Post-conflict reconstruction and citizenship agendas: lessons from Beirut

Abstract

How does post-conflict reconstruction embody citizenship agendas? By emphasizing the intersections between urban planning, architecture and political community in Hizballah's reconstruction discourse following the 2006 war, this article explores the articulation of such agendas in the historical production of urban space. The first section explores the denial of urban space and membership in the political community to Lebanon's Shi'a in the reconstruction of Beirut following the 1975–1990 civil war. The second section introduces Harat Hreik and the struggle over its reconstruction as resistance, on the part of Hizballah and its cadres, to this exclusion. The party's approach, anchored in an innovative not-for-profit NGO, ‘The Solemn Promise Project’ (Mashru' Wa'ad al-Sadiq), asserted the claims of its constituency to a place in both the city and the nation over considerations of profit. This citizenship agenda, inclusionary in sectarian terms, however, entailed its own set decidedly class-based inclusions and exclusions.

Keywords::

• citizenship
• neoliberalism
• post-conflict reconstruction
• Lebanon
• Beirut

Notes

^1. See, for example, Rosaldo (1994) on education and Murphy (2013) on housing programs. In both cases, institutions articulate and inculcate notions of what Murphy calls ‘propriety,’ those modes of thought and behavior consonant with dominant conceptions of citizenship.

^2. The Solidere Master Plan can be found at www.solidere.com

^3. There are 17 recognized religious sects in Lebanon. The largest are the Shi'a, followed by the Sunni Muslims, the Shi'a and the Maronite Catholics, the leaders of which divide he most important state offices between themselves. The most powerful is the prime minister, who is always a Sunni. Next is the president, who is always a Catholic. Finally, the weakest, the speaker of parliament, is always a Shi'a. Sectarian identity pervades the mundane interactions with power as well, as religious authorities govern ‘personal status issues,’ such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, according to religious tenets.

^4. Interview with a Solidere Public Relations officer, October 2000 (Beirut).

^5.http://www.solidere.com/city-center/history-and-culture/heritage-trail.

^6. As a derogatory Mutawli connotes poverty, ignorance and a rural lack of sophistication akin to the terms ‘hick’ or ‘redneck’ used in the USA to describe individuals who are white, rural and poor.

^7. Interview with Anonymous, Central Fund for the Displaced, May 1997 (Beirut).

^8. The Ministry of the Displaced was founded to manage the return of refugees to their homes. As the Ministry was a hybrid institution controlled by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, whose militia displaced many of the people the Ministry successes in the 1990s were few. Complicating matters further, Prime Minister al-Hariri created the Central Fund for the Displaced, his own hybrid institution, to control the Ministry's finances. It then expanded its mission to directly engage refugees, especially within Beirut, and cooperated with Solidere to evacuate refugees from the city center.

^9. Interview with Anonymous, Central Fund for the Displaced. May 1997 (Beirut).

^10. Personal interview with S. a Beirut based journalist, June 2012 (Beirut); and with M., Council for Development and Reconstruction, July 2012 (Beirut).

^11. A proper exposition of Hizballah's positioning as a resistance movement, locally, regionally and globally is beyond the scope of this paper. On its evolution, see Abboud and Muller (2012), al-Agha (2006), Norton (2007) and Saad-Ghorayeb (2001). For self-representations, see Qassem (2010) and Fayyad (2006). Al-Agha (2011) and Noe (2007) provide English-language compilations of Hizballah statements with useful introductory materials.

^12. Personal interview with Rahif Fayyad, December 2009 (Beirut).

^13. Personal Interview with Rahif Fayyad, December 2009 (Beirut).