https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6401-7560
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ABSTRACT
Non-party ministers and technocrats have emerged as leading political actors in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Five heads of government out of eight appointed between 2011 and 2020 were not affiliated to any political party. Technocrat-led governments were appointed amidst acute political crises due to their ostensible technical expertise and non-partisan profile. Despite their prominent role in government, existing studies on post-revolutionary Tunisia have largely neglected the role of non-party ministers and technocrats, treating them as relatively marginal actors. The article situates their emergence along a decades-long technocratic turn started under Ben Ali, which opted to replace the professional politicians of the Bourguiba era with technocrats hailing from the public administration. After 2011, a combination of demand- and supply-side factors have contributed to their increased participation in government. In particular, the article argues that the institutional autonomy of the technocratic apparatus, weakness of political parties, a preference for technical expertise and consensual politics, and pressures from international financial institutions were key to the rise of non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia.
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Notes
1 Data are drawn from the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED), which provides monthly breakdowns of ministerial appointments in several African countries from 1997 through 2017 (Raleigh and Wigmore-Shepherd Citation2020). The data were supplemented to include all years between 1987 and 2019 and additional socio-professional information, such as trade union affiliation, professional background, and education. Weekly issues of the ‘Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic’, local media sources, archival resources and other publicly available documentation were used to retrieve information on cabinet ministers. Data for the Bourguiba years (1956–1987) were drawn from Charfi (Citation1989).
2 The case of Chedly Hammi, alias Mohamed Larbi Mahjoubi, is emblematic. Hammi had long served in the Ministry of Interior under Bourguiba, having a marginal role in the coup d’état that ousted the old president. He was nevertheless appointed Secretary of State in the Interior Ministry in the government of Hamed Karoui in 1990 but arrested five months after his nomination for the alleged assassination of Palestinian leader Khalil Al-Wazir. Hammi was allegedly tortured and eventually condemned to four years in prison by a military tribunal (Kéfi Citation2011). Under Ben Ali, a handful of army officials briefly served in the government, such as Abdelhamid Escheikh and Habib Ammar.
3 A notable example is the secretary of state for National Solidarity Funds. Tunisian individuals and businesses were required to contribute to a national fund for development projects managed by Ben Ali himself and an ad hoc Secretary of State, typically a close collaborator of the president like Kamel Haj Sassi, an RCD member from the coastal town of Sfax who served in government almost continuously from 1993 to 2008. Through the National Solidarity Funds, otherwise known as the ‘26.26 account’, the government could discretionally invest millions of francs each year in a multitude of projects in Tunisia's rural regions, enhancing the image of Ben Ali – who was typically reported to be the prime sponsor of these projects – and of the RCD across the wider population (see Beau and Tuquoi Citation2011).
4 Already in the early 1990s, a foreign–recruited adviser was installed in the Prime Minister's Office to 'support policy determination and develop implementation procedures.' This appointment came in the context of a Public Enterprise Restructuring Loan accorded by the World Bank to the Tunisian Government in July 1989 (Aliriza Citation2020, 30).
5 By virtue of their kin relationship with Ben Ali, members of the Trabelsi, Mabrouk, Zarrouk, and Chiboub families owned several public enterprises; Hedi Djilani, who chaired the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat, UTICA) for almost twenty-four years, was father-in-law to Leila Trabelsi's brother; prominent businessmen Neji Mhiri and Lotfi Abdennadher were also personal friends of the presidential couple. According to a World Bank study, by late 2010 Ben Ali's family network had captured nearly 2 per cent of Tunisia's private sector profits (Rijkers, Freund, and Nucifora Citation2014).
6 Among the dismissed were the Ministers of Communication, Commerce and Religious Affairs, along with the governors of Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba and Zaghouan.
7 Notable examples include Leila Trabelsi's nephew Imed, former ministers Abdallah Kallel, Tijani Haddad and Samira Khayach Belhaj, and Secretary of State for National Solidarity Funds Kamel Hadj Sassi.
8 Three members of Tunisia's largest trade union confederation, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), resigned on 18 January before taking office due to strong criticism of their collaboration with members of the RCD. Other opposition figures, including the chairman of Ettakatol Mustapha Ben Jaafar turned down his nomination (Ben Achour Citation2016, 101).
9 At least half of the ministers from Sidi Bouzid, Le Kef, Kasserine, and Tozeur were initially not affiliated with any political party. Out of seventeen ministers from Medenine appointed between 2011 and 2019, ten were independent.
10 As many as nineteen organisations and trade unions took part to the Higher Authority for Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (HIROR, or Haute Instance pour la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution, de la Réforme Politique et de la Transition Démocratique), a commission established in March 2011 with the aim of reforming state institutions and preparing the first democratic elections. The National Quartet consisting of the UGTT, UTICA, the Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme, LTDH) and the lawyers’ organisation, played a key role in the political crisis that followed the assassinations of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013. In 2016, the UGTT, UTICA, and the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fisheries (Union Tunisienne de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, UTAP) adhered to the Carthage Agreement, which outlined policy guidelines on the economic, social and security fronts (Jeune Afrique Citation2016).
11 An estimated 18 out of 43 cabinet members in 2018 had served in government under Ben Ali, were members of the RCD, or were close to the deposed president (Bobin and Haddad Citation2018). Among the Ben Ali cabinet members who returned to the government after 2011 are former prime minister Habib Essid, Education minister Hatem Ben Salem, Finance minister Mohamed Ridha Chalghoum, Defence minister Abdelkrim Zbidi, and Public Function minister Kamel Morjane.
12 Interview with Ennahda officials, February 2017.
13 Author interview with members of Al Irada and Nidaa Tounes, June 2018.
14 Interview with Ennahda officials, February 2017.
15 According to a civil society activist critical of consensual decision-making, ‘you cannot take consensus accountable’. Author interview with civil society activist, June 2018.
16 Author interviews with members of the Tunisian Parliament, March 2017 and June 2018.
17 Author interview with members of Ennahda, March 2017 and June 2018.
18 Ennahda initially considered an independent government to be ‘an ally of the opposition, under the mantle of technocracy’ (Soudani Citation2013).
19 Saïed had been an early critic of technocratic governments, arguing that there ‘a member of the government cannot be but political’ (Espace Manager Citation2014).