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ABSTRACT
The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, especially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive effects on Anglo-American relations. This article recasts this decision as a shrewd manoeuvre in extremely tight circumstances, balancing multiple interests and preventing an open breach with Kennedy’s Congo policy. Moreover, ‘stand aside’ facilitated subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which this article demonstrates by examining events beyond December 1962, where much of the current analysis peters out.
Acknowledgement
Dr Marsh expresses his appreciation to the University of Valencia for its support of this research under the 'Attracting International Talent' scheme and to the Department of Contemporary History, especially Dr Encarna Garcia for her insights and advice.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. Cf Dumbrell, A Special Relationship; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations and Reynolds and Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart.
2. For a collection of perspectives on this speech see Butler and Stockwell, eds. The Wind of Change.
3. Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role; and Middeke, “Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation,” 69–96.
4. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War.
5. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis,195.
6. Kent, “Anglo-American Diplomacy: The not so Special Relationship,” 133.
7. James, “Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis,” 152.
8. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 34; Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 8; and Olaopa and Ojakorotu, “Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 247.
9. Olaopa and Ojakorotu, “Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 247.
10. Othen, Katanga 1960–1963, 27.
11. Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 9.
12. Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 10; Othen, Katanga 1960–1963, 27; and Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDE), Robinson McIlvaine, 7 July, 1978, Oral History, 23.
13. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 17; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 46.
14. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 59.
15. James, “Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis,” 154.
16. Olaopa and Ojakorotu, “Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 247; Gijs, “Fighting the red peril in the Congo,” 283; and Kent, Cold War conflict in the Congo.
17. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 64; and De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 6.
18. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJ), National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State, 27 January 1961, 4.
19. DDE, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1952–1961, International Series, Box 3, Congo (1), Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 9 July 1960.
20. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJ), National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State, 27 January 1961, 4–6.
21. Ibid., 6–7.
22. For an introduction to indigenous Katangese leaders see Larmer and Kennes, “Rethinking the Katangese Secession,” 741–761.
23. UK National Archives (UKNA), FO 371/176725, G. E Millard to Sir Roderick Barclay, 27 February 1964; Kent, “Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo,” 96–97.
24. Kent, “Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo,” 96.
25. UKNA, FO 371/146659, JB 1019/8, ‘Recognition of Katanga as independent’ comment by Belgian PM, memo by African Department, 13 July 1960.
26. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 66.
27. In the early 1960s, seventeen African countries were preparing for independence and subsequently, both Washington and Moscow were reviewing their African policies. Namikas explains that in the rawest form, both superpowers, wanting as many allies as possible were prepared to secure the allegiances of any newly independent African state. Namikas, 47; DDE, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central and East, ‘US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa’ 19 January 1960.
28. For an indication of the Eisenhower administration’s interest in Catholicism as a bulwark against communism in the Congo see DDE, Dulles, Eleanor Lansing: Papers 1880–1973, Box 33, Africa Trip Oct. 1960—Jan. 1961 (6), handwritten note. For a scholarly consideration of religion and anti-communism see Kirby, Religion and the Cold War.
29. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, 9–10.
30. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 38; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 68.
31. UKNA, FO 371/146644, ‘The Situation in the Congo’, memo by African Department, 14 September 1960; UKNA, FO 371/154964, ‘Washington Talking Points: Congo’, brief by the Foreign Office, 20 March 1961.
32. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 72; LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, 8.
33. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, 9.
34. DDE, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central and East, ‘Statement of US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa, 19 January 1960, 1.
35. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa- Congo Box 86 ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State 27 January 1961,18–21.
36. UKNA, FO 371/146769, Brief by the Foreign Office, 14 July 1960.
37. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 43.
38. See footnote four in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 18 July 1961, [online] available from. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d132 (accessed March 9, 2017).
39. Ibid.
40. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 25.
41. FRUS, Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 July 1960, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d140 (accessed November 20, 2017).
42. FRUS, Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, 26 August 1960, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d190> (accessed October 29, 2016).
43. Kent, “Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo,” 108.
44. DDE, US National Security Council Records Presidential Records, Intelligence Files 1953-61, Box 1, Minutes of Special Group Meetings, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 10 November 1960.
45. DDE, Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, NSC Series Box 13, 456th Meeting of the NSC 18 August 1960.
46. John F Kennedy Presidential Library (JFK), National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961.
47. Lefever, United National Peacekeeping in the Congo 1960–1964, 22–23.
48. DDE, White House Office Files, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol II (7), Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President, 15 December 1960.
49. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 123.
50. Ibid., 121.
51. JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961.
52. De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 118; Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 200–205; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 125.
53. Currently, there is no consensus as to when Kennedy was informed of Lumumba’s death. Lumumba’s return to power continued to be debated within Kennedy’s administration into mid-January 1961. First reports indicating suspicions of Lumumba’s death emerged on 17 January 1961 but the official announcement of Lumumba’s death was made on 13 February. FRUS Special National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d2> (accessed November 27, 2016); Ibid., Editorial Note, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d6> (accessed November 27, 2016); JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General, 1/61-4/61, Statement by US Representative in Security Council, 13 February 1961.
54. See note 51 above.
55. The Analytical Chronology Report perhaps best demonstrates that the Kennedy administration’s focus on the ‘Katanga Issue’ was initiated in August 1961 after ‘Efforts to Achieve Unity: March 1961-July 1961’, JFK, National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo General, “Congo Chronology,” 25–32.
56. At the July 1961 Lovanium gathering, where the Congolese leaders gathered to elect a new government, the CIA reportedly spent $23 000 in order to strengthen Adoula’s position during the closed meetings. FRUS, Editorial Note, Volume XX, Congo crisis, Document 71 [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d71> (accessed October 20, 2016); Ibid., Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 28 April 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d62 (accessed March 9, 2017). For an indication of Adoula’s political opposition to Lumumba see Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 70.
57. Ibid., Editorial Note, 20–21 February 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d34> (accessed November 28, 2016).
58. Ibid, Editorial Note, 28 August 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d100> (accessed February 20, 2017).
59. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 149–151.
60. In Operation Rumpunch, ONUC forces seized the headquarters of the gendarmerie, the radio station and other communications buildings in Elisabethville. On the same day Tshombé agreed to cooperate with the ONUC’s withdrawal request and the operation was halted. Hammarskjöld approved Operation Morthor after the arrival of new mercenary forces in Katanga. ONUC forces seized control of outposts in Elisabethville and made moves to arrest Tshombé but Rhodesian intervention precluded this. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 150–151; for Belgian and British reactions see footnotes in FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium, 15 September 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d111> (accessed March 8, 2017).
61. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 153; FRUS, Editorial Note, 116 [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116 (accessed November 29, 2017).
62. UKNA, CAB 130/178, Minutes of a meeting held at Admiralty House, The Congo, 12 September 1961.
63. United States National Archives (USNA), RG 59, Conference Files, Box 273, CF 2023- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, folder 2 of 2, Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 28 December 1961.
64. Ibid, CF 2025- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, Briefing Book, Congo: US.-UK. Differences, 18 December 1961.
65. JFK, Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Box 68, Congo General, 2/61-10/61, United States Policy in the Congo Report, 21 September 1961, 5.
66. JFK, National Security Files, Box 27A, Countries, Congo General 5/61-9/61, Memorandum for the President, report by Dean Rusk, 3 August 1961.
67. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 156.
68. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28, Congo General 12/21/61-12/31/61, Outgoing Telegram, Department of State, 29 December 1961; FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 26 December 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d181> (accessed February 20, 2017).
69. Recognising that Adoula and Tshombé were unlikely to come to an agreement through negotiations alone, Director of the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman sent a report suggesting policy alternatives to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk in March 1961. The report recommended ‘strong external pressures on both parties.’ JFK, National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo-General 3/10/62-4/30/62, Policy Alternatives in the Congo, report by Roger Hilsman, 29 March 1962.
70. U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary General on 3 November 1961. See for instance, footnote two in FRUS, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 11 November 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d140 (accessed November 29, 2017). For George Ball’s thoughts on the Congo, see JFK, National Security Files, Box 31, Countries, Congo Cables 7/16/62-7/23/62, Telegram from the Department of State, 21 July 1962.
71. Ibid., Box 28 A, Countries, Congo-General 8/3/62-8/10/62, Proposal for National Reconciliation, National Security Action Memorandum, 2 August 1962.
72. FRUS, Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Fredericks), 6 August 1962, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d269> (accessed February 20, 2017).
73. The National Reconciliation Plan was also referred to informally as the ‘U Thant Plan’, the ‘conciliation plan’ and the ‘plan’. FRUS, Memorandum for the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 11 August 1962, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d274 (accessed February 20, 2017).
74. Although the plan was generally supported by the French, Belgian and British governments, political participation varied significantly. The French refused to participate, the British refused to participate after phase two and the Belgians refused to participate after stage three. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A Countries, Congo General 8/11/61-8/27/62, Current Status of Proposed Action on the Congo, Department of State Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 11 August 1962.
75. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 164.
76. JFK, National Security Files, Box 32, Countries, Congo Cables 9/24/62-9/30/62, Telegram from New York to the Secretary of State, 25 September 1962.
77. USNA, RG59, Conference Files, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan Nassau Meeting, Memcons, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Congo, 19 December 1962.
78. For information on the British decision to stand aside, see Ibid., 21 December 1962. For information on Operation Glandslam see, FRUS, Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen), 28 December 1962,[online] available from < https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d387> (accessed February 20, 2017).
79. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174; FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 14 January 1963, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d411 (accessed February 20, 2017).
80. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A, Countries, Congo General 14/12/62-17/12/62, Congo Scenario, n.d.
81. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 109; James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 195; and O’Malley, “Anglo-American-UN relations during the Congo Crisis,” 40.
82. UKNA, CAB 130/178, ‘The Congo’, Cabinet Report, 12 September 1961.
83. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 124.
84. James, “Britain, the Cold War and the Congo Crisis,” 154.
85. UKNA, FO 371/146640, ‘British Business Interests in the Katanga’, report by E.B. Boothby, 20 July 1960.
86. Passemiers, “Safeguarding White Minority Power,” 70–91.
87. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 112.
88. UKNA, FO 371/154954, Letter from Sir Roy Welensky to Lord Home, West and Central African Department, 21 April 1961.
89. Oxford Bodleian Libraries, MSS. Macmillan dep, substitute for MS. Macmillan dep, d 46, 5 August 1962; Harold Macmillan diary note, 5 August 1962, cited in, Horne, Harold Macmillan, 405.
90. Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 113; and Williams, Who Killed Hammarskold? 135–139.
91. For correspondence between Welensky and Home, see Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days, 209–240; and Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 114–115.
92. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 140.
93. UKNA, FO 371/155007, Bombs for the UN in the Congo, FO Minute by K.M Wilford, 9 November 1961; PREM 11/3168, Telegram from UK Delegation to the UN, 12 December 1961.
94. Ibid., Meeting of Ministers to consider further the supply of bombs to the United Nations, Foreign Office note to Mr. Stevens, 7 December 1961.
95. UKNA, CAB 128/35, Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1961.
96. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 116; and O’Malley, “What an awful body the UN have become!!,” 37.
97. Oxford Bodleian Libraries, MS. Macmillan dep. c. 943, extract from H.M’s letter to the Queen, 13 December 1961.
98. JFK, Oral History Program, Lord Harlech recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, 36–37.
99. See JFK, The Personal Papers of George W Ball, Box 2 of 9, Congo 12/5/61-12/22/61, Telecon: Bundy/Ball, 13 December 1962; Ibid., telecon, Gov. Stevenson/Ball, 13 December 1962; Ibid., Oral History Program, Lord Harlech, recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, 37.
100. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Brief for the Cabinet Meeting on 11 December, F.O Minute by G.E, Millard, 10 December 1962.
101. UKNA, FO 371/161485, Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Dean Rusk at the American Embassy in Paris, 11 December 1962.
102. JFK, President’s Weekend Reading, Box 5, Weekend Reading, 26 May 1962.
103. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 30 A, Congo Cables 5/14/62-5/19/62, Telegram from London to Secretary of State, 16 May 1962.
104. Ibid., Box 28 A, Congo General 12/14/62-12/17/62, Report of Conversation with Secretary General U Thant on the Congo, memorandum from Harlan Cleveland, 16 December 1962.
105. UKNA, PREM 11/3630, ‘Congo’ memorandum by Michael Cary, 10 December 1962.
106. UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Secret and Personal’ Derek Riches to Sir Roger Stevens, 28 December 1962.
107. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 32, Congo Cables 9/24/62-9/30/62, Telegram to from New York to Secretary of State, 24 September 1962.
108. FRUS, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 25 September 1962 [online] available from http://state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d295 (accessed February 2, 2017).
109. USNA, RG 59 Conferences, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan, Nassau Meeting, Dec 19–20, 1962 memcons, The Congo, 21 December 1962.
110. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Resolution urging HMG to refrain from the forcible solution of Congo crisis, motion by Mr. Tufton Beamish, 12 December 1962.
111. Ibid, Statement by the Leader of the House, 13 December 1962.
112. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.
113. UKNA, CAB 130/178, Minutes of a meeting, Subject: The Congo, 12 September 1961.
114. UKNA, FO 371/161478, Letter to Macmillan from Patrick Dean, 4 December 1962.
115. Ibid., telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 17 December 1962.
116. UKNA, FO 371/167244, UK Aid to the Congo, FO Minute by P. M. Foster, 9 January 1963.
117. JFK, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo cables 1/1/63-1/5/63, Message from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January, 1962.
118. British Foreign Office officials were informed that the Congo refused to be compared with a ‘small child to whom one gives a piece of sugar to keep it quiet’. UKNA, FO 371/167244, Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office by Mr. Riches, 9 January 1963.
119. The Belgian Ambassador in Elisabethville was also requested to leave. JFK, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/1963-1/10/1963, Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 10 January, 1963.
120. Ibid., Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963.
121. Ibid., Telegram Department of State to American Embassy in Leopoldville, 10 January 1963.
122. Ibid, 1/11/1963-1/20/1963, Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 11 January 1963.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1963.
125. UKNA, PREM 11/4084, Secret memorandum to Philip de Zulueta from Tom Bridges, 14 January 1963.
126. USNA, RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/12-2962–/1-163, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962.
127. UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Congo’ brief for Cabinet Meeting by West and Central African Department, 2 January 1963.
128. Ibid., ‘Congo’ Brief for the Nassau Conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963‘ USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram from the Department of State, 3 January 1963.
129. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28 A, Congo General 1 1 63/1/15/63.
130. Ibid, Box 33 A, Congo Cables XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State, 30 December 1962.
131. For Gullion’s reservations for instance, see USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January 1963, for reservations concerning American public opinion, see Ibid., 770.g 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 8 January 1963.
132. The policy was first put forward by G.E Millard, head of the Western and Central African Department in December 1963. He explained that the idea was ‘inglorious’ but ‘good tactics.’ UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Congo’ brief for the Nassau conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963.
133. The message was meant to be sent to Tshombé through the British High Commissioner in Rhodesia, Lord Alport but on 4 January the communication route was queried with the Foreign Office ultimately deciding they preferred ‘to use the Union Minière Channel.’ For details see, UKNA, FO 371/167244, Message from HMG to Tshombé, 1 January 1963; Message from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 4 January 1963; Message from Foreign Office to Elisabethville, 4 January 1963.
134. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/1/63-1/5/63, Telegram from London to Secretary of State, January 4 1963.
135. Ibid., Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 5 January 1963.
136. Ibid., Box 33 A, Congo Cables Vol. XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962.
137. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from the Department of State, 8 January 1963.
138. Ibid.
139. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 368; and JFKL, National Security Files, Countries, Box 33 A, Congo Cables Vol. XV, 12/28/62-12/31/62, Outgoing Telegram from the Secretary of State, 31 December 1962.
140. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 3 January 1963.
141. Ibid., Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.
142. Sobelair, a Belgian company had a commercial airplane in Elisabethville under UN protection. The UN subsequently permitted the plane to fly to Kolwezi, pick up Tshombé and fly to Kipushi where Tshombé would then make his way to Elisabethville by road. Ibid, Telegram from New York (Plimpton) to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.
143. On 9 January, the UN also moved into Kolwezi- home of two of the province’s key dams and power generators. Tshombé again issued his scorched earth policy and demanded that all administrative workers refuse to cooperate with the UN. He was consequently placed under house arrest, from which on 11 January he escaped. On 14 January, Tshombé wrote to Adoula stating that the Katangese gendarmerie were ‘ready to proclaim immediately before the whole world that the secession of Katanga is over.’ Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174; JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/63-1/10/63, Telegram Leopoldville (Gullion) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Telegram Salisbury (Geren) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Congo Cables 1/11/63-1/20/63, Telegram from Salisbury to Secretary of State, 14 January 1963.
144. UKNA, FO 371/176683, ‘British Policy in the Congo’ report by G. E. Millard, 25 February 1964.
145. Ibid.
146. On 31 May 1963 Tshombé escaped to Spain to avoid house arrest as UN troops brought the final holdouts in Katanga under control. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174. For Tshombé’s return to the Congo, see Ibid., 191.
147. UKNA, FO 371/176653, Telegram from Leopoldville (Mr. Rose) to Foreign Office, 10 July 1964.
148. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 196–197; and LBJ, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3 8/64 [2 of 2], Telegram from Dar-Es-Salaam to Department of State, 5 August 1964.
149. UKNA, FO 371/176660, Comments on the American Attitude to the OAU’s Discussing Military Assistance to the Congo, memo by R.J. R. Owen, 9 July 1964.
150. Ibid., Interview with Mr. Looram of the State Department, report by R.J.R Jones, 4 August 1964.
151. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa- Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3, 8/64 [2 of 2] Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 5 August 1964.
152. The Americans had previously utilised the island in the Second World War and again in 1957. UKNA, CO 968/809, Letter to Sir John Field of Pantation House from R. G. Pettitt, 27 October 1964; Ibid., Letter to Mr. Eastwood from J. D Higham, 25 November 1964.
153. For information on the American letter see, UKNA, CO 968/809, Memo from C.M. Rose to John Higham in the Colonial Office, 30 September 1964. For British reaction see, Ibid., Letter to C. M. Rose from J. D. Higham, 7 October 1964; Ibid., Letter to J. D. Higham from C. M. Rose, 13 November 1964.
154. UKNA, FO 371/176746, Telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 22 November 1964.
155. LBJ, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 83, Congo, Volume 6 10/64-11/64 [3 of 4], Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964.
156. UKNA, CO 968/809, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 November.
157. The request was initially sent on 21 November but it was extended until the Operation had been completed on 24 November. See Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension Island (Administrator) 21 November 1964; Ibid., 22 November 1964; Ibid., 23 November 1964, Ibid., 24 November 1964.
158. Ibid, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Ascension Island (Administrator), 23 November 1964.
159. The telegram notes that the ‘U.S Government are most grateful for the imposition of the black-out.’ Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Ascension.
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Steve Marsh
Dr Steve Marsh is Reader in International Politics and has published widely on Anglo-American relations, American foreign policy and the external relations of the European Union. His most recent book is co-edited with Alan P Dobson (2017) Churchill and the Anglo-American Special RelationshipTia Culley is a Research Assistant and visiting scholar at the Gerald R Ford Presidential Library.