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Abstract
This article analyses inter- and intra-party relations in the formation of coalition governments in Morocco after the elections held in November 2011, and presided over by Abdelilah Benkirane. Although coalition theory has been applied in democratic contexts, we consider that the study of government coalitions, and in particular of party relations, is also important in hybrid political systems, in which there is significant room for political competition and participation. The methodology of the study is principally based on interviews carried out with members of the Moroccan Government, among them the Head of Government, and also with leaders and members of the parties in the government coalition and in opposition. The comments of these actors are discussed with reference to the academic literature. The results of the research show that despite the limits on democracy in Morocco, there are important interactions between the political parties, which can be seen in the form of alliances, consensus building, the distribution of power, and splits. In this political manoeuvring, ideology plays a secondary role. The context of the Arab Spring does not affect the coalition building, even though the national interest is found in the parties' political discourse for justifying their entry to the government. Thus, the most significant aspect of participation in Government is the acquisition of power and party's strategic interests. Looking at internal party dynamics, we also see that internal factors affect decisions as to whether to participate in government or not. Lastly, despite the reforms carried out in the wake of the Arab Spring, Mohammed VI continues to exert his influence on the formation of the Government. Nevertheless, the parties participating in the government coalition show their acceptance of the current rules of the political system, in which a significant executive role is reserved for the Monarchy.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions to improve the quality of the paper. I am also grateful to Professors Larbi Ben Othmane, Amina El Messaoudi, and Antonio Robles for their comments on earlier versions of this article. And finally, I am thankful to my interviewees for their time, and for their agreement to participate in this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. This rule change ended the discretion of the King in naming a Head of Government. In 2002, the naming of the independent, Driss Jettou, as Prime Minister, was criticised. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) had been expecting to gain the Prime Ministership, thanks to its victory in the elections. Similarly, the Istiqlal Party (PI) tried to claim control of the government asserting that it was able to gather more parliamentary support than the socialists. The dispute over the premiership led to a period of cool relations between the two parties, although the King opted for Jettou, in whose government there were members drawn from both the USFP and the PI.
2. The Constitution of 2011 replaced the term ‘Prime Minister’ with that of ‘Head of Government’. Thus, the role was reframed, moving from ‘coordinating’ government to ‘directing’ it (in the words of Abdelilah Benkirane, Head of Government, interview on September 5, 2014). Furthermore, the Constitution increased the powers of the Head of Government beyond those in previous constitutional texts.
3. The Constitution of 2011 does not specify that the Head of Government should be the leader of the party that wins the election. The King may name any member of the winning political formation. In fact, after the 2011 elections, there was speculation that Mohamed VI's choice might be Saâdeddine El Othmani, president of the National Council of the PJD.
4. In September, 2012, Abdelhamid Chabat replaced Abbas El Fassi as secretary general. Some authors consider that some circles in the Palace influenced internal party elections in the PI, as well as in the USFP, to install leaders who would not cooperate with the PJD (Masbah Citation2014, 2). On 12 May 2013, after three tense months, in an extraordinary meeting of the National Council, the PI decided to withdraw from government, a move which did not take effect until July 2013. The Head of Government and other Ministers indicated their good relations with the previous general secretary, Abbas El Fassi, as well as with the Ministers from the PI, with whom they worked in ‘perfect symbiosis’. Despite the crisis provoked by the PI, the Head of Government did not note any governmental instability, although he acknowledged that relations between the coalition parties had been very ‘turbulent’ (interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, September 5, 2014).
5. After the 2011 elections, the Parliament had a Rae's fractionalisation index of 0.849; the effective number of parliamentary parties was 6.6. Nevertheless, this is in fact a lower number of parties than resulted from previous elections using the proportional voting system: 10.1 in 2007 and 10.4 in 2002 (Szmolka Citation2010, 29).
6. A representative case study is ‘the study of a typical, standard example of a wider category' (Hague, Harrop, and Breslin Citation2004, 277). The aim of this research is to explore matters of interest in the particular case, rather than to derive generalisations, even though extrapolation to other similar cases is could be possible from the results observed.
7. Interview with Ali Hameddine, vice-president of the National Council, and member of the executive committee of the PJD, July 7, 2013.
8. Interview with Abdelhamid Jmahri, former member of the Political Executive of the USFP, and currently director of USFP's Arabic newspaper, Al Ittihad Al Ichtiraki, August 6, 2014.
9. Since 2009, a strong current of opinion had developed in the party in favour of abandoning the government formed by El Fassi two years earlier. Account must also be taken of the splits that happened within the organisation, such as that with the closely linked trade union, the Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT) (Democratic Confederation of Labor), and with its youth association, Chabiba Ittihadia. In addition, the election results had left the USFP in a weaker position than the PJD, which made it difficult for anything Benkirane might have been able to offer their cadres and activists, to be satisfactory to them (interview with Abdelhamid Jmahri, former member of the Political Executive of the USFP, and currently director of his own Arabic newspaper, Al Ittihad Al Ichtiraki, August 6, 2014). The internal situation within the party has not improved over recent years. During the IX Party Conference, held in December, 2012, there were more resignations. Driss Lachgar became secretary general in a bitterly fought election, which he won by a small margin over Ahmed Zaidi.
10. The Alliance for Democracy, created on 5 October 2011, brought together eight parties with a variety of ideological postures: the RNI, the MP, the Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM) (Authenticity and Modernity Party), the Union Constitutionnelle (UC) (Constitutional Union), the Parti Travailliste (PT) (Labor Party), the Parti Socialiste (PS) (Socialist Party), Parti de la Gauche Verte (PGV) (Green Left Party), and the Parti de la Renaissance et de la Vertu (PRV) (Renaissance and Virtue Party). They presented a common manifesto and agreed candidates at the legislative elections of November 2011.
11. Interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, September 5, 2014.
12. Interview with Anis Birrou, member of the executive of the RNI, and Minister with Responsibility for Moroccans Resident Abroad, and Migration, September 5, 2014.
13. In early December, 2011, a meeting took place between leaders of the PI, the USFP, and the PPS, to debate Benkirane's offer to Kutla. While the PI and the PPS both took the pragmatic view that participation in government would bring stability to the country, the USFP held fast to the ideological position that prevented them from working in the Executive with the Islamists (interview with Jalid Naciri, member of the executive committee of the PPS, August 8, 2014).
14. The opposition parties did not adopt a very belligerent stance, either, as they did not wish to make it more difficult to govern the country at a time of considerable instability in North Africa (interview with Mohamed Boudra, parliamentary representative of the PAM, June 24, 2014).
15. Interview with Rachid Talbi Alami, leader of the RNI and President of the Assembly of Representatives, July 14, 2014.
16. Interview with Anis Birrou, member of the executive of the RNI, and Minister with Responsibility for Moroccans Resident Abroad, and Migration, September 5, 2014.
17. Interview with Ali Hameddine, vice-president of the National Council, and member of the executive committee of the PJD, July 7, 2013.
18. Said Saâdi, a leading member of the PPS, in Tel Quel, June 27–July 3, 2014, 626.
19. Interviews with Jaled Naciri, member of the PPS executive (August 8, 2014), and Ismail Alaoui, former Minister and general secretary of the PPS from 1997–2010 (August 15, 2014). A full explanation of the PPS' participation in the coalition can be found in an article published by Alaoui in the Al Bayane newspaper: http://www.maghress.com/fr/albayane/115780; accessed 15 October 2014.
20. The meeting saw the resignation from the party executive of Said Saâdi, who was against participating in power with the Islamists, over his disagreement with the process by which the secretary general was elected. Mohamed Nabil Benabdallah was re-elected with 861 votes of a possible 885. Five other candidates had initially stood, Said Saâdi among them; they withdrew from the vote.
21. Interview on September 5, 2014.
22. For example, in the case of a woman put forward in Education.
23. Interview with the Head of Government, September 5, 2014.
24. The latter Ministry was taken up by Aziz Akhannouch, who was from a business background, and had been a Minister in the previous government, at which time he was active in the RNI. He resigned from the party in order to take up the post in Benkirane's cabinet.
25. Interview with Abdellah Baha, September 5, 2014.
26. Interview with Abdessalam Saddiki, Minister of Employment and Social Affairs, August 22, 2014; El Habib Choubani, Minister of Parliamentary and Civil Society Relations, July 14, 2014; and, Ismail Alaoui, August 15, 2014.
27. Interview with Ali Hameddine, vice-president of the National Council, and member of the executive committee of the PJD, July 7, 2013.
28. Interview with Lahsen Bensassi, member of the PI, July 23, 2014.
29. Interview with Ali Hameddine, vice-president of the National Council, and member of the executive committee of the PJD, July 7, 2013.
30. The resignation of Ouzzine occurred as a consequence of an investigation carried out by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance and the Ministry of the Interior into the holding of the Club World Cup (of football). Until the appointment of the new minister, in May 2015, his functions were assumed by Mohand Laenser, MP's president and minister of Urbanism and National Territorial Planning. In 20 May 2015 Mohamed VI named Mohand Laenser to replace Ouzzine as the new Minister of Youth and Sports. Also, the King appointed four new Ministers in order to replace the minister of Urbanism and National Territorial Planning and other figures who had resigned for personal reasons (Minister of Relations with the Parliament and Civil Society and Minister Delegate to the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Executive Training), or for spending public money on private purchases (Minister Delegate to the Minister of National Education and Vocational Training).
31. Telephone interview with Professor Larbi Ben Othmane, January 13, 2015.
32. Specifically, Chabat demanded that the Head of Government share out ministerial posts according to the number of seats held; that ministerial portfolios not be split into different ministries, or have added delegated ministries; that they be distributed on the basis of areas (economic, social, and governance); that the representation of women be increased to a minimum of 20%; and that the representation of the southern provinces be guaranteed (La Vie Économique, January 20, 2013).
33. The second Benkirane government declined to 37 members after the death of the Minister of State Baha (7 December 2014) and the resignation of Ouzzine (7 January 2015). Nevertheless, the Government grew to 38 members after the Cabinet reshuffle of 20 May 2015.
34. Interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, September 5, 2014.
35. Interviewees from the PPS indicated their satisfaction both with the number of ministerial portfolios, and with the areas of responsibility they had been given, mainly in social matters.
36. Interview with Ali Hameddine, vice-president of the National Council, and member of the executive committee of the PJD, July 7, 2013.
37. For the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane; for the PI, Abbas El Fassi; for the MP, Mohand Laenser, and for the PPS, Nabil Benabdallah.
38. In the first government, this was composed of three representatives for each of the four parties: for the PJD, the Head of Government, the Minister of State, Abdallah Baha, and the head of the Cabinet, Jamma Moatassim; for the PI, its secretary general, Hamid Chabat, the then-president of the Assembly of Representatives, Karim Ghellab, and a former Minister of Health, Yasmina Baddou; for the MP, their secretary general and then Minister of the Interior, Mohamed Laenser, and two members of the party executive, Said Ameskan, and Dris Meroune; and for the PPS, their secretary general, Nabil Benabdallah, and two members of the party executive, Amine Sbihi, and Abdelahad Fassi Fihri.
39. Each Assembly sets an ordinary meeting every two months, in order to schedule its work and parliamentary votes, with the option to call extraordinary meetings. The chair of these meetings rotates periodically among the parliamentary groups. Similarly, meetings of the Coalition Presidency with the parliamentary groups are scheduled, with the aim of establishing a coherent and unified overview of parliamentary activity. Notably, there is very strong voting discipline among the parliamentary groups of the coalition, which has not faltered on any occasion.
40. This consisted of one representative from each party: Jamma Moatassim (PJD), Said Ameskan (MP), Abdelahad Fassi Fihri (PPS), and Yasmina Badou (PI).
41. It in fact contains 873 words in Arabic.
42. Interview with Mohamed Cheikh Biadillah, President of the Assembly of Councilors, June 11, 2014, and Rachid Talbi Alami, President of the Assembly of Representatives, July 14, 2014.
43. The members of this commission were appointed by their respective general secretaries: Mustapha El Khalfi and Dris El Azami (PJD); Nizar Baraka and Mohamed Saad Alami (PI); Lahcen Haddad (MP); and, for the PPS, Abdesslam Seddiki and Abdelahad Fassi Fihri.
44. Interview with Abdesslam Seddiki, member of the commission for the elaboration of the government programme, and Minister for Employment and Social Affairs, August 22, 2014.
45. The Assembly of Representatives is the only Chamber that votes on the government's programme, in keeping with its role of representing the popular will. The only possible outcome provided for is acceptance by an absolute majority. The Constitution makes no provision for what should happen if this were not to be achieved. According to Amina El Messaoudi, a member of the constitutional commission, despite the fact that draft versions of the constitution did include a range of possible outcomes, in the end, it was decided to omit them on the grounds that the Head of Government would never present a government programme without first being sure of its receiving an absolute majority in the Assembly (interview, June 25, 2014).
46. Müller and Strøm (Citation2008, 172–173) use a triple categorisation for government programmes: agreements on a few, very select policies; agreements covering a range of policies; and agreements including a wide range of policies. They also state that a government agreement is extensive if it contains more than 10,000 words. Benkirane's government programme has 29,911 words in its French version.
47. http://www.pm.gov.ma/fr/fichier.30.48.programme+gouvernemental; accessed 13 October 2014.
48. The group was coordinated by Jamma El Moatassim, head of Benkirane's Cabinet, and comprised: Dris Azami and Mustapha El Khalfi (PJD); Anis Birou and Rachid Talbi Alami (RNI); Lahcen Haddad (MP); and Abdessalam Seddiki and Abdelahad El Fassi (PPS).
49. A synthesis of this can be found at: http://www.maroc.ma/fr/system/files/documents_actualite/bilan_etape.pdf; accessed 13 October 2014.
50. The only thing made public was a report in Arabic entitled: ‘The Action of the Government in 2012–2013: Preliminary Impacts and Future Prospects for Government Action 2012–2013' (http://www.maroc.ma/fr/content/rapport-sur-laction-gouvernementale-en-20122013-impacts-preliminaires-et-perspectives; accessed 13 October 2014).
51. Of the 16 enabling laws included in the government programme, Parliament only passed 6 during the first half of Benkirane's term, and 4 are in progress. Specifically, Parliament has passed 46 laws, of which 4 were bills for enabling laws, 18 were bills for the approval of international conventions, 2 draft laws, 21 ordinary law bills, and 1 framework law bill (Assembly of Representatives: http://www.parlement.ma/fe/_activite.php?filename=201402131505410; accessed 13 October 2014).