Abstract
Statelessness as a legal and political problem has attracted increasing attention from scholars and international advocacy organisations in recent years. This attention has predominantly focussed on the legal aspects of statelessness, and has generally held the acquisition of citizenship documentation as the primary goal in remedying citizenship deprivation. This article explores the merits of this focus through a case study of the Nubians of Kenya, widely considered stateless until recently. The article connects the focus on citizenship as documented status to a liberal conception of citizenship. The article identifies the ways in which this approach is helpful, that is, as a means of pursuing legal status and possession of individual rights. It then goes on to identify more important ways in which a liberal conception of citizenship falls short of accounting for the Nubians' citizenship problems by neglecting the more collective dimensions of citizenship practice and recognition.
Notes
1. A recent guideline produced by UNHCR (Citation2012) in relation to the definition of statelessness suggests that the common distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness is unhelpful, and offers authoritative advice that the definition of statelessness should ‘encompass not just legislation, but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial case law (in countries with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice’ (UNHCR Citation2012, 5). On the importance of administrative procedures in defining and remedying statelessness, see also Batchelor (Citation1995).
2. Studies of the sociological and political implications of identification regimes that are based on compulsory ID cards have tended to focus on cases in Europe, the UK, North America and Australia, with a few studies available on Asia and the Middle East. Foucauldian theories of discipline, normalization and governmentality, and exploration of the ways in which identification regimes make the population ‘legible’ have dominated studies in this field especially in relation to biometric identity cards. This is particularly so since 11 September 2001, as surveillance for security purposes has increased to the point where it threatens democratic principles of autonomy and privacy (Scott Citation1998; Lyon Citation2001; Lyon and Bennett Citation2008a; Lyon Citation2009). However, the various problems associated with identity cards in Kenya are of a qualitatively different nature, not related to the intrusiveness of identity cards.
3. Names of interview participants are used with their explicit permission. Where first names only are used, these are also used with permission, or if in inverted commas are pseudonyms. Whenever first names are used alone, the interview is with a Nubian.
4. Other ethnic groups who face this problem include Kenyan Somalis, and particularly the Galjeel, a Somali clan in Tana River district.
5. While this article was in press Al Shabaab attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi, in September 2013. This incident is likely to increase monitoring and oppression of Muslims in Kenya.
6. In contemporary Kenya, the exclusion of certain racial categories, namely Europeans and Indians, from indigenous status has little material effect on their lives. Their superior economic status has meant that their inability to access the benefits of being one of the ‘42 tribes’ has not led to material deprivation on the same scale as that experienced by Nubians. The comparative situation of these strangers, who are generally absent from public debates about tribe and belonging, and the Nubians, who engage heavily in such debates (at least at the local level), demonstrates the extent to which economic circumstances influence engagement with parochial discourses, such as indigeneity. However, it could be argued that the place of these racial outsiders in Kenya is still, nevertheless, not as secure as the ‘42 tribes’.