Guerilla capitalism and the platform economy: Governing Uber in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

ABSTRACT

Platforms play an increasingly important role in organizing our economic and political systems globally. Drawing on the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach and the notion of regulatory entrepreneurship, this article introduces the concept of guerilla capitalism to describe an emerging politically led and economic operative logic of platforms: their profitability relies on the active exploitation of legal gray zones and their ability to harness their network power to openly contest and reshape legislation politically. Through a comparative study of Uber’s operation in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, this article demonstrates that, despite the fact that Uber’s guerilla growth strategy remained strong, its political playbooks resulted in diverse dynamics within different regulatory regimes. The article further explains why its playbook was relatively more effective in the democratic context because the firm could successfully mobilize the fictitious voice of the citizens to legitimize its business. Through these three case studies, this article contributes to the existing literature on platform studies by introducing novel uses of political economy. It also enriches the VoC and platform economy literature by studying the behaviors of platforms in East Asian contexts which exist under separate and specific political regimes.

KEYWORDS:

• Uber
• platform economy
• varieties of capitalism
• regulatory entrepreneurship
• guerilla capitalism

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank the special issue editors Jonathon Hutchinson, Aphra Kerr, and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable help and constructive feedback. All errors and omissions are, of course, our own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 ‘The CME [coordinated market economy] and LME [liberal market economy] ideal types define the primary axis, while the dimensions of difference are conventionally reduced to five political-economic realms: corporate structure; financial system; education and training regime; industrial relations; and inter-firm relations’ (Zhang & Peck, 2016, p. 59). None of them is about the political relationships between the firm and the regulatory political agent.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ngai Keung Chan

Ngai Keung Chan is a PhD candidate in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. His doctoral research examines the intersection of platform governance, algorithms, and service workers. His work has appeared in such journals as New Media & Society, Surveillance & Society, Space and Culture, and Media and Communication, among others.

Chi Kwok

Chi Kwok is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Utrecht University in The Netherlands. His current research examines theories of the corporation and the political legitimacy of business corporate power. His work has appeared in international peer-reviewed journals, such as, among others, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Review of Social Economy, Space and Culture, and China Perspectives.