‘Rocking the vote’: new forms of youth organisations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

Abstract

This paper explores the social change and political engagement witnessed in several former socialist countries, devoting special attention to youth (or student) movements in Georgia and Ukraine. In particular, it explores the relationship between those youth movements and the so-called colour revolutions, suggesting that these revolutions boosted political opportunities for youth movements. By seizing those political opportunities, informally organised groups have been able to become formalised and more active in their respective societies. This explains why such youth movements have sometimes been perceived as being created overnight while, this article argues, they were only hidden and ready to emerge when opportunities emerged.

Keywords:

• youth
• former Soviet Union
• colour revolutions
• Ukraine
• Georgia

Notes

1. The term ‘colour revolutions’ is attributable to the fact that opposition movements and ordinary people adopted a colour to symbolise their anti-government demonstrations. Some scholars, like Bunce and Wolchik (2006, 2007), prefer the expression ‘electoral revolutions’, so-called because elections provide the trigger for protests.

2. Protests against President Saakashvili's administration in November 2007 prompted a state of emergency and the violent dispersal of demonstrators and closure of Imedi television station, which had inherited Rustavi 2's role as main outlet for opposition sentiment. Protests also coincided with and followed early presidential and parliamentary elections in January and May 2008, respectively.

3. Based on Donnacha Ó Beacháin's interviews with the following Zubr/Youth leaders, all conducted in Minsk, Belarus: Aliaksandr Mazur (4 August 2009), Aliaksandr Atroshchankau (13 August 2009), Timofey Dranchuck (6 August 2009), Andrei Kim (10 August 2009), Zmicer Dashkevich (5 August 2009), Misha Pashkevich (4 August) and Donnacha Ó Beacháin interviews Vaclaŭ Areška, Head of Planning and Analysis Group, United Democratic Forces of Belarus, (Minsk, 6 and 12 August 2009).

4. One of the authors (Donnacha Ó Beacháin) was a visiting fellow with the Civic Education Project at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, the country's most prestigious third level institution, which provided the main body of dissident students, and attended early meetings of the alternative student body.

5. Donnacha Ó Beacháin, interviews with Georgian journalist and Rustavi 2 presenter, Salome Asatiani and Liberty Institute Director, Levan Ramishvili, Tbilisi, 31 and 28 July 2005, respectively.

6. This account on the rise of Kmara is based on the following interviews conducted by Donnacha Ó Beacháin in Tbilisi: Kakha Lomia, January 2008 (Director of Soros Foundation 2003); David Darchiashvili (Director of Soros Foundation 2004–2008) January 2008; Giorgi Kandalaki (Kmara leader in 2003) 30 July 2005, Levan Ramishvili (Director of Liberty Institute), 28 July 2005. Merab Basilaia (ALPE), interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Tbilisi, 10 March 2006.

7. Lincoln Mitchell (Co-Director of NDI (Georgia) 2002–2004], interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, New York, 19 April 2008.

8. Dmytro Groisman, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Amnesty International Group, co-ordinator, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Yalta, Ukraine 8 July 2009, Pro-Orange Revolution Lviv businessmen Yaroslav Rushchyshyn and Andriy Beyzyk, interviews with Donnacha Ó Beacháin Lviv, Ukriane, 13 July 2009.

9. Despite Yushchenko being against the creation of PORA, some politicians from Nasha Ukraina remained active and contributed to the development of the campaign. In November 2004, Roman Bezsmertnyi, one of the closest advisers to Yushchenko, took the lead of the coordination of the street protests.

10. Leader of the main NGO coalition in Ukraine ‘Freedom of Choice’ from 1999 to 2004. A PORA leader in 2004, he is currently an adviser to the President of Ukraine.

11. We have suggested elsewhere (see Ó Beacháin and Polese 2010) that lack of regime change does not necessarily imply that protests had no effects. Even in the case of repression by the authorities, anti-regime forces might be able to take advantage of what they have learnt during the protests.