Information warfare and sub‐state actors: An organisational approach

Abstract

Information Warfare is perceived as an increasing threat by armed forces, governments and corporations alike. There is a perception that sub‐state groups pose a particular problem because they may find it easier than states to exploit Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to leverage limited resources into disproportionate political, economic or military gains. Since the mid‐1990s, therefore, Western governments have framed their Information assurance polices as defences against ‘cyberterrorism’.

However, it is proving difficult for states and corporations to assess the IW threat from sub‐state groups. Existing approaches that focus on the capabilities of potentially hostile actors address only part of the problem. Moreover, they provide only a steady state assessment of the threat. In a dynamic and fluid security environment characterised by rapid and nonlinear change, such approaches are unable to provide the predictive intelligence necessary for long‐term security planning.

This article proposes an organisational analysis approach that may be better able to provide predictive warnings of threats from sub‐state groups. The article argues that organisational culture and organisational structure are a primary locus of capability for IW. Organisational culture is a determinant of how likely a group is to adopt innovative strategies such as IW. Organisational structure is a determinant of how effective a group may be at exploiting ICT and IW. The article argues that measurement of these characteristics can provide predictive indicators of emerging IW threats.

Keywords:

• Information Warfare
• intelligence
• organisational analysis
• terrorism
• threat assessment