The United States and Libya: the limits of coercive diplomacy

Abstract

The protests that have broken out across North Africa in 2011 over, among other issues, demands for increased democracy draw our attention to the manner in which the United States has sought to promote democracy across the region during previous decades. The case of Libya is particularly insightful. The rehabilitation of Qadhafi's regime, one of the harshest dictatorships in the region, surprised those who had hoped that the United States was serious about making democracy and good governance one of its foreign policy objectives. In focusing on events since 1999, this article argues that the United States conditioned normalisation on Libya's cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the abandonment of its nuclear programme. Notably, it succeeded in affecting Libya's behaviour. However, other issues such as human rights and good governance have not been part of the package. The rehabilitation of Qadhafi's regime without fundamental change to its structures has not enticed the regime to democratise and has contributed to the consolidation of its authoritarian nature. The Libyan case demonstrates that coercive diplomacy has succeeded in affecting Libya's policy decisions in important ways, yet the US has not significantly affected the nature of Qadhafi's dictatorial rule.

Keywords:

• Libya
• United States
• Coercive diplomacy
• WMD
• terrorism
• rehabilitating ‘rogue’ state

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the guest editors for their helpful comments to an earlier draft of this article.

Notes

On the rift between hardliners and pragmatists during the 1990s when Libya's socioeconomic situation was dire, see Takeyh (2001).

On 29 May 2002, Libya offered US$2.7 billion to settle claims by the families of the 270 killed and the following year on 15 August 2003, Libya's UN ambassador, Ahmed Own, submitted a letter to the UN Security Council formally accepting ‘responsibility for the actions of its officials’ in relation to the Lockerbie bombing. Yet on 20 August 2009 Megrahi was freed on compassionate grounds by the Scottish Government on the basis of medical report according to which he had terminal prostate cancer.

For a theoretical perspective applied to the Libyan case, see Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06).

Interview with British Ambassador to Libya, Anthony Layden, London, February 2007.

For the violations of the sanctions by various countries, see Zoubir (2002, p. 38).

Author's interviews with US officials, State Department and National Security Council, Washington, DC, May 2000 and afterward.

Author's interview at US Department of State, Washington, DC, 5 May 2000.

For example, Colin Powell stated that ‘American power formed the essential backdrop to Libya's decision. There can be little doubt about this. But that backdrop was not enough. It took American and British persuasion to turn a Libyan impulse into a victory for all sides. So, in this case, as in most others, power is a necessary condition for foreign policy success, but it's usually not a sufficient one … Diplomacy is neither the opposite of force nor the same as force. Diplomacy without power is just naked pleading and power without diplomacy is often unavailing’ (State Magazine 2004).

It seems that Libya wishes to make US sales of military equipment, both lethal and non-lethal, and security guarantees as a litmus test of US real intentions toward Libya.

To be sure, recently there have been no large finds.

For more on the role of Italy in the European decision to lift the embargo in relation to increasing arrivals of undocumented migrants see Cuttitta (2006).

In the 2009 report on human rights, the US government lists the following violations: inability of citizens to change the government; disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest; lengthy pretrial and sometimes incommunicado detention; official impunity; and poor prison conditions; denial of fair public trial by an independent judiciary, political prisoners and detainees, and the lack of judicial recourse for alleged human rights violations were also problems; new restrictions on media freedom and continued restriction on freedom of speech (including Internet and academic freedom); continued impediment on freedom of assembly, freedom of association and civil liberties; restriction of freedom of religion; corruption and lack of government transparency; societal discrimination against women, ethnic minorities and foreign workers; trafficking in persons; restriction of labour rights violation of the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and in some cases the government participated in their abuse (US Department of State – Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2009).

Since this article was written before the deadly uprising in Libya in February–March 2011 it does not analyse that period during which President Obama called twice on 26 February (CBS News 2011) and 3 March (DeYoung 2011), respectively, for Qadhafi to step down.

On the definitions of such bases, see GlobalSecurity.org (n.d).