Who's Afraid of Saddam Hussein? Re-examining the ‘September Dossier’ Affair

Abstract

The controversy surrounding the September 2002 dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction has been pivotal in the decline of trust in the New Labour Government. The absence of a comprehensive, detailed and diachronic analysis of this episode therefore stands out as an issue that needs to be addressed. In doing so, this paper diverges from conventional narratives of the ‘September dossier’ affair in several respects. It argues that New Labour's desire for regime change in Iraq pre-dated the rise of the neo-conservative Bush administration and the events of 9/11; that the British Government were fully willing and active participants in the policy of regime change and that the production of the dossier was one of the key components of a broader political strategy designed to achieve this aim.

Keywords:

• September Dossier
• Iraq
• Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Intelligence
• Spin
• New Labour

Notes

 [1] See Bluth ‘The British Road to War’; Doig and Pythian, ‘The National Interest’, 368–76; ‘The Hutton Inquiry’, 104–8; Dumbrell, ‘Working with Allies’, 452–72; Freedman, ‘War in Iraq’, 7–50; Glees, ‘Evidence-Based Policy’, 138–55; Humphreys, ‘The Iraq Dossier’, 156–70; McLean and Patterson, ‘A Precautionary Approach’, 351–67; Pythian, ‘Hutton and Scott’, 124–37, ‘Still a Matter of Trust’, 653–81; Ramsay and Cliffe, ‘Comment’, 349–59; Riddell, Hug Them Close; Williams and Roach, ‘Security, Territorial Borders…’, 1–23; Yeung, ‘Regulating Government Communications’, 53–91.

 [2] For instance see Coates and Krieger, Blair's War; Kampfner, Blair's Wars; Naughtie, The Accidental American; Seldon, Blair; Stephens, Tony Blair; for an exception see Kettell, Dirty Politics?

 [3] Among the most notable websites include: j-n-v.org (justice not vengeance); spinwatch.org; labouragainsthewar.org.uk; stopwar.org.uk (stop the war coalition); impeachblair.org; and iraqwatch.org

 [4] Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002–03, HC 813 (hereafter FAC Report), HMSO, London; Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Intelligence and Assessments, Cm.5972 (hereafter ISC Report). HMSO, London; Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly, Lord Hutton, January 2004, HC 247, (hereafter Hutton Report), HMSO, London; Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC 898, (hereafter Butler Report), HMSO, London.

 [5] See for example Bluth, ‘The British Road to War’, 851–72; Coates and Krieger, Blair's War; Glees, ‘Evidence-Based Policy’, 138–55; Hoggett, ‘Iraq’, 418–28; Kampfner, Blair's Wars; Riddell, Hug Them Close; Seldon, Blair.

 [6] See for example Cook, Point of Departure; Rangwala and Plesch, A Case to Answer; Sands, Lawless World; Short, An Honourable Deception?; Yeung, ‘Regulating Government Communications’, 53–91.

 [7] Press Conference with George W. Bush, 17 July 2003.

 [8] Tony Blair speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, 10 November 1997.

 [9] Butler Report, section 5.2.

[10] Tony Blair statement in the House of Commons, 24 Feburary 1998.

[11] Remarks by Tony Blair in the House of Commons, 17 December 1998.

[12] Cited in the Butler Report (2004), paras 213–17.

[13] Tony Blair speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, 17 November 2001; Interview in the Observer, 14 October 2001.

[14] Iraq: Options Paper, 8 March 2002.

[15] Butler Report, sections 5.3, 5.4 and Annex B.

[16] Memo. from Manning to Blair, 14 March 2002.

[17] Memo. from Meyer to Manning, 18 March 2002.

[18] Memo. from Ricketts to Straw, 22 March 2002.

[19] Memo. from Straw to Blair, 25 March 2002.

[20] Iraq: Conditions for Military Action, Cabinet Office briefing paper, 21 July 2002. Reprinted in The Sunday Times, 12 June 2005.

[21] Joint Press Conference by George W. Bush and Tony Blair, 6 April 2002.

[22] Tony Blair Statement to the House of Commons, 10 April 2002; Joint Press Conference with Dick Cheney, 11 March 2002; Interview with NBC, 4 April 2002; Interview for Newsnight. BBC2, 15 May 2002.

[23] Short, An Honourable Deception?, 150.

[24] Oral evidence from Clare Short to the Inquiry of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (hereafter FAC Evidence), 17 June 2003. The Hutton Inquiry (hereafter ‘THI’) FAC2/1–50.

[25] Iraq: Conditions for Military Action, Cabinet Office briefing paper, 21 July 2002. Reprinted in The Sunday Times, 12 June 2005.

[26] J. Hardy, ‘Blair in the Doghouse’, Daily Mirror, 3 July 2002.

[27] Memo. from Matthew Rycroft to Manning. Published in The Sunday Times, 1 May 2005.

[28] ISC Report, 23.

[29] R. Norton-Taylor and J. Borger, ‘Secrets of Saddam's Hidden Arsenal’, The Guardian, 5 September 2002.

[30] Oral Evidence from Tony Blair to the Hutton Inquiry (hereafter THI Evidence), 28 August 2003, para 17.

[31] Oral Evidence from Tony Blair to the Hutton Inquiry (hereafter THI Evidence), 28 August 2003, paras 1, 2, 9, 17; Butler Report, para 316.

[32] Remarks by Tony Blair to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 16 July 2002.

[33] Remarks to the FAC Inquiry by Ricketts, 24 June 2003. THI:FAC2/208–248. Q.742; THI Evidence (Campbell), 19 August 2003, para 88; and (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, para 33.

[34] S. Powell (on behalf of Campbell) to J. Powell, 5 September 2002. THI:CAB11/17. The draft dossier as it presently stood was entitled: Iraqi Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Programmes—the Current Threat. THI:CAB23/5–14.

[35] THI Evidence (Campbell) 19 August 2003, paras 10, 123; Campbell to Scarlett 9 September 2002. THI:CAB6/2–4.

[36] Government Briefing Papers on Iraq, 20 June 2002. THI:CAB23/16–67; JIC Extracts. THI:CAB17/2–5; Butler Report, paras 289–307, and Annex B.

[37] ISC Report, paras 49–57; Butler Report, section 6.5; JIC Papers. THI:CAB17/2–5; THI Evidence (Dearlove) 15 September 2003.

[38] JIC Papers for Lord Hutton. THI:CAB17/2–5.

[39] See THI Evidence (Hoon), 22 September 2003, paras 80–1; (Dearlove), 15 September 2003; FAC Evidence (Cook), 17 June 2003. THI:FAC2/1–50.

[40] THI Evidence (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, para 144.

[41] JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002. Extracts cited in the Butler Report, Annex B.

[42] THI Evidence (Scarlett) 26 August 2003, paras 58–60; Scarlett to Campbell, 10 September 2002. THI:CAB23/2.

[43] Draft Dossier, 10 September 2002. THI:DOS2/2–57.

[44] Smith to Pruce and Campbell, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/23–24; Kelly to Campbell 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/27.

[45] Bassett to Smith, Pruce, and Campbell, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/23–26.

[46] Pruce to MM, 10 September 2002. THI:CAB11/21; Pruce to Campbell, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/25–26.

[47] Sedwill to various, 11 September 2002. THI:CAB11/34; Campbell to Scarlett, 9 September 2002. THI:CAB6/2–4; THI Evidence (Campbell) 19 August 2003.

[48] Anonymous email, 11 September 2003. THI:CAB23/15; Morrison in A Failure of Intelligence, Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004; David Kelly Conversation with Susan Watts, 30 May 2003. THI:BBC1/58–63.

[49] BBC News, 11 July 2004; THI Evidence (Anthony Cragg, former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence), 15 September 2003, passim.

[50] Butler Report, paras 573–8.

[51] Draft Dossier, 16 September 2002, THI:DOS2/58–106; draft executive summary, 16 September 2002. THI:CAB11/141–143.

[52] Anonymous memo. 10 September 2002, THI:CAB3/21.

[53] Unnamed DIS Document, 17 September 2002. CAB33/116.

[54] David Kelly Conversation with Susan Watts, 30 May 2003. THI:BBC1/58–63; Note on Iraq Dossier (unnamed), 20 September 2002. THI:CAB33/114–115; Anonymous document, 19 September 2002. THI:MOD22/1–2; Bryan Jones interviews in the Independent, 4 Feburary 2004, 10 Feburary 2004; Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004.

[55] THI Evidence (Hoon), 22 September 2003, para 85; Blair Remarks in the House of Commons, 4 Feburary 2004.

[56] Panorama. BBC1, 11 July 2004; Bryan Jones interviews in the Independent, 4 Feburary 2004, 21 July 2004.

[57] Powell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/69; Powell to Campbell and Manning, 17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/53; Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 18 September 2002. THI:CAB11/77.

[58] Campbell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002. THI:CAB11/66–68; THI Evidence (Campbell), 19 August 2003; (Scarlett), 26 August 2003, paras 75, 82–4.

[59] Scarlett to Campbell, 18 September 2002. THI:CAB11/70–71.

[60] Scarlett to Campbell and 19 September 2002. THI:CAB23/1; Draft Dossier, 19 September 2002. THI:CAB3/22–78.

[61] Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 19 September 2002. THI:CAB11/103; THI Evidence (Dearlove), 15 September 2003, para 95; Iraq's Weapons of Mass destruction, final draft dossier, 20 September 2002. THI:CAB33/56–113.

[62] N. Watt, ‘Weapons Claim: The Dossier, the PM, and the Headlines’, The Guardian, 6 Feburary 2004.

[63] Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002.

[64] Tony Blair Statement to House of Commons, 24 September 2002.

[65] N. Rufford, and N. Fielding, ‘Tracked Down: The Man Who Fooled the World—And was Duped Himself’, The Sunday Times, 1 August 2004.

[66] THI Evidence (Blair), 28 August 2003, para 16; Butler Report (2004), paras 225, 304, 327, 331.

[67] Hutton Report, para 228.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Steven Kettell

Steven Kettell is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. He is the author of Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq (Zed, 2006). He is also a founder and Co-Executive Editor of British Politics (Palgrave Journals).