The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?

Abstract

This paper revisits the controversy over the cancellation of the US Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile in 1962. Cancellation provoked an acute crisis in Anglo-US relations, which historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic have generally sought to explain in terms of mis-communication. This approach may be termed the 'muddle' thesis. Other analysts have been more suspicious of British intentions and tactics in the run-up to cancellation - the 'mischief' thesis. In order to assess these interpretations, the paper poses three questions. First, were the British fully informed about what was likely to happen, or just selective listeners to Washington opinion? Second, had the British government really staked its hopes unequivocally on Skybolt, or was it from the outset hedging its bets? And third, how were alternatives to Skybolt evaluated? The flows of information between Washington and London are examined to establish what was known, when, and what other choices were open to the British government.