The Ambiguities of Opposition: Economic Decline, International Cooperation, and Political Rivalry in the Nuclear Policies of the Labour Party, 1963–1964

Abstract

This article explores the twenty-month period between Harold Wilson securing the leadership of the opposition in February 1963 and the General Election of October 1964. It considers how Wilson balanced his own approach to nuclear weapons with the demands of the party and broader international constraints. As the Leader of the Opposition principally sought to satisfy the needs of the party, which often came at the expense of a more conciliatory negotiating position with Washington. In private discussions with foreign officials, he vigorously contested any future commitments to nuclear sharing, and cast doubt on Britain's future as a nuclear power. International pressures, however, eventually led the Leader of the Opposition to produce a number of subtle caveats to his negotiating position. In contrast to this private and more aggressive style of nuclear diplomacy, Wilson's public position was far more ambivalent and intentionally ambiguous. Claims that he could not make a final decision on the future of the Polaris programme, and thus nuclear sharing, until he was in power provided a convenient way to keep the party united without necessarily committing to cancellation. Wilson's criticisms of the Polaris programme also complemented the Labour Party's efforts to highlight the Conservative government's perceived mishandling of the national economy.

Keywords:

• Harold Wilson
• Labour Party
• Nuclear Weapons
• US–UK Relations
• British Economy

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the comments and advice of Professor Len Scott, Dr Andrew Priest, Dr Thomas Robb, The Royal Historical Society and Michael Gill on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to Royal Historical Society and LBJ Library for their generous assistance with my research. Any error of fact or judgement is entirely my own.

Notes

David James Gill is a Lecturing Fellow at the School of Political, Social, and International Studies at the University of East Anglia. He has recently written articles for Diplomacy and Statecraft, International Affairs, and The Journal of Strategic Studies.

  [1] See, for instance, Cooper, ‘Margaret Thatcher and the Transatlantic Relationship before Power’, 23–42; Heffernan, ‘New Labour and Thatcherism’, 56–7.

  [2] Pimlott, Wilson, 319; Hennessy, Muddling through, 249.

  [3] Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 133–203; Priest, ‘In American Hands’, 353–76; Priest, ‘From Hardware to Software’, 148–161; Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb’, 685–700; Macintyre, Anglo-German Relations, Ch. 2 and 5.

  [4] An exception to this criticism is Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 251–72. For Wilson's major biographies, see Pimlott, Harold Wilson; Morgan, Harold Wilson; Ziegler, Wilson.

  [5] For a fuller discussion on the Nassau conference, see: Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 231–42; Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 319–58.

  [6] Ponting, Breach of Promise, 87; Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 31; Vickers, ‘Foreign Policy Beyond Europe’, 139. Biographical accounts supporting this view can be found in: Wilson, Labour Government, 40; Benn, Wilderness, 94–5; Healey, The Time of My Life, 302.

  [7] Shrimsley, Hundred Days, 88–9; Ziegler, Wilson, 208; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 262–7; Hennessy, The Secret State, 70–1; Young, ‘International Factors’, 363.

  [8] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 252–81; Ziegler, Wilson, 136; Healey, The Time of My Life, 156. The first ballot was declared on 7 February, with Wilson achieving 115 votes against 88 for Brown and 41 for Callaghan. The second ballot result was declared on 14 February, with Wilson securing 144 votes against Brown's 103 Wilson is alleged to have stated that he ‘hadn't lost a moment's sleep in this contest’: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 259; Ziegler, Wilson, 136.

  [9] Labour History Archive, Manchester, Labour Party Annual Reports, 1960–61; Benn, Wilderness, 64; Castle, Fighting all the Way, 326, 336.

 [10] Hennessy, Muddling through, 266. Wilson makes a similar claim in, Wilson, The Governance of Britain, 156–7.

 [11] One should be wary of simplifying the Labour Party as two opposing factions: Favretto, ‘“Wilsonism” Reconsidered’, 54–80.

 [12] Fielding, ‘Rethinking Labour's 1964 Campaign’, 71.

 [13] Butler and King, The British General Election, 72; Morgan, The People's Peace, 231; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 87.

 [14] See, for example, Callaghan, Time & Chance, 150; Jones, Michael Foot, 270; Healey, The Time of My Life, 150; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 19.

 [15] Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 31; Phythian, ‘CND's Cold War’, 139–41; Taylor, Against the Bomb, 275–314, specifically 309.

 [16] Young, ‘International Factors’, 364.

 [17] Hansard, HC Deb 05 March 1963, vol. 673, cc223–224.

 [18] Tomlinson, ‘Managing the Economy’, 565–8; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “Decline”’, 748; Blaazer, ‘Devalued and Dejected Britons’, 125; Fielding, ‘Rethinking Labour's 1964 Campaign’, 317.

 [19] Blaazer, ‘Devalued and Dejected Britons’, 125.

 [20] Hansard, HC Deb 05 March 1963 vol. 673, cc328–329.

 [21] The Harold Wilson Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford (Hereafter HWP), NBC, Meet the Press, Volume 7, No. 13, Sunday 7 April 1963.

 [22] HWP, MS. Wilson. C.881, Letter from Patrick Gordon Walker, 12 March 1963; Healey, The Time of My Life, 302; Benn, Wilderness, 94–5.

 [23] Austin, Texas, USA, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (Hereafter LBJL), National Security File (Hereafter NSF), Security File, Box 34, American Embassy London to Department of State, 21 October 1964.

 [24] Healey, The Time of My Life, 245.

 [25] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 326–7; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–6.

 [26] See, for instance, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 314; Haftendorn, Nuclear Revolution, 111–39.

 [27] Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 39–46; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 133–162; Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 294–5, 326–31; For an excellent discussion of the nuclear control issue within NATO, see, Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon.

 [28] Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141.

 [29] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 326.

 [30] See, for instance, Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324.

 [31] Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141.

 [32] The National Archives, London, Public Records Office, (Hereafter PRO), DEFE 25/33, Note of conversation between S of S and Mr A. E. M. Duynstee, 2 November 1964; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 91.

 [33] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 328.

 [34] Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence’, 228; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 89–91; Young, Labour Governments, 116; Wilson, Labour Government, 41; Wilson, Labour Government, 49; Healey, The Time of My Life, 245, 304.

 [35] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 330.

 [36] Schrafstetter and Twigge, Trick or Truth, 165–6.

 [37] Holt, ‘Lord Home and Anglo-American Relations’, 712–3.

 [38] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 328–9.

 [39] Reed and Williams, Policies of Power, 158.

 [40] Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence’, 228.

 [41] Pearce, Political Diaries, 300.

 [42] HC Deb 04 March 1963 vol. 673, cc61.

 [43] Priest, ‘From Hardware to Software’, 148–61.

 [44] The Gordon Walker Papers, Churchill Archive, Cambridge (Hereafter GNWR), 1/15, Note, 12 March 1963; HWP, MS Wilson C. 881, Confidential Letter from Gordon Walker to Wilson, 12 March 1963.

 [45] Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb’, 688; Healey outlines this proposal in a Fabian Society lecture in 1957: ‘A neutral belt in Europe’ in Healey, When Shrimps Learn to Whistle, 159–75.

 [46] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 85, quoting: JFK, POF, Countries, Box 127A, United Kingdom, Security, 1/63-4/63, Brubeck to Bundy, 30 March 1963: Note of meeting between Wilson and Rostow, 30 March 1963.

 [47] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 310–1.

 [48] GNWR 1/15, Note, 29 May.

 [49] GNWR 1/15, Note, 29 May.

 [50] GNWR 1/15, Note, 29 May.

 [51] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86, quoting: JFK, NSF, Country Files, Box 170, United Kingdom, 1/2163-12/31/62, Memorandum of Conversation, 29 May 1963.

 [52] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86, quoting JFK, NSF, RSF, Box 218, Multilateral Force, General, 5/22/63-5/31/63, Memorandum of conversation between Merchant and Gordon Walker, 29 May 1963.

 [53] GNWR 1/15, Note, 31 May.

 [54] Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141.

 [55] GNWR 1/15, Note, 6 April 1963.

 [56] Pearce, Political Diaries, 284–5.

 [57] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87, quoting JFK, NSF, RSF, Box 218 A, Multilateral Force, General, 11/1/63-11/14/63, Bruce to Rusk, 14 November 1963.

 [58] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86–7.

 [59] GNWR 1/15, Summary of discussions between Wilson Gordon Walker and Khrushchev, Gromyko and Gomulka on separate occasions. June 1963.

 [60] Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence’, 228; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86–7; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 89–91; Young, Labour Governments, 116; Wilson, Labour Government, 41; Owen, The Politics of Defence, 180.

 [61] Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 330; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth?’, 166.

 [62] PRO, DEFE 7/2028, Washington to FO, 31 January 1964.

 [63] Ponting, Breach of Promise, 90; Ellison, Transatlantic Crisis, 19.

 [64] Young, Labour Governments, 20; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Young, Labour Governments, 20; Ellison, Transatlantic Crisis, 19–20; Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence’, 222.

 [65] Young, ‘International Factors’, 356.

 [66] Wilson, Labour Government, 40; Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 24 and 31; Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 203–4.

 [67] Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 252; Young, ‘International Factors’, 356.

 [68] Healey, The Time of My Life, 242; Ziegler, Wilson, 208.

 [69] See, for example, Ziegler, Wilson, 516; Healey, The Time of My Life, 331; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 403; Hennessy, Muddling through, 247–9; Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson, 330; Heath, The Course of My Life, 250; Dockrill, ‘Britain's Power and Influence’, 211–3; Owen, Time to Declare, 47.

 [70] Hennessy, The Secret State, 71.

 [71] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308.

 [72] HWP, MSC. Wilson C.891, Brown to Wilson 18 February 1964.

 [73] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308.

 [74] Wilson, The Making of a Prime Minister, 201; Ziegler, Wilson, 142, 152.

 [75] PRO, PREM 11/4733, Thorneycroft to Douglas Home, 3 February 1964.

 [76] Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, 167; Hennessy, The Secret State, 71. In both cases, Hennessy refers to PRO, PREM 11/4733, Thorneycroft to Douglas Home, 3 February 1964.

 [77] See, for instance, Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324.

 [78] Reed and Williams, Policies of Power, 163–4.

 [79] 690 HC Debs. col. 480–1 (26 February 1964).

 [80] Healey, The Time of My Life, 302. It has been alleged that Healey thought the Polaris programme would continue under a Labour government and had made every effort to ensure that Labour was not irrevocably tied into surrendering the deterrent: Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 264.

 [81] LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy London to Department of State, 21 October 1964.

 [82] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87, Quoting: LBJ, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Box 213, Rostow to Tyler, 17 February 1964.

 [83] Ziegler, Wilson, 208: Ziegler references: LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, documents 10, (Memorandum of Conversation between Wilson and Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 2 March 1964) and 17a (Memorandum of Conversation between Wilson and William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 2 March 1964).

 [84] LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, document 10, 5 March 1964 (Memorandum of Conversation between Wilson and Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 2 March 1964).

 [85] LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Memorandum of Conversation between Wilson and William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 2 March 1964.

 [86] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS hereafter), 1964–1968, (Volume) XII, document 227, Tour d'Horizon with Harold Wilson, 2 March 1964.

 [87] Ziegler, Wilson, 124.

 [88] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 88; Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 266.

 [89] During his first formal meeting on the subject of the bomb after taking office, Wilson was keen to use the bomb to extract ‘substantial concessions’ from the US: PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1: Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 November 1964; PRO, CAB, 130/213, MISC. 17/1-4 Meeting(s), Defence Policy, Minutes of Meetings Held at Chequers, 21 November 1964 and 22 November 1964.

 [90] LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy London to Department of State, 21 October 1964.

 [91] Healey, The Time of My Life, 307; Vickers, ‘Foreign Policy Beyond Europe’, 139; Hennessy, Muddling through, 116; Owen, Time to Declare, 146.

 [92] LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Harold Wilson, 3 March 1964.

 [93] HWP, MSC. Wilson C.891, Letter to Wilson from Wayland Young, 20 May 1964.

 [94] LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Harold Wilson, 3 March 1964.

 [95] Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87.

 [96] Healey, Time of My Life, 302. This is in contrast to the Prime Minister's recollections: Wilson, Labour Government, 40–1.

 [97] Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 284–5; Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 32; Hennessy, The Secret State, 72.

 [98] Walker, ‘Labour Foreign and Defence Policy’, 391–8; Mulley, ‘NATO's Nuclear Problems’, 21–35.

 [99] Wilson, The Making of a Prime Minister, 201; Ziegler, 142, 152.

[100] Young, ‘International Factors’, 355.

[101] LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Harold Wilson, 3 March 1964.

[102] Morgan, Pimlott, and Ziegler all make these claims in their lengthy biographies on Wilson.

[103] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308.

[104] Hughes, Harold Wilson's Cold War, 51.

[105] GNWR 1/15, Note, 30 April 1964.

[106] MSC. Wilson C.891, Lobby Briefing 13 May 1964.

[107] HWP, MS. Wilson. C.55, Letter to G. Banner, 15 April 1964; Letter to Mr Boyd, 10 March 1964; Reply to Mr Johnstone, 10 July 1964.

[108] HWP, MS. Wilson. C891. Wayland Young, ‘Bombs and Votes’, Fabian Tract 354 (May 1964). On page four Young states, ‘The Labour Party has been thirteen years without contact with the official planners in this complicated and largely secret field; it is right that we should refuse to be drawn into detail’.

[109] Wilson, Labour Government, 40.

[110] Benn, Wilderness, 108.

[111] Benn, Wilderness, 108; Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, 373.

[112] Hennessy, Whitehall, 188.

[113] Ziegler, Wilson, 152–3.

[114] Morgan, Harold Wilson, 254; Ziegler, Wilson, 157–8.

[115] Dale, General Election Manifestos, 123–4; Butler and King, The British General Election, 130.

[116] Tomlinson, ‘It's the Economy, Stupid’, 338.

[117] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 306; Wilson, Making of a Prime Minister, 200.

[118] This is erroneously suggested by a number of authors. See, for example, Morgan, The People's Peace, 283; Owen, Time to Declare, 146. Owen claims that ‘Most Labour MPs forgot that they had fought the 1964 Election on getting rid of Polaris’; Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, 145.

[119] Wilson, Labour Government, 201; Roth, Yorkshire Walter Mitty, 301; Ziegler, Wilson, 157; Howard, Crossman, 263; Young, ‘International Factors’, 355–6.

[120] Young, ‘International Factors’, 355.

[121] Shrimsley, Hundred Days, 73.

[122] Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 263; Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, 31; Hennessy, Muddling through, 114; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Ponting, Breach of Promise, 87; Hennessy, The Secret State, 70; Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb’, 689.

[123] Shrimsley, Hundred Days, 73.

[124] Respectively: Wrigely, ‘Now you see it now you don't’, 123–35; Coopey, ‘Industrial Policy in the White Heat of the Scientific Revolution’, 102–22.

[125] Hennessy, Muddling through, 114.

[126] See, for instance, Tomlinson, Economic Policy; Fielding, Labour and Cultural Change; Thompson, ‘Labour's “Gannex Conscience”?’, 136–50.

[127] Pierre, Nuclear Politics, 252; Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 203–4; Heath, The Course of My Life, 266; Young, ‘International Factors’, 354 and 363.

[128] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 311.

[129] Young, ‘International Factors’, 359–64.

[130] Young, ‘International Factors’, 369 footnote 41.

[131] Butler and King, The British General Election, 131.

[132] Young, ‘International Factors’, 351–71.

[133] LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy London to Department of State, 21 October 1964.

[134] Butler and King, The British General Election, 130.

[135] Haftendorn, Nuclear Revolution, 131–2.

[136] PRO, PREM 13/25, Bonn to Foreign Office, 9 October 1964; FRUS, 1964–1968, XIII, documents 36–38, correspondence between Erhard and Johnson and memorandum of conversation between West German and US representatives on the MLF, 30 September 1964 to 7 October 1964; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth?’, 167.

[137] PRO, PREM 13/25, Record of Meeting, 23 and 26 October.

[138] Pearce, Political Diaries, 299–300.

[139] PRO, DEFE 7/2028, Washington to FO, 31 January 1964 originally located in Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 331; The Labour government formally acknowledges this threat after coming to power: PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC. 17/3, Defence Policy, 21 November 1964.

[140] Hennessy, Muddling through, 116.

[141] PRO, PREM 13/1273, Note, 4 March 1966.

[142] PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker Diary Memorandum, 26 December 1964, Record of meeting, 22 October 1964.

[143] Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 300–1.

[144] Wilson, Labour Government, 44.

[145] 1964 General Election results: Labour: 317, Conservatives: 304, Liberal: 9. The Labour Party was thus returned to power with a majority of only four seats.

[146] Wilson, The Labour Government, 2.

[147] Home, The Way the Wind Blows, 215.

[148] Wilson, The Labour Government, 40; Hennessy, The Secret State, 70.

[149] Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 235; Healey, The Time of My Life, 303–4.

[150] See endnote 3.

[151] Hennessy, Muddling through, 114.

[152] PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 November 1964; PRO, CAB 128/39, Cabinet Meeting, 26 November 1964.

[153] LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy London to Department of State, 21 October 1964.