The Wilson Government and British Responses to Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964–1970

Abstract

One of the most pressing questions for the new government of Harold Wilson following the Labour Party's slender General Election victory of October 1964, as far as the UK's nuclear deterrent was concerned, was how to shore up the credibility gap that was in evidence with the decline of the effectiveness of the V-bomber force.1 Already in train was the Polaris programme agreed by the Conservative Macmillan government at Nassau in December 1962, in which five submarines were planned.2 However, Polaris was not due to be fully deployed until the first quarter of the 1970s and doubts were already beginning to emerge regarding their perceived effectiveness. This article will ask two main questions: first, why did the development of anti-ballistic missile defences by the Soviet Union threaten the credibility of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent?; and second, what was the UK's response to this development?

Keywords:

• Strategic
• ABMs
• Polaris
• Britain
• Nuclear
• Deterrent

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank a number of people for their help and assistance in the preparation of this article. My gratitude is owed in particular to Professor John Baylis, Dr Jeremy Stocker, Dr Pavel Podvig and Sir Michael Quinlan, numerous anonymous peer reviewers as well as participants at the British Rocketry Oral History Project Conference (BROHP) at Charterhouse in April 2005, all of whom have offered useful comments in preparation of this paper. The author would also like to pay gratitude to a number of key officials who wish to remain nameless for their comments. Their contribution is referred to in the footnotes as ‘confidential correspondence’. All references prefaced by TNA are taken from the National Archives, Kew, UK. Any omissions or errata in this article are the author's own and bear no relationship to those who were kind enough to contribute.

Notes

  [1] On the decline of the effectiveness of the V-force see for example, Brookes, V-Force.

  [2] Priest, ‘In American Hands’, 353–76.

  [3] Among the most notable are Pierre, Nuclear Politics; Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons; Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State; Clark and Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945–1955; Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship; Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence; and Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb.

  [4] Following the passing of the Freedom of Information Act (2005), it is now possible to request all but the most recent documents. Despite FOIA, it remains difficult to get access to this evidence. This is particularly the case in such a key area of national and international security such as nuclear weapons. For more information see Twigge, ‘Freedom of Information and the Historian’, Issue 42. Available from Ariadne web site, http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue42/foi-historians-rpt/intro.html, 26 March 2006.

  [5] As ABMs did not begin deployment in any purposeful way until the mid to late 1960s, the issue is not well covered by the existing literature on British nuclear weapons and none of these could utilise primary source evidence due to the ‘Thirty Year Rule’ discussed below. The only notable exception to this, from a UK perspective, is Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002. However Stocker's work concentrates on the UK approach to anti-ballistic missile defence and not on the issues resulting from ABMs for offensive strategic systems such as Polaris, and as a result differs vastly in its approach. The US approach to combating ABMs can be found for example in York, Race to Oblivion; Stützle, Jasani, and Cohen, eds. The ABM Treaty; and Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident. Very little is known of Soviet views of US ABMs and, as far as is known, none are unavailable in an English translation.

  [6] Although a large number of key documents remain withheld by the British government under the Public Records Act, it has been possible to overcome this ‘documentary deficit’ assisted by the British Nuclear History Study Group based at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at Southampton University (MCIS), and the British Rocketry Oral History Project (BROHP) conferences held annually at Charterhouse. Both provide a hub around which active academic researchers and former participants in UK nuclear weapons programmes have discussed the British nuclear weapons programme. MCIS web site, http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk, 26 March 2006 and BROHP web site, http://www.brohp.org.uk, 26 March 2006.

  [7] Ziegler, Wilson, 105–6.

  [8] See for example, Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, 202–37.

  [9] Bartlett, The Long Retreat, 170–263.

 [10] Middeke, ‘Britain's Global Military Role’, 143–64. See also Bartlett, The Long Retreat, 180–233.

 [11] TNA DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966.

 [12] Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, Cmnd. 537 (HMSO, 1958). For an outline of the breakdown of atomic collaboration see for example Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 112–20, and for the period between the passing of the McMahon Act and the resumption of nuclear exchanges see for example, Ball, ‘Military Nuclear Relations’, 439–54.

 [13] Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets’, 33–61.

 [14] Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, 176–91.

 [15] See for example TNA AIR 66/7, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, 1 March 1960 and Brown, ‘Britain's strategic weapons I. Manned bombers’, 293–8.

 [16] TNA PREM 11/2945, Prime Minister's Discussion on Deterrent Policy, 20 February 1960.

 [17] TNA PREM 11/3716, The Importance of Skybolt to the R.A.F., late 1962.

 [18] Jackson, V-Bombers, 90–7.

 [19] This point is well covered by the Chief Scientific Advisor to the British government, Sir Solly Zuckerman. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, 239–41. See also Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, 264–80, and Young, ‘The Skybolt Crisis of 1962’, 614–35.

 [20] For an excellent synopsis, written from an American perspective, on the decline of the bomber in the age of the missile see Roman, ‘Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon, 1957–1963’, 198–236.

 [21] TNA PREM 11/3716, Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, 8 November 1962; PREM 11/3716, FO to Paris (Samuel from Wright), 9 December 1962; PREM 11/3716, Zuckerman to Ministry of Defence, 9 December 1962; PREM 11/3716, de Zulueta to Ormsby-Gore, 11 December 1962.

 [22] Bahamas Meetings: Text of Joint Communiqués, Cmnd. 1915 (HMSO, 1962). See also Grove, Vanguard to Trident British Naval Policy Since World War 2, 242.

 [23] PSA, Cmnd. 1995 (HMSO, 1963). The A-3 was a significant step forward from the A-2, with a vastly greater maximum range and the capacity to house three warheads as opposed to the single warhead of the A-2. In June 1963, it had been decided that Britain should purchase the very latest generation of Polaris, the A-3P, which had a maximum range of 2500 nm. (2880 statute miles), and which could carry three warheads each of around 200 kt. Equally important was that only the A-3 was guaranteed to be supported by the US Navy and government defence contractors during the expected lifespan of the UK Polaris Force. The A-2 was coming to the end of its production run at this stage as the US moved towards the improved A-3 and the British were told that only the A-3, which entered service in 1964, could be guaranteed long-term in-service support. (The UK government has steadfastly refused to disclose details of the yield of its warheads.) Confidential correspondence, October 2002. See also Pike, Federation of Atomic Scientists (henceforth FAS.org), Nuclear Weapons Page, USA, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/a-3.htm, 5 October 2002.

 [24] Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 38. However the agreement ‘excluded a lot as well, including vulnerability, system performance and the decoys. This meant that changes, called SPALTS, were notified and arrangements made to incorporate them into UK missiles’. Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

 [25] See also Middeke, ‘Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation’, 69–96.

 [26] TNA DEFE 13/548, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to P/S of S of S, 19 March 1969.

 [27] Confidential correspondence, October 2002. This was also due to the nature of the separate 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, amended in 1959, by which the British had to make a strong case to the US for the exchange of data related to nuclear warhead designs and manufacture. The UK, through the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, had also to demonstrate a specific need for the release of that information. The UK in return was able to trade its own work on nuclear warheads with the American nuclear weapons laboratories to mutual advantage. This view is based on discussions held between the author and a number of former senior government officials over a number of years.

 [28] Smart, ‘Advanced Strategic Missiles’, 63.

 [29] Pay, ‘New Effort Aimed at X-Ray Protection’. The issue of ABMs is discussed at length in many of the industry journals such as this, as well as in the newspapers of the time.

 [30] Pay, ‘New Effort Aimed at X-Ray Protection’.

 [31] For a more thorough analysis see Smart, ‘Advanced Strategic Missiles’. 63.

 [32] Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002, ch. 6. The first tests of ABM system components did not begin until about 1957 with a test of a prototype of the V-1000 missile, whilst tests of the system began in 1960. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005.

 [33] TNA ES 10/1046, Comparison of the neutron flux from clean and dirty warheads for ABM, 01 January 1963–31 December 1963, classified under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. Although these reports are not yet scheduled for public release they nevertheless contain a listing in the National Archives, Kew.

 [34] TNA DEFE 19/83, SZ/554/65, Solly Zuckerman to Paul Gore-Booth, 3 September 1965.

 [35] Zuckerman himself remained firmly opposed to any Polaris improvement programme on the basis that no ABM system would be fully effective and that if necessary the deterrent could be used to attack undefended targets. Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, 239–41. It was not until Zuckerman left to become CSA to the Cabinet in 1967, to be replaced by William Cook and Alan Cottrell, that government research establishments were instructed to look much more seriously towards methods of improving Polaris. Confidential correspondence, March 2005.

 [36] Khariton was one of the Soviet Union's chief warhead designers and, along with Igor Kurchatov, began the Soviet nuclear weapons programme. See for example Khariton and Smirnov, ‘The Khariton Version’.

 [37] Now commonly known as Arzamas-16. FAS.org, IMints Page, www.fas.org/irp/imint.html, 11 November 2002.

 [38] Jones, ‘Overview of History of UK Strategic Weapons’.

 [39] More commonly known now as Chelyabinsk-70.

 [40] Raspletin, Golubev, and Kamenskiy et al. Russia's ABM System, 22 and Kisunko, Restricted Area, 439, quoted in Podvig ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 413.

 [41] Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 413–4.

 [42] Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 414.

 [43] However, ‘A more important factor in cutting this number down was the excessive complexity of the system. It was more like Kisunko was ordered to scale the system down and advances in technology helped him keep the performance at somewhat acceptable level’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005.

 [44] Volintsev, ‘Unknown Forces’, 32, quoted in Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 414.

 [45] These ABM systems were codenamed Griffon, Galosh, Gazelle and Gorgon by NATO.

 [46] ABM should not be seen as a single complete system but rather as several integrated systems acting in coordination.

 [47] Griffon was initially designated as a Surface to Air Missile system.

 [48] Vladimir Trendafilovski, RZ-25 Anti-Ballistic Missile System Page, http://www.wonderland.org.nz/rz-25.htm, 19 January 2002. However, the ‘Griffon, the Tallinn and Leningrad lines etc. were an ambitious air-defence project gone awry. It was considered in the West to be a missile defense…but in reality it wasn't’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005.

 [49] Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces Requirements and Responses, 148.

 [50] US ABM Programmes, Nike Zeus Page, http://www.paineess.id.au/missiles/NikeZeus.html, 23 September 2002.

 [51] Eight were originally planned but only four were ever made operational.

 [52] For a late Cold War assessment of Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems written from an American perspective see Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence and the Western Alliance, 25–9.

 [53] Like the US Safeguard program, the initial Russian system had problems with its radars vulnerable to ‘blackout’ or ‘blinding’ by nuclear explosions (which could include those from its own interceptor missiles). The system could not cover all possible attack corridors, which meant that missiles approaching from certain directions may be undetectable until too late in the attack. Furthermore, the Moscow defence was largely incapable of dealing with countermeasures, such as decoys and chaff, and could be overwhelmed by missiles armed with MIRVed warheads, which were relatively inexpensive compared to the cost of maintaining or expanding the defensive system. Thus the system was strictly limited and designed to defend against an attack by only six to eight ICBMs, a plausible number when the idea was first conceived in 1959 but which would prove to be essentially redundant by the 1970s when ICBM forces had reached higher quantitative and qualitative levels. For these reasons, Anglo-US intelligence assessed the Soviet system as having little ability to protect Moscow against anything other than a strictly limited attack. UCSUSE.org, Russian BMD Programmes, http://www.ucsusa.org/security/fact.russiaMD.html, 2 December 2002 and Bunn, Foundation for the Future, 50.

 [54] Podvig, ‘History and the Current Status of the Russian Early Warning System’, 21–60.

 [55] Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Process and Problems, Article 3, http://www.armscontrol.ru/reductions/ch3.htm, 3 January 2003 and Global Security.org, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Russia, Hen House Radar Page, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/hen-house.htm, 5 January 2003. Although these radars were ‘somewhat limited in their capability, it wasn't a factor in overall ABM system performance’. Private correspondence with Pavel Podvig, 22 June 2005.

 [56] FAS.org, ABM Programmes, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/.htm, 15 July 2002. See also Karpenko, ‘ABM and Space Defense’, 2–47.

 [57] Holst, Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy, 145–86.

 [58] Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 414.

 [59] On the background to these systems see Zaloga, Target America.

 [60] However, by the late 1960s American studies passed on to the British were indicating that maintaining radar blackout would only occur in a large scale strategic exchange as it would require ‘a few hundred missiles’, but that the ‘placing [of] black-out patches in position…[would] conceal the advance of an offensive missile’. TNA CAB 134/3120, PN(67) 2nd Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967.

 [61] Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 415.

 [62] On nuclear arms control until SALT see Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon.

 [63] TNA DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969.

 [64] TNA DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969

 [65] TNA DEFE 68/21, V.H.B. Macklen to ACSA (SN) to P.S. to Secretary of State, US Public Statements on ABMs and Improvements to Offensive Systems, 9 July 1968.

 [66] BND(TSC) (61) 3 Ministry of Defence British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group Technical Sub-Committee Active Defence Against Strategic Missiles in the Period 1970/80 Report by Ministry of Aviation, 18 January 1961. Declassified document provided through confidential correspondence, March 2005.

 [67] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966.

 [68] TNA DEFE 44/115, Galosh, Undated but likely to be spring 1965.

 [69] The report mentions: ‘Because so little can be seen of the missile inside the canister it is impossible to make an accurate or comprehensive analysis of either the missile or its performance. However, this report, which is based solely on parade photography, presents a concept of the type of missile which could be enclosed and a reasonable assessment of the performance of such a missile. While the quantitative results must be treated with reserve, it is felt that they represent a reasonable estimate of range and times of flight which might be expected’. The report continued: ‘No attempt has been made to assess the effectiveness of the system of which GALOSH may form a part. This would require a knowledge not only of the missile's characteristics but also of its associated electronic equipment on the ground. This information is not available’. TNA DEFE 44/115, Galosh, undated but likely to be spring 1965.

 [70] That new intelligence assessments had been made available is hinted at in the documents contained within this class but, is not explicitly stated due to ongoing security restrictions related to intelligence gathering.

 [71] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, undated spring 1966.

 [72] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966

 [73] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966

 [74] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966

 [75] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966

 [76] The development of Galosh was a ‘radical change of ABM doctrine which needed assessment’. Confidential correspondence, 24 March 2005.

 [77] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, undated spring 1966.

 [78] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966

 [79] TNA DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966.

 [80] TNA DEFE 19/83, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966

 [81] TNA DEFE 19/83, DP.16/166(A)(Draft) 8 March 1966.

 [82] Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002.

 [83] Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine’, 53–65.

 [84] Views expressed to the author by a number of senior government officials involved in the Polaris improvement project at The History of the Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme, conference held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, UK, October 2004.

 [85] TNA DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966.

 [86] TNA DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966

 [87] TNA DEFE 44/115, Appendix 1 to Annex A to COS 1181/8/2/66 The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Programme Outline Intelligence Report Covering Inception to September 1965, Undated Spring 1966. Added to this was the concern that the proposed modification to Polaris by the Americans, Antelope, may have been compromised in flight tests off Kwajelein atoll as part of proving trials. Soviet ships were in the impact area of the full scale Antelope trials and ‘must therefore be assumed to have obtained radar information on Antelope decoys and warheads for subsequent study’. TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970.

 [88] TNA DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966.

 [89] TNA DEFE 68/21, Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems, undated, 1966

 [90] TNA DEFE 68/21, Attachment to: VHBM/489/68 dated 9 July 1968. Precis of US Official Statements on ABM's and Improvements to Offensive Missile Systems, 9 July 1968.

 [91] McNamara, The Essence of Security, 64.

 [92] TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970.

 [93] TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970

 [94] TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970

 [95] TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970

 [96] TNA CAB 168/27, EF/D/01059, Robert Press to Sir Solly Zuckerman ABM/PENAIDS, 23 July 1970

 [97] On its formation see TNA CAB 134/3120, PN(66)1, 30 September 1966.

 [98] Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

 [99] In 1964 the UK had also began a modest research programme of improvements to the front-end of Polaris containing the warheads known as HR 169. HR 169 was developed by the UK from 1964 until 1967, and proposed a more numerous and lighter suite of decoys than the original front-end developed by the Americans. In 1967 the US agreed to supply the A-3T version of the Polaris missile which protected the missile guidance system. Ridley, ‘The Requirement and Early R&D Programme’.

[100] Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’, 128.

[101] TNA CAB 134/3120, PN(67) Second Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967.

[102] TNA CAB 134/3120, PN(67) Second Meeting Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, 3 April 1967

[103] Known more commonly as the ‘Press Gang’.

[104] Private correspondence, October 2002.

[105] TNA DEFE 13/547, F.L. Lawrence Wilson to Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence, 6 December 1967.

[106] Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident, 86–112.

[107] TNA DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)152/68 Polaris Improvements William Cook to Secretary of State, 9 April 1968.

[108] TNA DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)152/68 Polaris Improvements William Cook to Secretary of State, 9 April 1968

[109] TNA DEFE 13/548, C.M. Rose Future Nuclear Policy, 15 February 1969.

[110] Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

[111] TNA DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)152/68 Polaris Improvements William Cook to Secretary of State, 9 April 1968.

[112] TNA DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)108/68, Polaris Improvement Study William Cook to I.P. Bancroft, 6 March 1968.

[113] TNA DEFE 13/548, CA(PR)108/68, Polaris Improvement Study William Cook to I.P. Bancroft, 6 March 1968

[114] Flight trials were an expensive but necessary method of proving the characteristics of the Polaris front-end as it re-entered the atmosphere. Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

[115] TNA CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968.

[116] TNA CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968

[117] TNA CAB 134/3121, Report to the Minister of Technology and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority by the Working Party on Atomic Weapons Establishments, July 1968

[118] TNA DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), ACSA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969.

[119] TNA DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), ACSA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969

[120] TNA CAB 168/277, SZ to Prime Minister, undated January 1970.

[121] It was believed that ‘the design of decoy systems can be improved to an extent that, allied with some further hardening of the warhead, satisfactory penetration capability could be maintained without resulting in either a new weapons system or intolerable costs’. TNA DEFE 13/770, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to DUS(P), 6 May 1970.

[122] TNA CAB 168/277, S.Z. to Sir Burke Trend, March 1970. Zuckerman presumably meant AWRE and the MoD as ‘the boys’.

[123] TNA CAB 168/277, S.Z. to Sir Burke Trend, March 1970.

[124] For a synopsis of the early US ABM programmes see for example Goldfischer, The Best Defense and Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America The Case for National Missile Defence, 3–7.

[125] For the views of the Chief Scientific Advisor to the government on ABMs see Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, 393 and TNA DEFE 1983, COS 1181/8/2/66, 8 February 1966 and TNA DEFE 19/83, DP.16/166(A)(Draft) 8 March 1966 for the opinions of the UK Chiefs of Staff.

[126] An endo-atmospheric or terminal defence system was a lower tier interception system such as the American Sprint and the later Patriot defensive missiles. In theory these can successfully intercept offensive missiles in the lower atmosphere.

[127] TNA DEFE 68/21, Attachment to: VHBM/489/68 dated 9 July 1968. Precis of US Official Statements on ABM's and Improvements to Offensive Missile Systems, 9 July 1968. It is unclear from the evidence so far released what effect such defensive measures would have on the population they were meant to be defending through nuclear fall-out.

[128] An EMP is part of the effect of a nuclear detonation following on from the release of gamma rays in the form of photons. These photons produce high energy free electrons which, through a process known as Compton's Scattering, become trapped in the earth's magnetic field between approximately 20–40 km of the atmosphere. This results in the process known as an EMP. This pulse can spread very quickly to an area the size of a continent and produce destructive ground effects on electrical systems. For further information of EMP and their relation to nuclear weapons see the Federation of American Scientists EMP Page, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/emp.htm, 11 July 2004.

[129] The exo-atmosphere is a term used to denote the area of the atmosphere that is 40–100 km above the earth's surface.

[130] Up to 300 NIKE missile systems were deployed at various times around large American cities and military installations until 1967.

[131] FAS.org, SALT 1 Page, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt1/intro.htm, 24 June 2002.

[132] Finney, The ABM Treaty, 29–44.

[133] York, Race to Oblivion, 195–212.

[134] FAS.org, ABM Programmes, United States Page, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/complete.htm, 27 September 2002. Safeguard narrowly avoided the fate of Sentinel with approval being granted on 6 August 1969.

[135] Finney, The ABM Treaty, 35–41.

[136] The Times, 8 February 1967. See also for examples the recollections of Jackson and Fosdick, ed. Henry M. Jackson and World Affairs.

[137] See for example, Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 62–88 and Laquer, Europe in Our Time, 362–9.

[138] Middeke, ‘Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation after the Nassau Conference’, 69–96.

[139] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 278–358; and Middeke, ‘Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Co-operation after the Nassau Conference’, 69–96.

[140] Ziegler, Wilson, 329–32.

[141] Greenwood, Budgeting for Defence. Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70 Volume 2 International Policy, 31–61 and 115–41.

[142] On British influence and attitudes to arms control see Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 163–201.

[143] As Robert MacNamara lucidly pointed out, ‘Since even with our current superiority, or indeed with any numerical superiority reasonably attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact remains that the Soviet Union would still-with its present forces-effectively destroy the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first-strike’. The Times, 19 September 1967.

[144] Confidential correspondence, March 2005. The JOWOGs had first been set up as part of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement along with the Joint Atomic Energy Information Group (JAEIG) which provided a mechanism for passing information along with regular Stocktakes or Reviews which ensured that everyone employed in each specialist area worked to mutual advantage. Confidential correspondence, October 2002.

[145] TNA DEFE 68/21, Draft Brief for Prime Minister Anti Ballistic Missile Deployment, undated 1964–1966.

[146] TNA DEFE 68/21, Draft Brief for Prime Minister Anti Ballistic Missile Deployment, undated 1964–1966

[147] As Michael Quinlan, then Director of Defence Policy in the MoD, cautioned at the time, ‘it seems that we might thus find ourselves in the midst of what might be a very dirty rugger game!’. TNA DEFE 68/21, A.W.G. Le Hardy to A. Charmier, Defence Policy and Planning Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 February 1970.

[148] Kissinger, The White House Years, 204–10.

[149] Private correspondence with Frank Panton, 2005.

[150] TNA DEFE 19/83, DCSA (S) A.B.M.s (Proposed informal talks with US), J.E.F. Clarke, 23 August 1965.

[151] TNA DEFE 19/83, P.H. Gore-Booth to Sir Richard Way, 30 September 1965.

[152] TNA DEFE 68/21, Anti-Ballistic Missiles Draft Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation, undated July 1966.

[153] TNA DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967.

[154] See also Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’, 128–33.

[155] TNA DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967.

[156] TNA DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967

[157] TNA DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967

[158] TNA DEFE 68/21, Prime Minister PM/62/12 The ABM Question, 30 January 1967 Although the document is not explicit, this presumably meant the State Department who were traditionally hostile to the British and French nuclear programmes.

[159] Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 86–100.

[160] McNamara was already known by the Foreign Office to be hostile to ABMs. TNA FO 371/187536, Dean to Rennie, 23 December 1966, FCO 10/174 and Dean to Rennie, 11 January 1967. Quoted in Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002, 138.

[161] Healey, The Time of My Life, 312–3. This view however conflicts with official government documents which show prior warning was given diplomatically, Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002, 142.

[162] Harold Wilson, in his memoirs, attempted to paint a different picture of the British lack of involvement in SALT. Somewhat contradicting declassified government documents Wilson stated, ‘Though we were not directly involved, our nuclear expertise and international experience had been of some value to the American negotiations, not least in helping resolve the anxieties of non-nuclear European allies who feared, as we did not, the consequences of a deal between the United States and Soviet Union’. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964–1970, 689.

[163] TNA DEFE 68/21, Annex A to COS 1702/11/8/67 Polaris Improvement Programme—Contribution B to Paper for DOP(O) Committee, 11 August 1967.

[164] A slighter later document indicates that the SSBNs were considered to be almost undetectable on patrol, although vulnerable by the ASW capabilities of the Soviet Northern Fleet and to pre-emptive action against the submarine's staging facilities at Faslane and Coulport. CAB 168/277, Solly Zuckerman to Prime Minister, 4 January 1971.

[165] Baylis, ‘The “Moscow Criterion”’.

[166] Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002.

[167] Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’.

[168] Baylis and Stoddart, ‘Britain and the Chevaline Project’, 144–6.

[169] Healey, The Time of My Life, 133.

[170] The British government were under few illusions about the difficulty of this task. TNA DEFE 13/548, Note of a discussion between the Secretary of Defence, CA(PR), AC SA(SN), DUS(P) and AUS(POL) on Wednesday 12 February 1969, 12 February 1969.

[171] The Soviets, too, had been critical of what they clearly viewed as British interference in Superpower negotiations. In heated exchanges during a visit by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in February 1967, Wilson commentated, ‘Kosygin…had been critical of our view that there should be direct talks before either major power embarked on a major programme of development of ABMs’. Wilson, The Labour Government, 380–1 and 689.