Rationales of risk and uncertainty and their epistemological foundation by new phenomenology

Abstract

Risk studies have shown that many people rather than following rational means of managing risk refer to non-rational (hope, faith) and in-between rationales (trust, intuition), which are not irrational but reasonable and based on subjective experiences, which are difficult to overcome by the communication of mere expert knowledge. We suggest that the problem of analyzing subjective risk management can be itemized as a result of the tension between subjective and objectified forms of certitudes. To clarify this distinction, the article turns to the New Phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz for outlining the different epistemological foundations of rational, non-rational and in-between rationales. We then develop a model of three different forms of knowledge that are involved in subjective risk management and elaborate the basic neo-phenomenological distinction of subjective and objective facts by differentiating the latter ones into rational and non-rational ones. We conclude with considering consequences of these epistemological challenges for risk communication.

Keywords:

• Risk communication
• lifeworld
• in-between rationales
• new phenomenology
• epistemology

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 „Sensible” means here and elsewhere „capable of being sensed”.

2 As initially mentioned, we will expand this analytical distinction in section 5 further into a three-dimensional model. In order to do so, we will differentiate the objectified knowledge, resulting from reflexive thinking, into rational and non-rational forms by using the categories of being anchored in subjective lifeworld and the level of empirical foundation.

3 Unfortunately, the English translation of this passage is incomplete. We added the missing parts in square brackets because they are crucial for our argument. Compare Schütz 1981, pp. 140.

4 In the coming section we will sharpen the distinction between the two forms of objectivations generated by reflection, namely rationality on the one hand, and hope and faith on the other. The two crucial differences are the degree of empirical foundation and the level of being anchored in the subjective lifeworld.