The Middle East as a weapons of mass destruction-free zone

Introduction

As the quinquennial Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) scheduled for the Spring of 2015 in New York approaches, it is useful to be reminded of the critical role of the proposal for convening a Conference on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). Writing in 2010, when the eighth NPT Review Conference had ended, I concluded:

Although the relief of the NWS [nuclear weapon states] over the adoption of the final declaration’s conclusions and recommendations and the lukewarm reaction by the NAM [nonaligned movement] states and the pro-disarmament NGOs has bought the NPT another five years, the tensions endemic in the central bargain remain. Good-faith implementation of the document’s action plan will be crucial, as will progress on the new START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], and ratification of the CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty] by the United States. The future course of the Six-Nation Talks on DPRK, the resolution of the questions over Iran’s nuclear program, and the outcomes of the 2012 Middle East conference will also determine the future of the NPT. The NPT has survived another challenge, but without further action by the NWS, the nonproliferation regime may well fray. (Dhanapala 2010, 12)

The apparent failure of Finland, the designated host nation and Facilitator for the 2012 conference, to make substantial progress beyond a series of ‘consultations’ has already led to the Egyptian delegation walking out of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference held in Geneva last year. At the Third Session, held in New York from 28 April to 9 May 2014, bland statements from the UN Secretary-General and the Facilitator reflected the lack of progress. A report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) observer at the meeting refers to the recommendations contained in the Chairman’s Summary produced on his own initiative and with no endorsement by the meeting. This is a weak outcome and there is no gainsaying the fact that absent any significant progress on this issue we are likely to have a failed the NPT Review Conference in 2015, with serious consequences for the viability of this unique international legal norm which is also the sole multilateral instrument committing all the nuclear weapon power signatories to nuclear disarmament.

A description of the background to the MEWMDFZ proposal against the wider canvas of the NPT’s history is therefore very necessary as we approach the 2015 Review Conference.

A profile of the proposed zone

Figure 1 indicates the extent of the proposed zone that has been discussed within the NPT and other contexts.¹ The Bonn International Centre of Conversion’s (BICC) Global Militarization Index (GMI) 2013 states that the Middle East is the region with the highest level of militarization in the world. Israel (GMI: 1st place) and the Arab states of Syria (GMI: 5th place), Jordan (GMI: 6th place), Kuwait (GMI: 10th place), Oman (GMI: 11th place) and Saudi Arabia (GMI: 13th place) are among the most militarised countries in the region (BICC 2013). This high level of militarization is demonstrated among other things by the ratio between military expenditure and Gross Domestic Product, which is well over 7% in some states in the region and thus far in excess of the world average of approximately 2.5% (by comparison; the figure for Germany is approximately 1.4%). Military expenditures in the Middle East show a clear upward trend. In 2012, they amounted to US $128 billion, while in 2000, they came to US $80 billion – a remarkable increase of 60 (BICC 2013b).

Figure 1. Map of the proposed zone.

Source: CSIS (2011).

In April 2014, the prestigious SIPRI stated in its annual estimate of global military expenditure:

There was only one change in the list of countries comprising the world’s top 15 military spenders in 2013, with Canada dropping out, to be replaced by Turkey. There were also several changes in order. Most notably, Saudi Arabia climbed from seventh to fourth place, having increased its military spending by 14 per cent in 2013. Among the largest spenders, Saudi Arabia has by far the highest military burden – that is, military spending as a share of GDP. At 9.3 per cent, it is also the second highest (after Oman) for any country for which SIPRI has recent data. (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2014, 2)

It went on to state:

Military expenditure in the Middle East increased by 4 per cent in real terms in 2013 and 56 per cent between 2004 and 2013, to reach an estimated $150 billion. While figures for military expenditure in the Middle East have traditionally been very uncertain, the lack of data has worsened recently. In 2013, there was no available data for Iran, Qatar, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2014, 5)

Another key factor is the adherence of the states in the region to the three international legal instruments covering the weapons of mass destruction. All states are parties to the NPT with the sole exception of Israel, which is widely known to possess nuclear weapons with an arsenal estimated at 200 warheads. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has Israel as an outlier while Egypt and Syria are signatories but have not ratified this treaty. As for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Egypt has not become a party while Syria has just recently signed the treaty in controversial circumstances. Israel has signed the CWC but not ratified it.

A brief history of the proposal in the UN

At the 17th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1963, Egypt suggested nine conditions for establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East. Later at the 29th session of the UNGA in 1974, Egypt and Iran introduced a resolution calling for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The resolution was adopted in the UNGA by a majority of 138 members (Israel and Burma abstained) (United Nations General Assembly 1974). From 1980 onwards, there was no opposition to the annual resolution and all countries including Israel voted for it. In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu’s disclosure of Israel’s nuclear weapon capability confirmed an open secret. In 1990, a UN Report was issued following the adoption of a resolution (United Nations General Assembly 1990). It was a study on effective and verifiable measures which would pave the way for a NWFZ in the Middle East and recommended Confidence-Building Measures together with elements of an agreement.

The 1990 UN Study merits special mention since it could be relevant to the MEWMDFZ proposal, despite the effluxion of time. The study’s authors were Jan Prawitz of Sweden, Benjamin Sanders of the Netherlands (formerly of the UN) and James Leonard. Salient features of the Study included:

1. Geographic extent – obtaining the necessary broad political and legal endorsements of the zone and overcoming issues of ratification through the use of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in which parties are committed not to act in a manner that would undermine the basic objectives of the agreement.

2. Basic prohibitions – the ban on any form of possession of a nuclear weapon by some States. Decisions will be needed on whether this ban will or will not extend to particular installations or equipment aimed at either the development or the delivery of a weapon.

3. Verification – Procedures expanding and reinforcing current IAEA safeguards may be needed and it may be necessary to have staff dedicated to compliance problems that could arise regarding the zone.

4. Technical clauses – a ‘core group’ to participate in the agreement as it is brought into force. Arrangements for later accessions and for possible amendments to be made.

5. Role of outside Powers – a commitment to respect the zone and especially to remedy any breach or threat of breach of its terms.

6. Duration and withdrawal – an unlimited duration suggested. The delay between notification of intent and the effective date of withdrawal should be as extended as can be justified.

7. Relationship to other international agreements – Zone to be not dependent on the continued viability of any other agreement but ‘preambular’ endorsements of NPT, etc. and some defined relationship to IAEA and its safeguards system.

A subsequent UN Study expanded the concept further by including all League of Arab states, plus Iran and Israel in the zone. The Arab League has officially endorsed the UN Study delimitation and Israel has raised no objection other than to note that any country in the region should be publicly recognised and accepted as an integral part thereof. Suggestions of including Afghanistan, Pakistan as well as Turkey in the eventual zone have not gained any significant traction.

In 1990, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East thus expanding on long-standing calls to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East but to be pursued in parallel to the same. This recognised the view of some that chemical weapons could be the ‘poor man’s nuclear weapon’ and the possibility that some countries would trade membership of the BWC and CWC for Israel’s joining the NPT. From 1991–1995, the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Stability talks of the Madrid peace process was the first multilateral talks to address regional security encompassing the question of WMD. With their failure no progress was made.

The next major development was the NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995 over which the author presided. It is now widely acknowledged that the package of decisions to extend the NPT indefinitely with a strengthened Review Process and the adoption of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament would not have succeeded without the all important Resolution on the Middle East which was negotiated and added to the package in the final stages bringing all the Arab countries on board (Dhanapala and Rydell 2005, 55–57 and 172–174). Operative paragraph 5 of that Resolution said very clearly that it

calls upon all states in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards inter alia the establishment of an effective, verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective. (United Nations General Assembly 1995)

The NPT Review Conference that followed in 2000 merely stated that the resolution on the Middle East is ‘valid until its goals and objectives are achieved’ (NPT Conference 2010a, 26). Worse was to follow. With the neo-conservative policies pursued in the USA by the Bush Administration, it was no surprise that the 2005 Review Conference ended with no Final Document, adding to the frustration of the non-nuclear weapon states in general and the Arab countries among them in particular. The Swedish Government took the initiative of convening a Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission with the distinguished Hans Blix as Chairman. In 2006, the WMD Commission Final Report called for an intensification of international efforts to establish a WMDFZ in the ME. Its recommendation said

All states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a confidence- building measure, all states in the region, including Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit themselves to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories. Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT. (WMD Commission 2006, 81)

The 2010 NPT review conference and its sequel

In 2010, it was clear that the Arab countries led by Egypt were going to demand some forward movement on the MEWMDFZ at the Review Conference held in New York. The Conference finally endorsed five practical steps to make progress towards the goal of establishing a MEWMDFZ which included convening a regional conference to discuss the issue in 2012 and appointing a WMDFZ Facilitator. The steps were –

The UNSG and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will:

• Convene a conference in 2012, on the establishment of a ME ZFNW and all other weapons of mass destruction. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution.

• Appoint a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

• Designate a host Government for the 2012 Conference.

• Take additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international organisations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained.

• Take consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organised in June 2008 (NPT Conference 2010b, 30).

Eventually Finland was appointed the host country for the Conference and Ambassador Jaakko Laajava as the Facilitator.

In an attempt to assist the process, Pugwash identified the likely issues to be considered. They included:

• What immediate arms control steps are acceptable to all regional actors? Realistically, these are the only ones that might emerge from the conference.

• What expert and working groups should be formed as a concrete result of the conference?

• What wider processes might be launched at the proposed 2012/2013 conference?

• What can be done to prevent 2012/2013 from being a damaging experience?

• What WMD-related confidence-building measures might be considered?

A 2011 public opinion poll in the Middle East revealed some interesting findings – by a ratio of two to one, Israelis support an agreement that would make the Middle East a NWFZ, including Iran and Israel, with a system of full inspections of all facilities where nuclear components are built or stored.

Given a choice of two options, one where both Israel and Iran have nuclear weapons and one where neither has them, 65% of Israeli Jews support the latter while only 19% support the former (Telhami 2011).

At the end of 2012, when the Conference promised in the Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference was supposed to be held, there was an announcement by the USA alone that the conference had been postponed. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning Pugwash Conferences for Science & World Affairs issued this statement

The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs regrets very much the decision, announced unilaterally in the US State Department Press Release of November 23, 2012, to postpone the conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) envisaged in the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Final Document. We commend the efforts of the Finnish facilitator and urge the three depository states of the NPT together with the UN Secretary-General to reconsider this retrograde decision, and to use their good offices to ensure the meeting is convened as soon as possible.

The indefinite postponement of the Helsinki conference would be a very serious setback for all those who are hoping to create a better and more peaceful environment in the Middle East and a de facto reward for all those who have worked to undermine this laudable objective.

This unilateral announcement also represents a serious blow to the credibility of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the non-discriminatory objective of the conference was contained in the Resolution on the Middle East as an indispensable part of the conclusions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference without which there would have been no indefinite extension of the NPT. Fifteen years later its inclusion in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference of 2010 revived the confidence of all the parties to the NPT on the relevance of this vital bulwark against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. (Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs 2012)

Writing in the Palestine–Israel Journal in 2013, Randy Rydell of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs stated:

Jaakko Laajava of Finland, the chosen facilitator for the conference, addressed the first (2012) and second (2013) sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. In the second session, he explained that while there was insufficient time to conclude preparations for the 2012 conference, the convenors have reaffirmed their commitment to convene the conference as soon as possible. Concerning the postponed conference, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated, “We have missed a deadline. But we have not lost the opportunity to move this initiative forward. (Rydell 2013)

There is little prospect of any forward movement on the MEWMDFZ between now and 2015 given the political stalemate in that region. The US Secretary of State himself has had difficulty in moving his initiative and with the problems in Syria and Egypt there seems to be no conducive climate for any progress. The adverse impact this will have on the NPT Review Conference of 2015 remains to be seen.

Notes on contributor

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, a former ambassador of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva (1984–1987) and the USA (1995–1997), president of the NPT Review & Extension Conference 1995, acting chairman of the SIPRI Governing Board, director of UNIDIR 1987–1992 and current the president of Pugwash.

Notes

1. On the issue of the territory – the 1989 IAEA Technical Study, which first took up the geographic delimitation of a future Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ), applied the concept to a region extending from Libya in the west, to Iran in the east, and from Syria in the north to Yemen in the south.