Dublin, the SDLP and the Sunningdale Agreement: Maximalist Nationalism and Path Dependency

Abstract

This paper seeks to fill a gap in the literature on the Sunningdale agreement as regards the role played by the two nationalist negotiators—the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Dublin, Fine Gael–Labour coalition government. Utilising recently released archival material and internal party sources, the paper argues that, despite declining chances of success, these actors became locked-in to an increasingly narrow policy trajectory, based on maximising gains for the minority community in Northern Ireland. This interpretation challenges existing academic accounts of the period, by demonstrating that the accumulation of concessions rather than simply the reactions of unionists radicalised Catholic politics in the early 1970s. It offers a fresh approach to studying the Northern Ireland conflict and points out that path-dependent processes can play a significant role in policy development and direction.

Keywords:

• Northern Ireland
• Path dependence
• Nationalism
• Political opportunity
• Temporal processes
• Sunningdale

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Henry Patterson and Carol-Ann Barnes who both read over earlier versions of this article. An earlier version was presented to the annual Political Studies of Ireland conference at University College Cork in October 2006.

Notes

 [1] News Letter (Editorial), 3 October 1973.

 [2] Including the then SDLP Deputy Leader Seamus Mallon's oft-cited description of the 1998 Agreement as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners.’ Quoted in Tonge, ‘From Sunningdale’, 39.

 [3] Tonge, ‘From Sunningdale’, 43. See also, Patterson, ‘British Governments’; Hennessey, A History; Gillespie, ‘The Sunningdale Agreement’; and Jackson, Home Rule.

 [4] See, for example, Fitzgerald, All in a Life; Devlin, Straight Left; Currie, All Hell will Break Loose.

 [5] See Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence’; Pierson, Politics in Time. For Mahoney, path-dependence describes those deterministic sequences that occur through either incremental or reactive changes. Pierson, on the other hand, tends to emphasise the former version. Perhaps, the most concise definition of the concept is Douglass North's: ‘Path-dependence is not “inertia”; rather it is the constraints on the choice set in the present that are derived from historical experiences of the past’. See North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 52.

 [6] See Arrow, ‘Increasing Returns’ for an introduction to the development of the concept in economics. See Pierson and Skocpol, ‘Historical Institutionalism’ for a discussion of the concept within the field of institutionalist studies.

 [7] Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism. See also, Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, 26–37 for a further discussion of layered change.

 [8] Gains et al., ‘Path Dependency’; Kay, ‘A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency’. See also Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration’ for an introduction to path dependency and policy development. Pierson and Kay argue that EU social and budgetary policies (respectively) follow path-dependent trajectories that delimit individual states' autonomy following the introduction of policy initiatives. This occurs as states adapt to changed circumstances, reducing the potential for radical u-turns through, for example, inter-state negotiation downstream.

 [9] Although Paul Pierson favours the term ‘increasing returns’ to characterise path-dependent logic this paper chimes with the more flexible concept of layered change (Thelen, How Institutions Evolve; Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism). The perspective nevertheless remains within the path-dependent school, by emphasising the importance of that change proceeding according to the parameters established by the initial choice.

[10] Cortell and Peterson, ‘Altered States; Explaining Domestic Institutional Change’; ‘Limiting the Unintended Consequences of Institutional Change’. The empirical evidence from the SDLP suggests that the insights of Cortell and Peterson are correct in that perceived opportunities, rather than simply the ‘threat’ of intra-communal outbidding, drove policymaking. For a critique of the threat/opportunity motivational equation see Goldstone and Tilly, ‘Threat (and Opportunity)’.

[11] Kathleen Thelen argues that path-dependency implies a ‘deterministic’ rendering of historical change and instead proposes a model of layered change (How Institutions Evolve; see also Streeck and Thelen, ‘Institutional Change’, 18–33). Although the development of Irish nationalism chimes with this model, the ongoing nature of layered change, proceeding from initial choices, as presented here is closer to Colin Hay's metaphor of ‘punctuated evolution’ (Political Analysis, 163). Hay's conceptualisation retains the importance of decision-making and early events to historical sequences that Thelen's presentation, arguably, reduces in importance in comparison to her central concern of ‘process tracing’ (see, for example, Streeck and Thelen, ‘Institutional Change’, 6–9).

[12] For example, John Whyte's standard text, Interpreting Northern Ireland; McGarry and O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland.

[13] Hayward, ‘The Politics of Nuance’; Farrington, ‘Reconciliation or Irredentism?’.

[14] Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry have long advocated consociational schemes for Northern Ireland; see, for example, McGarry and O'Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict. See Ruane and Todd, ‘Path Dependence’ for an alternative approach.

[15] Hay, Political Analysis.

[16] Gormley-Heenan, Political Leadership; Dixon, Northern Ireland, ch. 2. Processual metaphors such as ‘constructive (or creative) ambiguity’ are rife in the Northern Ireland political literature. As the path-dependent approach demonstrates, their own inherent ambiguity fails to specify the actual means through which, for example, manipulation mobilises support, or how exactly change occurs.

[17] Irish News, 22 August 1970. Those reforms included a minimum wage, economic development of rural areas, the established of state industries, and ‘cooperation in all fields between North and South’.

[18] Irish News, 3 March 1971. For a recent examination of the party's original reformism, see also McLoughlin, ‘“… it's a United Ireland”’.

[19] Sunday Times Insight Team, Ulster, 259.

[20] See, for instance the Irish Press report that ‘[p]rivately, a couple of members of the [SDLP] have been admitting recently that there seems to be little more that they can secure through parliament, except to…act as watchdogs’. Irish Press, 23 March 1971.

[21] Hume, interview with author, 14 June 2002.

[22] Todd, ‘Nationalism and Republicanism’, 53; Murray and Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 28; McLaughlin, ‘“… it's a United Ireland”’.

[23] Jackson, Home Rule, 267.

[24] The coalition government, headed by Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave, was elected at the beginning of March 1973.

[25] The Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, quickly sided with the SDLP's anti-internment campaign of civil disobedience, telling the British Premier, Edward Heath, that, ‘In the event of the continuation of existing policies attempting military solutions, I intend to support the policy of passive resistance now being pursued by the non-Unionist population’. Lynch to Heath, 19 August 1971, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast (henceforth PRONI) D/3072/1/43/1.

[26] Fanning, ‘Playing it Cool’, 58.

[27] ‘Draft working document on proposals relating to the present situation in Northern Ireland, September 1971’, PRONI D/3072/1/30/1.

[28] Ivan Cooper, ‘Northern Ireland—A Condominium? August 1972’, PRONI D/3072/17/319.

[29] ‘SDLP Proposals, September 1972’, National Archives of Ireland, Dublin (henceforth NAI) DFA/2004/7/2698.

[30] Cabinet Minutes, 12 June 1973, NAI DT/2004/21/624. The approved memorandum called for departments to begin work to secure a ‘strong Council of Ireland with real functions to perform…[that] should be as comprehensive and authoritative as possible’. ‘Memorandum on the Conference Proposed by the British Government's White Paper, 24 May 1973’, ‘SDLP Proposals, September 1972’, National Archives of Ireland, Dublin (henceforth NAI) DFA/2004/7/2698 (hereafter, ‘Memorandum, 24 May 1973’).

[31] See ‘Visit of the Prime Ministers of the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland, 26–27 September 1971’, The National Archives, London (henceforth TNA) PREM 15/487. The suggestion formed part of Faulkner's proposals for reforming Stormont in February and March the following year (see Faulkner to Heath, 16 February 1972, and Faulkner to Heath, 1 March 1972, TNA CJ/4/189); and carried through to his September 1972 ‘Blueprint’ proposals for restoring the Stormont parliament (see Faulkner, Memoirs, 176–7).

[32] Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland, 73.

[33] Daily Express, 7 May 1973.

[34] Inter-Departmental Unit on Northern Ireland, ‘Interim Report on Council of Ireland’, 12 June 1973, NAI DT/2004/21/624.

[35] Costello to Cosgrave, 30 May 1973, NAI AG/2004/1/254.

[36] ‘Report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Possible Functions and Structures of a Council of Ireland, 30 July 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/624. See also, ‘Memorandum to the Government, on the Possible Functions of a Council of Ireland, submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 31 July 1973’, in Costello to Cosgrave, 30 May 1973, NAI AG/2004/1/254 in which Fitzgerald's suggestion of devolving policing to the council is crossed off.

[37] O'Brien urged caution in the government's approach to the North and to the SDLP, who he said were not reliable judges of unionist opinion: ‘some of them have in the past been very unrealistic about reactions in the Protestant community’. O'Brien to Cosgrave, 26 March 1973, NAI AG/2004/1/254. Heath, meanwhile, advised Cosgrave as late as September 1973 to remain cognisant of Faulkner's difficulties; see ‘Heath visit, 17 September 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/624. Furthermore, Cosgrave conveyed these concerns to the party warning it not to overplay its hand and ‘torpedo’ Faulkner but to initiate talks. See ‘Report of a meeting between the SDLP and the Irish government, 20 September 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/670. In secret talks with Irish officials, Faulkner himself outlined a detailed vision of what he was willing to accept at the end of October 1973. Among other matters, Faulkner agreed to go forward with a Council of Ireland on the proviso that he would attend as chief executive. ‘Report of a Meeting between D Nally and B Faulkner, 26 October 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/625.

[38] Farrington, ‘Reconciliation or Irredentism’, 105.

[39] See, for example, Hayward, ‘The Politics of Nuance’; Ivory, ‘Revisions in Nationalist Discourse’.

[40] See Faulkner, Memoirs, 203–25; Currie, All Hell will Break Loose, 211–26.

[41] ‘Report of Conversations with the SDLP, 27 September 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/624.

[42] ‘Report of Conversations with the SDLP, 27 September 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/624

[43] ‘Summary of Government Decisions, December 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/627.

[44] Paddy Devlin claimed that the SDLP approach was ‘get all-Ireland institutions established which, with adequate safeguards, would produce the dynamic that would lead ultimately to an agreed united Ireland. SDLP representatives thus concentrated their entire efforts on seeking a set of tangible powers for the council which in the fullness of time would create and sustain the evolutionary process. All other issues were governed by that approach…’ Straight Left, 205.

[45] ‘Status of Northern Ireland, December 1973’, NAI DT/2004/21/627.

[46] Murray and Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 59; Murphy, ‘Gerry Fitt’, 187.

[47] ‘Visit to Belfast, 9 January 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649.

[48] Devlin expanded on the point, describing how Fitt's room at Stormont adjoined Faulkner's and that since he had no executive responsibilities, ‘he simply has his room, a secretary, and a cabinet of liquor—he has plenty of time to develop a relationship with Faulkner, which will work mainly to Faulkner's advantage’. ‘Visit to Belfast, 9 January 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649

[49] ‘Report of Meeting between the All-Party Committee on Irish Relations and a Delegation from the SDLP, 18 January 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/621.

[50] Hibernia, 15 March 1974.

[51] ‘Note of a Meeting between the Secretary of State and SDLP Assembly Members on 19 March 1974’, TNA CJ 4/521.

[52] ‘Note of a Meeting between the Secretary of State and Dr Fitzgerald, 7 March 1974’, TNA CJ 4/800.

[53] Ibid. Briefing papers for Harold Wilson also contended that Faulkner had ‘little experience of “open” politics’ and that he had become increasingly isolated from his backbenchers and general unionist opinion—‘ironically, he is in many ways closer to his SDLP ministerial colleagues’. The April papers forecast a bleak future for the executive predicting that it may fall amidst a general collapse of Faulkner's assembly party. See ‘Prime Minister's meeting with Rt. Hon Brian Faulkner’, April 1974, TNA PREM 16/163.

[54] ‘Sunningdale: Alternative Courses of Action, 26 March 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/658.

[55] ‘Note of a Meeting between the Secretary of State and a Delegation from the SDLP, 15 May 1974’, TNA CJ 4/473. Seamus Mallon warned Rees that they were ‘not interested in a diluted version of Sunningdale’, and that unless there was movement on internment and the Council of Ireland by the end of June, ‘there would not be [an] SDLP’.

[56] ‘SDLP, Draft Statement, 21 May 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649.

[57] ‘Meeting of the Northern Ireland Executive, 22 May 1974’, PRONI OE/2/26. For the extent of backbench unease at anything that could be presented as a concession, see the SDLP's meeting with NIO minister Stanley Orme ‘Note for the Record, 22 May 1974’, TNA PREM 16/147. Orme assured the party that once the Council of Ireland issue was settled, Westminster would confront the strike. See also Currie, All Hell will Break Loose, 271.

[58] ‘Sean Donlon: Visit to Northern Ireland, 31 May 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649.

[59] Donlon claims that, ‘Hume and others are even talking about leaving politics and Hume is, for financial reasons, immediately looking for a job’. ‘Sean Donlon: Visit to Northern Ireland, 31 May 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649

[60] ‘Sean Donlon: Visit to Northern Ireland, 31 May 1974’, NAI DT/2005/7/649

[61] Note on briefing by Taoiseach, 7 June 1974', NAI DT/2005/7/658.

[62] McAllister, The SDLP; Murray, John Hume.

[63] McAllister, The SDLP, 146.

[64] Murray and Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP.

[65] ‘Memorandum, 24 May 1973’: Murray and Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, 48.

[66] For example, Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party, 220; Devlin, Straight Left, 205.

[67] Spotlight, BBC One, 5 May 1994, ‘The UWC Strike in 1974: 20 Years On’.

[68] Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors, 197; Farrington, ‘Reconciliation or Irredentism?’

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cillian McGrattan

Cillian McGrattan is currently completing a Ph.D. at the University of Ulster at Jordanstown, which was made possible by funding from the Department for Employment and Learning (Northern Ireland).