India’s nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?

Abstract

India envisioned an ambitious three-stage nuclear energy programme with plans to generate over 20,000 MW of power, though realities forced its revision to 10,000 MW. Despite being targeted by denial regimes after its 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, the country managed to develop a largely indigenous infrastructure, propelled by the promise of exploiting its vast thorium resources. Having been stuck in the first-stage for long, India decided to integrate with the non-proliferation regime through the nuclear suppliers group waiver. The renewed access to nuclear commerce opened up opportunities for expanding its nuclear industry with international support, while sparing domestic resources for the three-stage plan. However, following the Fukushima incident and subsequent public upheavals, nuclear expansion plans face the prospect of being derailed. More spoilers came through India’s nuclear liability and international restrictions on recycling technologies. The paper examines the current status of India’s three-stage plan, the promise of the nuclear deal and the implications of public movements against nuclear expansion.

Keywords:

• nuclear energy
• Fukushima
• nuclear deal
• uranium
• three-stage programme

Notes

1. Some documents on the correspondences between these personalities, which reflect on the early decisions pertaining to the nuclear programme, are available at: http://idsa.in/npihp/document.html.

2. Text of this note is available at: http://www.idsa.in/npihp/documents/IDSA-HBP-26041948.pdf.

3. India response to the Atoms-for-Peace Plan and descriptions of its subsequent role in the establishment of the IAEA is available through various documents listed in Jain (1974).

4. US Department of State, Agreement of March 16, 1956, by and between the US Atomic Energy Commission and the President of India for the sale of 21 short tonnes of heavy water, Text released by Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations on June 2, 1956, and carried in Appendix A of Chellaney (1993).

5. Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the USA and the Government of India Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed in Washington, 8 August 1963, and entered into force 25 October 1963.

6. See INFCIRC/211: Text of a Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Canada and India relating to the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, November 6, 1974, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc211.pdf. Also see, Brief Annual Report: 1963–1964, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, April 1964.

7. See DAE Resolution, Constitution of the Atomic Energy Commission, Bombay, March 1, 1958, http://idsa.in/npihp/documents/IDSA-HBP-01031958.pdf.

8. Department of Atomic Energy, Programme for Surveying, Prospecting and Development of Atomic Minerals During the IVth and Vth Plan Periods (1969–1978); document available with IDSA’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

9. Department of Atomic Energy, Note on the Development of Fast Breeder Reactor, document available with IDSA’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

10. Roy (1982) and Claiborne (1983), restored by Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe.

11. The CSA is a safeguards agreement between IAEA and a non-nuclear-weapon State party as required by Article III.1 of the NPT. The agreement is comprehensive as it provides for the IAEA’s right to ensure that safeguards are applied ‘on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the State’s territory, jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.’ See text of INFCIRC/153 (corrected), June 1972, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf.

12. Chart accessed from Nuclear Power Corporation India Limited (NPCIL), http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/AllProjectOperationDisplay.aspx.

13. Thorium is the only such isotope found in nature which could be used without enrichment. Though the material is not fissile, it is fertile. Though its fabrication process is costly, it is more stable than oxide fuel.

14. See Shaping the Third Stage of Indian Nuclear Programme, http://www.dae.nic.in/writereaddata/.pdf_32.

15. “India to Have 6 Fast Breeder Reactors.” Deccan Herald, February 17, 2011, http://www.deccanherald.com/content/227582/6-commercial-fast-breeder-reactors.html. Also see, ‘India to Use “Plutonium” Reactor in Two Years: Atomic Energy Commission,’ 26 July 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-26/news/32869614_1_ahwr-reactors-kalpakkam.

16. See n. 14.

17. Text of the joint statement available at: http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/indousjoint.htm.

18. The new safeguard agreement, essentially based on the Infcirc-66 type, had a preamble covering the umbrella agreement, and covered 14 Indian civilian reactors and all future civilian reactors under facility-specific safeguards scheme. ‘IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement’, 1 August 2008, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2008/board010808.html.

19. ‘India Gets NSG Waiver by Consensus,’ September 6, 2008, http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/06ndeal4.htm.

20. See text of the ‘Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006’ passed in December 2006 at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-5682.

21. See ‘Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,’ Agreed Text, released on 1 August 2007, http://www.cfr.org/india/agreement-cooperation-between-government-united-states-america-government-india-concerning-peaceful-uses-nuclear-energy-123-agreement/p15459.

22. See interview with Dr Anil Kakodkar, then AEC Chairman and Secretary DAE, Subramanian (2004).

23. The Indian leftist parties, which opposed the nuclear deal, criticised the government for not exploiting India’s uranium mines and not opening new mines, though overlooking the fact that local opposition and environmental concerns have blocked these forays. See Vinod Mubayi, ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Is the Left Going to fall on its Own Sword?’ http://www.insafbulletin.net/archives/351.

24. See n. 22.

25. Apart from the over 4000 tonnes of uranium from these former Soviet republics, Russia was also to work with the NPCIL to produce fuel for the Kudankulam project. See ‘India Signs Uranium Contract with Russia.’ Indian Express, February 11, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-signs-uranium-contract-with-russia/422044. Also see ‘India to Receive Uranium from Kazakhstan.’ May 11, 2009, http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=659695.

26. Countries like Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia have given permits for uranium explorations, which has attracted foreign companies. For more on the African uranium mining scene see, ‘New Uranium Mining Projects – Africa,’ 6 June 2008, www.wise-uranium.org/upafr.html#MG.

27. See, ‘India seeks uranium from Namibia for enhancing nuke energy.’ The Hindu, March 27, 2008.

28. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The Treaty recognises five nuclear weapon states and designates the rest as non-nuclear weapon states. While India, Pakistan and Israel refused to sign the Treaty, North Korea withdrew from it in 2006. Text of the Treaty available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.

29. Keynote Address by Foreign Secretary Shri Ranjan Mathai at the Ministry of External Affairs – Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) National Export Control Seminar, 18 April 2012, http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/AddressbyForeignSecretaryShriRanjanMathai.

30. Text of the Act available at: http://www.dae.gov.in/rules/civilnucliab.pdf.

31. Parashar (2011). Also see Dikshit (2012).

32. For a collection of reports on the strife at Kudankulam, see http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Kudankulam-Nuclear-Protests/news/; also see http://www.dianuke.org/latest-updates-from-koodankulam/.

33. For reports on the agitations in Jaitapur, see http://www.ndtv.com/topic/protests-over-jaitapur.

34. See, Shiva (2011). Also see, Singh (2012); Kumar Das (2011); ‘Experts against Nuclear Power Plant at Kovvada,’ The Hindu, December 10, 2012; ‘West Bengal Government Rules out Haripur Nuclear Project,’ The Hindu, August 17, 2011; Yusuf (2011).

35. After failing to soothe tempers in protesting villages near Kudankulam, the government sent former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam for a conciliatory mission as he could converse in Tamil. Though Kalam’s visit was productive, he also tried to highlight the genuine concerns that drove the protests in Kudankulam, see ‘Kalam Suggests 10-point Action Plan on Koodankulam project,’ Indian Express, November 7, 2011.

36. Facts on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, NPCIL/ED (CP&CC)/2011/M/, September 28, 2011. Copy available at: http://pibmumbai.gov.in/English/PDF/E2012_FR39.PDF, also see, http://npcil.nic.in/main/MOEF_clearance_EIA_KKNPP.aspx. For details on the BARC outreach programme, see http://www.barc.gov.in/pubaware/op.html.

37. NPCIL published summaries and detailed reports of the safety audit in their website – http://npcil.nic.in/pdf/presentation.pdf.

38. An example will be the reporting on the IAEA review of RAPS wherein the media highlighted the defects, but underplayed the positive findings of the team (Sunderarajan 2012).

39. ‘Archbishop Flays Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project,’ New Indian Express, October 1, 2012.

40. See, ‘Our Policy is to Reprocess All the Fuel Put into a Nuclear Reactor,’ R. Prasad’s interview with Sekhar Basu, Director BARC, The Hindu, October 29, 2012.

41. ‘Shiv Sena to Oppose Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant.’ Accessed April 10, 2011. http://post.jagran.com/Shiv-Sena-to-oppose-Jaitapur-Nuclear-Power-Plant-1302409905.