600
Views
4
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

Understanding Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism in contemporary Indonesia

A different voice from Nahdlatul Ulama under pluralist leadership

 

ABSTRACT

The Sunni-Shi’a sectarian conflicts in Muslim countries have intensified during the last two decades; Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, is no exception to this trend. While sectarian discourses influenced by geopolitical dynamics are catalysed by many scripturalist groups in local sectarian conflicts, the traditional Islam represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is left out from the scholarly analysis on sectarianism as it has been largely considered representative of tolerant Islam. However, a series of sectarian incidents have been provoked by NU clerics in East Java. This urges us to re-examine the more complex nature of NU’s diversity. Why have intolerant kiai emerged from NU, what motivates them to engage in sectarianism, and who are they? I argue here that sectarian anti-Shi’a sentiments emerged as an attempt to delegitimise NU pluralist leaders and enhance the influence both within and outside the organization. Specifically, I explore the rise of anti-Shi’a NU figures who have developed a particularly strong bond through their commonality as followers of Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki (1944–2004), a cleric from Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He was an exceptionally well respected ulama among NU members. Although he proclaimed the importance of tolerance, and refrained from denouncing any one as a non-believer (kafir) including the Shi’a, some of his disciples are increasingly engaging in sectarianism in order to seek influence in Indonesia’s electoral democracy.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Numbers 18K12702 and 17H04510 and Asia Euro Policy Dialogue.

Note on contributor

Yuka Kayane is an assistant professor at University of Tsukuba, Japan. Her forthcoming publication co-authored with K. Miichi is on ‘The politics of religious pluralism in Indonesia: the Shi’a response to the Sampang incidents in 2011–2012’ (TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia). Email: [email protected].

Notes

1 DDII has striven to purge all rituals and beliefs of elements not derived from the Qur’an and Hadith. Saudi sponsors of this group heavily influenced this view, in which neither traditional practices nor new, liberal interpretations are acceptable (Bruinessen Citation1999: 13, 14).

2 Regarding Shi’ism in Southeast Asia, see Formichi and Feener (Citation2015). For more detail on Shi’ism in Indonesia specifically, see Zulkifli (Citation2009).

3 Followers of traditional Islam seek to preserve the authority of medieval Islamic scholarship through adherence to one of the four classical Sunni schools. However, this is only one element of traditionalism. Scholars agree that traditionalists are tolerant of local customs and spiritual practices (e.g. Fealy et al. Citation2006: 40).

4 Shi’ism restricts religious guidance to the followers of the Prophet and his descendants (ahlul al-bayt). Ali is regarded as the first Imam (Jafari Citation2009: 135–142, Dabashi Citation2009: 142–149).

5 Hasyim Asy’ari is Abdurrahman Wahid’s grandfather.

6 This information is from the author’s interview with Ihya Ulumuddin, one of al-Maliki’s earliest disciples, and the former head of Hai’ah Ash-Shofwah al-Malikiyyah (Malang, East Java, 27 June 2018).

7 This information is from the author’s interviews with Abdullah Munif Marzuqi, a Pesantren Langitan kiai who studied under al-Maliki in the 1980s (Tuban, East Java, 25 June 2018); and with Husein al-Habsyi’s son Musa (Jakarta, 22 December 2018).

8 A sayyid is one who identifies as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and in Indonesia is commonly called a habib. The community of sayyid has been a major proponent of Indonesian Shi’a. For more information on these individuals’ religious trajectories, see Zulkifli (Citation2009: 16–29).

9 Pesantren Dalwa has several thousand students, making it one of the largest Islamic boarding schools in the region.

10 The current heads of Langitan and Dalwa, Ubaidillah Faqih and Ali Zainal Abidin Baharun, respectively, are both students of Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki.

11 This information is from Tim Majelis Khoir (Citation2016: 41) and from the author’s interview with Ihya Ulumddin (Malang, East Java, 27 June 2018).

12 Ihya Ulumddin organised an association for his school’s alumni on instructions from Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki in December 2002. Accordingly, on 5 March 2003, Hai’ah Ash-Shofwah al-Malikiyyah was established in Pesantren Darussalam Tambak Madu in Surabaya (Hamdani Citation2014: 82). This group’s website is <http://www.shofwatuna.org>.

13 Neither senior alumni of the school nor respected NU kiai such as Ihya Ulumuddin has been involved in anti-Shi’a provocations. Ihya Ulumuddin studied under YAPI’s founder in the late 1970s, so Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki instructed him to pay his respects at the funeral of Ihya Ulumuddin’s former teacher, Husein al-Habsyi. (interview with Ihya Ulumuddin, Malang, East Java, 27 June 2018).

14 For a more detailed analysis of the DDII’s ideas and its articulations during the 1990s, see William Liddle (Citation1996b).

15 Author’s interview with Abdullah Munif Marzuqi (Tuban, East Java, 25 June 2018).

16 However, like most of the MUI’s fatwas, this tausiyah has no legal effect and could not prohibit Shi’i activities.

17 For a more detailed discussion of the National Congress’s actions in 1994, see Fealy (Citation1996: 261–273) and Hefner (Citation2000: 167–174).

18 Amin Djamaluddin, a former Persis and DDII activist, is known for his aggressive stance against Ahmadiyya and Shi’ism. For more details, see Burhani (Citation2016).

19 In the fatwa, the MUI (2011: 375–379) stated that nika mutah is haram (forbidden) and that those who perform it should be convicted based on valid current laws.

20 Jalaluddin Rachmat, a former student activist from Bandung, shares pluralist views with Wahid.

21 These Shi’i followers ended up as refugees and are now still living in Sidoarjo, more than 100 km from their homes.

22 Many scholars have pointed out that the MUI’s fatwa triggered attacks on religious minorities in many places throughout Indonesia (e.g. Ichwan Citation2013 and Crouch Citation2014). Abdusshomad Buchori stated that it had issued the fatwa because Shi’ism had caused conflict in many places, including in Bondowoso, Jember, Malang, and Pasuruan (IPAC Citation2016: 16–17).

23 Tajul Muluk was a nephew of Ali Karrar, who also studied under al-Maliki in the 1990s. Tajul discontinued his studies as he was unattracted by Sunni teachings. He kept to Shi’ism from his time at YAPI, before leaving for Mecca (Afdillah Citation2016: 38–42).

24 Author’s interview with an activist from NGO called ‘Gus Durian’, who monitored the development of the situation (Bangil, East Java, 6 June 2018).

25 See NU online (Citation2007). However, after retiring as NU chairman, Hasyim Muzadi defended Shi’ism in Sampang by stating that it is a part of Islam (NU online Citation2012).

26 Yahya Zainul expanded his organisation, Al Bajah, primarily through obligatory ‘donations’ from his followers. To prevent him from threatening the NU’s authority in Cirebon, the leaders of the local NU branch attempted to include him in the local leadership on several occasions. Each attempt ended in failure as Yahya Zainul is staunchly opposed to Said Aqil Siradj’s pluralist leadership. However, Yahya Zainul’s aggression against NU leadership has significantly reduced since he suffered a serious neck injury in a car accident in 2016 (author’s interview with several NU activists, Cirebon, West Java, 28 December 2018). Throughout West Java, Yahya Zainul owns not just several schools but also numerous businesses, including a travel agency, as well as local TV and radio stations (Pikiran Rakyat Citation2016).

27 As the Saudi government has restricted the admittance of students from Indonesia, many disciples from Dalwa and Langitan have instead been sent to Al-Ahgaff University (author’s interview with Abdullah Munif Marzuqi, Tuban, East Java, 25 June 2018).

28 Part of Yahya Zainul’s speech can be viewed on YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6OZQLMiB5nA>

29 Before the NUGL website (<www.nugarislurus.com>) was shut down in early 2017, it had approximately 190,000 Facebook followers.

30 However, within the sayyid community, Rizieq Shihab, the head of FPI, is known for his exceptionally moderate views on Shi’ism and has restricted members from attacking Shi’a (author’s interview with a leader of the Indonesia’s Shi’i organisations, who has known Rizieq Shihab well since childhood, Jakarta, 9 December 2017).

31 Other figures who have joined ANNAS include Abdus Samad (from LPPI), Ahmad Cholil Ridwan (from Persis and DDII), and Muhammad Alkhaththath (from Forum Umat Islam, the Forum for Islamic Brotherhood). For more information, see the ANNAS website <http://www.annasindonesia.com/profil/iftitah-dan-sejarah-aliansi-nasional-anti-syiah>

32 With support from the Alawi community, Achmad Zein Alkaf established the Al-Bayyinat Foundation in Surabaya in 1986 which has fomented alarm at the supposed threat of Shi’ism. For more information, see its website <http://www.albayyinat.net/ind1.html>.

33 Muhammad Baharun is the son of Hasan Baharun from Bondowoso, the former head of the Al Khairiyya school whose colleague was Husein al-Habsyi. Both father and son later came to hold deep resentment against Shi’ism after Hasan lost vehement debates with several of his Shi’i students (author’s interview with Husein al-Habsyi’s son Musa, Jakarta, 22 December 2018).

34 Although Salafi preachers who had graduated from the Islamic University of Medina established the MIUMI, its members are not confined to the Salafi and include many traditionalists such as NU kiai.

35 See, for instance, ‘Bahaya Syiah & Wahabi – Ustaz Somad’ (Danger of Shi’ism and Wahhabism) filmed in Malaysia, Calipha Channel 21 February 2019 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYHcsGlmxis>

36 Abdul Somad publicly endorsed NUGL in his speech in Riau, uploaded 5 July 2017, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD-iAtO952A>

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.