jama’at Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunna (Society of Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna), otherwise known as the Izala movement. For details, see Abubakar Mahmud Gumi and Ismaila Abubakar Tsiga, Where I Stand, Ibadan: Spectrum, 1992.

63. Daily Trust, “Gumi’s Letter, Zakzaky’s Response”, 12 December 2014, http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/daily/news/41854-gumi-s-letter-zakzaky-s-response (accessed 21 November 2016).

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67. Zenn, “The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria”, p. 18.

68. BBC, “Sheikh Zakzaky: Why Nigeria Could Fear An Attack on Iran”.

69. The American government appeared to have shown some interest in the candidacy of President Buhari during the 2015 presidential elections following the gross mismanagement of the Boko Haram conflict by the Jonathan administration and the incredible cases of corruption in the government. Secretary of State John Kerry was in Nigeria to promote a free and fair and violence-free election. At his visit, his first port of call was Lagos where he specially met the leaders of the then opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) before he met the incumbent President Jonathan in the State House Abuja. See Michael R. Gordon, “Kerry Meets With Nigerian Leaders to Encourage Peaceful Election”, The New York Times, 25 January 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/africa/kerry-meets-with-nigerian-leaders-to-encourage-peaceful-election.html?_r=0 (accessed 21 January 2017).

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