Associations and young people during the Tunisian transition: pluralism, socialisation, and democratic legitimation?

ABSTRACT

In Tunisia, during the initial years of the democratic transition, the number of registered associations has doubled. The few studies available point out that a significant proportion of the new associations’ membership is made up of young people. This specific participation of young people in the network of associations that emerged from 2011 onwards is not very well-known either. In this article, we wish to contribute primarily to providing information that facilitates understanding of the changes that have taken place in the associative sector and in the participation of young people in it. Furthermore, we believe that Tunisia is, in a way, a ‘laboratory’ in which civic participation in contexts of democratic consolidation can be explored. Specifically, using data obtained from two surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016 we propose, first, to examine the profile of the young people active in the associations and the areas in which their associations intervene, in order to see to what extent the argument regarding the plural representation of the heterogeneity of young people can be verified through the network of associations. Second, we aim to evaluate the contribution of socialisation through associations to the inculcation of a democratic culture that would be verified in the electoral behaviour of young association activists. Third, we aim to open a debate about the possible ‘macro’ or systemic effects of these data; that is to say, about the representation of pluralism and diversity in Tunisian society, as well as the legitimation of democratic institutions.

KEYWORDS:

• Association
• young people
• activists
• civil society
• democratic transition
• Tunisia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Article 8 of the new constitution stipulates: ‘Youth are an active force in building the nation. The State seeks to provide the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realising their potential, supports them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalise their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development’. https://www.venice.coe.int/files/Constitution%20TUN%20-%2027012014.pdf [Accessed 14 January 2019].

2 On the crisis of 2013, see Gobe and Chouikha (2014).

3 See, for example, Thor Halvorssen, president of the Human Rights Foundation, who said that it also involved the backing by the Nobel Committee for the ‘instrumental role that civil society played in the transition from a dictatorship to a democracy’. From editor, ‘El Cuarteto de Túnez premio Nobel de la Paz 2015’, periodistas-es, 10 October 2015, https://periodistas-es.com/el-cuarteto-de-tunez-premio-nobel-de-la-paz-2015-59377 [Accessed 4 November 2018].

4 Apart from the quartet, the following also stood out: Office National de l’Artisanat Tunisien (ONAT) (National Office of Tunisian Artisans); Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) (Tunisian Association of Democratic Women), Union des diplômés chômeurs (Union of Unemployed Graduates); Confédération générale tunisienne du travail (Tunisian General Confederation of Labour) and Association des anciens combattants (Veterans Association).

5 According to Diamond (1994), civil society is conceived here as the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the State, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State, and hold State officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the State. Thus, it excludes individual and family life, inward-looking group activity (e.g. for recreation, entertainment, or spirituality), the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms, and political efforts to take control of the State.

6 See IFEDA (Institut d'Étude et de Documentation sur les Associations — the Centre for Information, Training, Studies and Documentation on Associations) http://www.ifeda.org.tn/stats/francais.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2018].

7 The report for the Foundation for the Future estimates over 30 million Tunisian Dinars (10 million US dollars) of support provided by the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Embassy of Finland, the cooperation of Switzerland, Spanish cooperation, the French Institute of cooperation, and the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders as aid for the support of civil society between 2011 and 2014. See Foundation for the Future (2013), Études sur les organisations de la société civile en Tunisie, p. 60. https://fr.slideshare.net/jamaity_tn/etude-sur-les-organisations-dela-socit-civile-en-tunisie [Accessed 1 December 2018]. Deane (2013) proposes sums of 400 million dollars provided by the EU to strengthening the capacities of civil society; and he evaluates US cooperation at over 57 million dollars for the 2011–2013 period.

8 The following reports should be mentioned: Bureau international du Travail (2014), Transition vers le marché du travail des jeunes femmes et hommes en Tunisie. Programme sur l'emploi des Work4Youth Série de publication; No. 15 jeunes, Département des politiques de l'emploi; Observatoire National de l'Emploi et des Qualifications. Geneva, BIT. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247560.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2018]; Foundation for the Future (2013), Études sur les organisations de la société civile en Tunisie, p. 60. https://fr.slideshare.net/jamaity_tn/etude-sur-les-organisations-dela-socit-civile-en-tunisie [Accessed 1 December 2018]; PNUD, 2013, Enquête nationale sur les attentes des jeunes à l’égard du processus constitutionnel et de la transition démocratique en Tunisie, Rapport de Synthèse, Tunis: PNUD, avril, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/tunisia/docs/Projets/Gouvernance%20D%C3%A9mocratique/Publications/UNDP_TN_Rapport%20Gouvernance.pdf [Accessed 1 September 2018].

9 Apart from the bibliographical references mentioned previously, see, for example, the attempt to overcome these difficulties carried out by Sika and Werenfels (2018).

10 CEA-AN. 2013. Etre jeune au Maghreb. Nations Unies Commission économique pour l’Afrique Bureau pour l’Afrique du Nord (CEA-AN), Tunis, online [Accessed 4 July 2017] https://www.uneca.org/fr/publications/etre-jeune-au-maghreb; OCDE. 2017. Pour un meilleur engagement de la jeunesse dans la vie publique en Tunisie, Document de travail préliminaire, Septembre, Programme MENA OCDE pour la gouvernance, online [Accessed 15 January 2018] https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/Tunisia-discussion-paper-Sept17-web.pdf; PNUD. 2013. Enquête nationale sur les attentes des jeunes à l’égard du processus constitutionnel et de la transition démocratique en Tunisie. Rapport de Synthèse, Tunis: PNUD, avril. Online [Accessed 15 January 2017] http://www.undp.org/content/dam/tunisia/docs/Projets/Gouvernance%20D%C3%A9mocratique/Publications/UNDP_TN_Rapport%20Gouvernance.pdf; UNFPA. 2015. Défis de la jeunesse tunisienne. Tunis : Fonds des nations unies pour la population, online [Accessed 22 January 2017] http://www.onj.nat.tn/pdf/p10.pdf.

11 The report of the ILO (International Labour Organisation) on employment trends in 2014 states that Tunisia is a specific case of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, as it is characterised by a population that is overqualified and poorly adapted to the demands of the local labour market. An average of 35% of young people between 15 and 29 years were looking for work between 2012 and 2014; and 40% of young graduates were unemployed. See Bureau International du Travail (2014), Transition vers le marché du travail des jeunes femmes et hommes en Tunisie. Programme sur l'emploi des Work4Youth Série de publication; No. 15 jeunes, Département des politiques de l'emploi; Observatoire National de l'Emploi et des Qualifications. Geneva, BIT. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247560.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2018].

12 According to the results of the survey on the transition from school to an active life (ETVA) ‘jóvenes’ 2013, 18% of young people between 15 and 29 years were NEET. Bureau international du Travail (2014), Transition vers le marché du travail des jeunes femmes et hommes en Tunisie. Programme sur l'emploi des Work4Youth Série de publication; No. 15 jeunes, Département des politiques de l'emploi; Observatoire National de l'Emploi et des Qualifications. Geneva, BIT. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247560.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2018].

13 More than 40,000 youths would have emigrated to the European Union since 2011 and close to half of young people are considering leaving the country. See: Défis de la Jeunesse tunisienne, United Nations Population Fund; http://www.onj.nat.tn/pdf/p10.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2018]; and International Organization for Migration (2014), L'Organisation internationale pour les migrations et la Jeunesse en Tunisie, factsheet, https://tunisia.iom.int/sites/default/files/resources/files/Fiche%20th%C3%A9matique%20IOM%20Jeunesse%20-%20Print%20version%20%282%29.pdf; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group (2014) Tunisia. Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA Report No. 89233-TN [Accessed 7 July 2018].

14 In May 2018, according to data from the Tunisian government, close to 3,000 young Tunisian people were in war zones in Syria or Iraq. They are mainly between 25 and 29 years and 70% are single. According to the data provided, 47% had secondary school education and only 4% had studied at a higher level. ‘Les terroristes-tunisiens-par-les-chiffres’, Espace manager, 18 May 2018, https://www.espacemanager.com/les-terroristes-tunisiens-par-les-chiffres.html [Accessed 20 June 2018].

15 See among other examples for the United Nations: Défis de la Jeunesse tunisienne, United Nations Population Fund, http://www.onj.nat.tn/pdf/p10.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2018] and The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank Group (2014) Tunisia. Breaking the Barriers to Youth Inclusion, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC 20433, USA Report No. 89233-TN [Accessed 7 July 2018].

16 For each Forum, the activities lasted two days and they were structured fundamentally around fifteen workshops of training and reflection on issues related to the environment, social and solidarity-based economics, human rights, governance, economic inclusion, citizenship, and education in order to later present project proposals. The questionnaires in Arabic and French were distributed and presented to all participants — people from Tunisia, France, Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, Senegal, irrespective of their age — at the beginning of a workshop session, and they were individually completed and collected at the end of the session. We wish to thank the directors and staff of the French Institute for their interest and collaboration and, especially, Marianne Poche, without whom the field work could not have been carried out.

17 The datum for 2016 does not appear, because in the questionnaire of the survey conducted in Gafsa in 2016, the interviewees were not asked whether they had children.

18 Official statistics overvalue the proportion of people from well-off (19%) and upper-middle classes (27%) in the social stratification of Tunisia, except if one assimilates the lower-middle and working classes, who represent 54% of the population, where the vulnerable population reaches 41% and the poor 15%. The vulnerable population is defined on the basis of the likelihood of a household falling into poverty, taking into account their sociodemographic characteristics, their place of residence, the professional situation of the head of household, access to services, savings, and assets.

19 These last data are even more relevant since they are percentages coming from a minority of mothers that have or had a job (42%; 35.3%), because 57.1% of those surveyed in the Forum of Tunis and 64.7% in that of Gafsa stated that their mother was a housewife. It is also interesting to point out that in the survey conducted at the Forum of Gafsa, the father’s connection with professions related to security (military, police, and security officers) (9%) stood out.

20 These features converge with those of the young association activists originating from other national democratic contexts, like in the European Union, although they have a more pronounced elitist nature due to the fact that we are dealing with a society with greater levels of inequality and less frequent access to higher education.

21 The IFEDA classifies the associations into 14 categories: scientific, feminine, sports, friendship, cultural, development, social, school, micro-credit, environment, citizenship, youth, childhood, legal. See http://www.ifeda.org.tn/stats/francais.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2017].

22 See the data on the IFEDA website. http://www.ifeda.org.tn/stats/ [Accessed 10 July 2017].

23 According to the World Bank (2016), 15.4% of Tunisians have a level of income below 40% of the average of households of the country. This proportion is higher than any country of the European Union, even those that have been heavily affected by the 2008 crisis, like Romania (13.5%), Spain (10.7%), and Greece (10.2%). See World Bank (2016) Évaluation de la Pauvreté en Tunisie 2015, March 2016, Unité Pauvreté dans le Monde/Afrique du Nord et Moyen Orient/Département Maghreb, http://documents.banquemondiale.org/curated/fr/694411467099901074/pdf/104913-FRENCH-P146815-PUBLIC.pdf and https://www.inegalites.fr/La-pauvrete-en-Europe [Accessed 6 December 2018].

24 This type of organisation is underrepresented in our simple if we compare it to the IFEDA statistics where they represent, on 1 July 2014, 23% of the associations established after 2011.

25 Placing the associations that defend human rights in the category ‘Public Nature’ resulted in serious restrictions under Ben Ali. Control was maintained by making it impossible to refuse the entry of multiple individuals close to the regime who were responsible for asserting their control over organisation boards.

26 The gap between the narrative on the ‘revolution of young people’ and the situation of underrepresentation of young people in the constituent assembly led the assembly to include in article 25 of the 2014 electoral law the demand that each electoral list includes among its first four candidates at least one person under 35 years. As a result of that decision, the proportion of representatives under 35 has doubled in the national assembly elected in 2014 (10.5%).

27 This high proportion is probably related to the fact that the 2015 survey was conducted during the first week of May in Tunis, a month and a half after the terrorist attack at the Bardo National Museum, where seventeen people were killed.

Additional information

Funding

This paper presents some of the results of the research projects ‘Public problems and activists in the Maghreb. Social and political participation of young people in its local and transnational dimensions’, supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [CSO2014-52998-C3-2-P] and ‘Crisis and political representation in North Africa. Institutional mechanisms and opposition’ [CSO2017-84949-C3-2-P], financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (MCIU), the Spanish State Research Agency (AEI), and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).