The contingent home: how second-generation Arab migrants negotiate belonging in Qatar?

ABSTRACT

Utilising semi-structured interviews, this study aims to explore how second-generation Arab migrants perceive and negotiate their belonging in Qatar. It is argued that second-generation Arab migrants construct their belonging to Qatar beyond the legal definition (Citizen/resident) imposed on them as temporary migrants. However, the same legal definition is key to understand how their sense of belonging to Qatar is perceived and negotiated. Participants’ reflections on their sense of belonging were analyzed based on two analytical levels: the place-belonging level, and the politics of belonging level. Three general strategies for negotiating the gap between the sense of place-belonging and being exposed to the boundaries of belonging in the Qatari context were identified. The study concludes that while second-generation Arab migrants construct their positions on the spectrum of belonging – unbelonging beyond the legal status imposed on them, such status is still the rigid criteria on which inclusion and exclusion are based.

KEYWORDS:

• Second-generation
• Arab migrants
• belonging
• citizenship
• Qatar

Introduction

A central concern pertaining to the sociology of migration in the West is studying the formation of identity and belonging among migrants (Anthias 2009, 2002; Levitt and Waters 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). This has not been the norm everywhere. For example, most migration research in the Arab Gulf countries has focused primarily on labour migrants, exploring issues such as the migrants’ share in the local labour markets, their economic characteristics, and the legal conditions that govern them (Alajmi 2017; Hosoda and Matsukawa 2019). Issues of identity, belonging, long-term settlement, and integration have not received much attention from migration researchers in the context of the Gulf countries like elsewhere (e.g. Soysal 1994, 2000; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Wessendorf 2007; Foner and Dreby 2011). This can be attributed to the fact that migration to Gulf countries is governed by the restrictive legal framework of kafala (sponsorship) that bonds migrants to their economical function through fixed-term contracts perceiving them as temporary guests or residents (muqimun). However, it appears that long-term migrant communities do exist; in some cases for several decades, resulting in second and third-generation migrants residing in Gulf countries nowadays without being able to gain the right for citizenship or permanent settlement (Ali 2011; Babar 2014, 2017; Soudy 2017).

While this group of second and third-generation migrants is ethnically diverse (i.e. Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis and Iranians), in the case of Qatar, Arabs make a significant segment of them (Babar 2014). Second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants are a very specific group that is unlike their counterparts from other ethnic backgrounds. Although non-Gulf Arab migrant communities show diverse characteristics and differences from each other in terms of dialectics, religion, and socioeconomic backgrounds, however, relative cultural proximity does exist between Arab migrants and the Qatari society, in terms of common language, shared history, and a shared body of knowledge. Such cultural proximity arguably makes the experiences of second-generation Arab migrants considerably different from their non-Arab counterparts. (Shah 2017; Hosoda and Matsukawa 2019; Akinci 2020; Dakkak 2022).

Studies focusing exclusively on second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants in the Gulf remain scarce, and the Qatari context is not an exception of that. To the best of our knowledge, there are only three studies to date that have looked at the experiences of second-generation migrants in Qatar. Whilst El Berni (2018) has studied the process of identity construction of the Arab and non-Arab second-generation youth migrants as compared to their Qatari counterparts, Malik (2017), has employed a transnational lens to study how second-generation youth Sudanese in Qatar formalise their identity and belonging, and how they exhibit a state of in-between-ness in the diaspora. The third study was conducted by Soudy (2017) who compared how different modes of settlement shape the sense of belonging among second-generation Egyptians in Qatar and the 1.5 generation Egyptians in the United States.

Although these studies help expand our understanding of the experiences of certain second-generation migrants in Qatar, they fail to explain what it means to be a second-generation Arab migrant in an Arab country like Qatar, leaving some important questions unanswered such as: To what extent the experience of a second or third-generation of non-Gulf Arab migrant is shaped by their language, religion, culture, and even physical appearance similarity with Qataris vis a vis the restrictive legal framework of the kafala system? And how do second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants in Qatar perceive and negotiate their belonging as temporary residents?

The study builds on the theoretical literature about place belonging and politics of belonging by drawing on the experiences and the ways in which second-generation Arab migrants perceive and negotiate their belonging. Unlike the few previous studies on this issue (e.g. El Berni 2018; Soudy 2017; Malik 2017), the current study examines the formation of the sense of belonging among second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar by analysing qualitative data that were obtained through eleven interviews with second-generation Arab migrants from five different Arab countries. The findings of this study show that second-generation Arab migrants construct their belonging to Qatar beyond the legal definition imposed on them as temporary migrants. At the same time, this legal definition plays a significant role in shaping their sense of belonging to Qatar and the way through which this belonging is perceived and negotiated. We argue that in a modern nation-state where formal belonging is determined by citizenship, a sense of belonging and integration cannot be fully achieved by migrants only based on primordial connections with the host society (e.g. common language, culture, religion and history). In these cases, with regards to rights and privileges, cultural, religious, language and physical appearance proximity between migrants and host society become meaningless in the absence of a formal legal standpoint.

We begin the paper by outlining the theoretical framework in the next section providing an overview of some of the debates regarding the concept of belonging in relation to describing and explaining the attachments that people formalise during their life trajectories. In the same section, we also discuss the migration context of second-generation Arab migrants. In the second section, we provide information in relation to the methodology of the study, data collection, analysis procedures and the participants’ characteristics. In the following section, we present the findings, whereas in the last section, these findings are discussed highlighting their relation to the previous studies, as well as, their implications for future research.

Theoretical background

Aiming to explain the diverse forms of attachments formalised during people’s life trajectories, social scientists have attempted to explore the concept of belonging (Probyn 1996; Yuval-Davis 2006; Krzyzanowski and Jones 2011). Many of these attempts emerged from critical approaches that have discussed the concept of identity, trying to overcome the ambiguous definitions of the term identity and the overall overgeneralised application of it as a ‘catch-all concept’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Anthias 2002, 2008; Krzyzanowski and Jones 2011). Although there is a considerable body of literature on belonging, however, several researchers have raised concerns that much of that literature treats this notion as a self-explanatory concept and as a synonym of identity or citizenship (Antonsich 2010; Lähdesmäki et al. 2016; Errichiello 2018). Such concerns encouraged scholars (Antonsich 2010; May 2011; Anthias 2009) to call for more clarification on the concept of belonging. However, there have been several notable attempts to develop comprehensive analytical frameworks to address the concept of belonging. These include Yuval-Davis’ contributions (Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006; Kaptani and Yuval-Davis 2008), as well as Antonsich (2010), and Krzyzanowski and Jones (2011) model of studying belonging.

According to (Yuval-Davis 2006; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005), there is a need to distinguish between the concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging. While the latter refers to the power of constructing boundaries of inclusion or exclusion of particular people and social categories and grouping them within these constructed boundaries, the former refers to people’s feelings, attachments, and orientations towards places, social localities, and social categorisations. Although such a distinction between belonging and politics of belonging is needed for analytical purposes, this does not imply that there is no link between them. On the contrary, since politics of belonging is mainly concerned with notions and practices of inclusion and exclusion as well as access and participation (Anthias 2008), the individualistic sense of belonging is influenced by such practices. As Anthias (2009) illustrated, to claim belonging is a political act, and such a claim is linked with access to certain criteria, such as cultural norms and legal rights. Indeed, the politics of belonging involves a continuous process of production and reproduction of membership’s boundaries, a process that revolves around the status and entitlements of such membership (Yuval-Davis 2006; Errichiello 2018).

In a similar way to the proposed framework by Yuval-Davis, Antonsich (2010) introduced another comprehensive framework to conceptualise belonging. According to him, a study of belonging should involve two analytical levels, namely the level of ‘place-belongingness’, the sense of being ‘at home’ (Soudy 2017; Yuval-Davis 2006), and the politics of belonging level. As to belong involves the sense of being ‘at home’ (Soudy 2017; Yuval-Davis 2006), Antonsich (2010) suggests that the first step in approaching belonging is to understand how this sense is developed by an individual in reference to a specific place, which generates what he calls ‘place-belongingness’ (Antonsich 2010, 646). As a result of analyzing various empirical findings and theoretical models, Antonsich puts forward five factors that may contribute to generating the sense of place-belongingness. The first one is the auto-biographical factor which relates to the person’s experiences, practices, and memories that were accumulated in a particular place. Memories of childhood, as well as the presence of family members in that place, may play an important role in developing the sense of place-belongingness. The second factor relates to social relations linked to this particular place, and the third one to cultural factors such as language, traditions or habits linked to it. Importantly, the materialised aspect of cultural factors, such as dress code, food consumption, and entertainment practices, may also play a role. The fourth factor is concerned with economic conditions present in a particular place, and the final factor is the legal status of the individual’s presence in a given place.

Several scholars had emphasised the legal status factor as an important factor contributing to generating the sense of place-belongingness (Fenster 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006; Anthias 2008) due to its vital role in determining individual’s rights. This may include not only political rights (e.g. obtaining citizenship), economical rights (e.g. to work), or social rights (e.g. to benefit from healthcare), but also ‘spatial rights’ (e.g. to stay or to leave) (Yuval-Davis 2006, 208). According to Antonsich (2010), the interplay between these factors determines, to a large extent, the sense of place-belongingness.

The formation of place-belongingness should not be separated from the politics of belonging when analyzing people’s experiences (Yuval-Davis 2006; Anthias 2009; Antonsich 2010; Krzyzanowski and Jones 2011). At the same time, this does not imply either assuming an automatic relationship between the social/political aspect of belonging and the personal one or reducing one to the other. Instead, sociological research should consider both dimensions of belonging. This is crucial, as to focus only on belonging as a personal manner poses a risk of ignoring its social and political contexts. On the other hand, to focus only on the social and political dimensions of belonging may lead to over-politicising the daily life experiences as well as eliminating the agency of social actors in expressing their attachments and detachments. Different forms of belonging could exist despite the permeability of official boundaries that exist in certain contexts (Vora 2013; Vora and Koch 2015; Malik 2017). Moreover, as noted by Dakkak (2022), more attention should be given to the role of personal lived experiences and daily practices when exploring the development of belonging in contexts where formal integration is absent, as it is in Qatar.

Migration to Qatar in a context

Although the original migration to Qatar started long before the discovery of natural gas and oil in the area, the event did stress the need for additional workforce and encourage the flow of hundreds of thousands of migrants to the area (Nagy 2006; Gardner 2010). Hence, the contemporary migrants’ population in Qatar consists predominantly of labour migrants, who constitute the majority of the population in Qatar.

Labour migrants in Qatar came from all over the world, contributing to the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of migrant communities in the country. However, there is a lack of official and reliable data that would accurately describe the characteristics and size of this large and diverse group (Babar 2017; Iskander 2021). For example, the published statistics from the most recent census (2020), show no direct information regarding the proportions of Qataris versus non-Qatari residents. However, by combining data on educational attainment for population (10 years and above) by nationality in the 2020 census (Planning and Statistics Authority 2020, 27), on one hand, and the registered live births by nationality between 2010 and 2019 on the other hand (Planning and Statistics Authority 2021, 33); the proportion of Qataris is 11.4% (324,730) out of 2,846,118 residents in Qatar in 2020.¹ In terms of the ethnic composition of migrants in Qatar, some recent studies point out that the majority come from South Asia and Middle East countries (Iskander 2021). While most migrants in Qatar are short-term migrants attached to the development mega-projects taken by the state, some segments of migrant population have inhabited the country for decades which makes their presence to be considered a multi-generational (Babar 2014; Shaker 2019). These long-term residents constitute a distinct category of Qatari residents, as they neither fall into the category of citizenship nor can they be considered fully temporary migrants. While it should be noted that long-term residency in Qatar is not exclusive to Arab migrant communities, what does make this segment of migrants unique, albeit their multiformity, is their relative closeness, but not sameness, in terms of language, religion, and culture, to Qatari citizens.

Regardless of the duration of residence, country of origin, class, or profession, the presence of all migrants in Qatar is governed by a so-called kafala (worker sponsorship) system. The kafala system bounds the migrant/employee with the employer/sponsor (kafeel) through a work contract that is tied to a specific job for a defined period. Therefore, the permission for the migrant to reside in Qatar is linked with employment, and their presence is mainly driven by their role in the labour market (Babar, Ewers, and Khattab 2019; Iskander 2021).² Much of the criticism of the kafala system stems from concerns about human rights and revolves around the restrictions regarding switching jobs and travelling outside Qatar, as well as, of the migrants not being able to object to poor work conditions and discriminatory practices (El Berni 2015; Babar, Ewers, and Khattab 2019). Although kafala system still exists as the main legal regulator of migrants’ presence in the country, several reforms have been introduced since 2017. For instance, most workers are no longer required to obtain approval from their employers in order to travel, and some workers are now allowed to change their employers without their former employer’s permission (Iskander 2021, 18).

As Babar (2017) noted, literature on migration in GCC, including Qatar, tends to perceive the regulations and conditions of migrants in the Gulf as being unique to this region. The inability of obtaining citizenship through a clear legal pathway, and the unattainability of legal status allowing permanent residency are all seen through the lens of regional specificities that are exclusive to the Gulf context. However, such an approach hinders understanding these issues from a wider perspective. As many scholars have argued (Babar 2017; Iskander 2021), many practices experienced by migrants in Qatar and other GCC countries resemble those present in other parts of the world. For example, issues related to temporariness produced by the kafala system are comparable to issues related to the temporary worker programs that exist in North America and Europe. This similarity indicates a global tendency of trying to fulfill the demands of local labour markets without offering a permanent settlement to the workers (Haas, Castles, and Miller 2020). Many other rights, including the political rights and cultural rights of the migrants, are being violated across the world.

However, what makes the Qatari context unique is not the mere presence of a legal framework that binds migrants with their economical function, but rather the fact that this legal framework is the only pathway to reside in the country, and that it applies to all migrant segments regardless of their demographic characteristics and stay duration. This is considerably different from most other countries, where only a fraction of all migrants are covered by temporary worker programs/frameworks (Iskander 2021).

Methodological considerations

A qualitative approach was adopted utilising semi-structured interviews with eleven second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar. We defined second-generation as individuals who were born in the country or have been raised in the country since a young age, specifically before six years old (Somerville 2008).

Before starting the data collection, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval has been obtained from Research and Grants Department at Doha Institute on 26 October 2021 with the number DI-IRB-2021-S85. Interviews with participants took place between December 2021 and February 2022. The participants were recruited through friends and colleagues who had connections with second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar.

Interviews took place in various public and private settings, such as cafes, libraries, offices, and cars. All of the semi-structured interviews were conducted in Arabic and lasted between one and two hours. Most of the interviews were recorded, however, two participants did not consent to record the conversations. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with most of the participants. However, due to preventative measures for COVID-19, as well as some participants’ preferences, some interviews were held remotely via ZOOM or Facetime applications.

The interview questions were divided into three clusters. The first cluster covers participants’ personal, educational, and familial backgrounds, as well as their migration trajectories. The second cluster addresses participants’ relation to their respective ‘home’ countries. For instance, topics like their social and familial relationships, their attitudes toward visiting or living in those countries, and forms of connectedness and belonging they have out there have been identified in this section. The third cluster focuses on participants’ relation to their ‘host’ country Qatar. For example, topics such as cultural practices in their daily life experiences, their perception of opportunities and challenges of being second-generation migrants in Qatar, their social networks in Qatar as well as their futural hopes and plans fell under this cluster.

All recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed utilising thematic analysis approach. Sonix software was used in the transcription process, and MAXQDA software was used in coding the data, and extracting themes and patterns from the data. Interviewees’ data have been anonymised and pseudonyms are used in this paper.

All the eleven participants were born in Qatar to migrant families who were migrated into Qatar between the late 1960s and 1990s. Only one participant was born outside Qatar and arrived in the country at age of two years, and two of them were third-generation migrants. Five of the participants were females and six were males, all aged between 20 and 41 years old, all of the research participants completed their higher education at least with a bachelor’s degree, three completed a master’s degree and two of them are pursuing doctoral studies. In terms of their employment sectors, 8 of the participants were employed in a governmental or semi-governmental sector, one unemployed at the time of the interview, and one as a graduate student outside Qatar. Participants originated from five Arab countries, with one from Lebanon, one from Syria, two from Sudan, three from Yemen, and four from Palestine. All participants hold citizenship of their countries of origin except one with dual citizenship. For Palestinian participants, two of them hold Jordanian citizenship, and the other two only hold travel documents.

Findings

This section presents the findings regarding the participants’ reflections on the notion of belonging in the context of Qatar. Following Antonsich’s (2010) suggestion that a study of belonging should involve two analytical levels, concerned with place-belongingness and the politics of belonging, this section is divided into three parts: the diverse forms of place-belonging, the boundaries of belonging, and the ways in which second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar may negotiate the gap between these two levels.

Unbounded belonging: familiarity and memories

One of the main elements of the concept of belonging are people’s perceptions of ‘home’ (Yuval-Davis 2006). In this current study, various forms of familiarity with Qatar were discussed by all interviewees. In that, some participants pointed to their extended social connections, familiar places, local traditions and symbols promoting a sense of rootedness and comfortability.

Omar, for example, a 30-year-old single Sudanese migrant, described his perception of a place to be called ‘home’ as consisting of two aspects: the characteristics and meanings of coming from a specific country, and the materialised lived experiences during an individual’s life trajectory. In describing Qatar as ‘home’, he says:

What makes me consider a place to be home is … what I inherited from my family such as skin color, the local dialect, cultural symbols, and figures, this aspect is mainly connected with Sudan. [and] … material aspects such as places, childhood friends, poems we studied in the school, restaurants we used to eat in; all of these things are connected with Qatar. Indeed, these things make me feel that I have a space in this place [Qatar]. (Omar, December 2021)

Other factors contributing to the sense of familiarity with Qatar were also discussed. For example, two participants noted that Qatar being an Arab country with a conservative Islamic environment contributes to their sense of place-belonging in this country. However, such sense extends to personal memories. Mohammed explains why he would prefer to stay in Qatar:

Qatar is special, because it is, in one way or another, my country. It may sound strange to say Qatar is my country because it is not, but at the same time, it is. (…) It is not that I want an Arab, and Islamic society to raise my daughter, and because Qatar offers these things; so I prefer Qatar. No, it is not like that, it is not one plus one equals two. It is more complicated. I believe that the experience that I had in Qatar is a complicated and rich one (…) Qatar is special for me because I have many memories here. (Mohammad, January 2022).

Although Mohammad acknowledges that his sense of place belonging in Qatar is linked to several factors, he feels that his personal experiences and memories in this place play a central role in his attachment to Qatar. However, this attachment to Qatar is disrupted by temporariness, incomplete rights, exposure to different forms of inequality, and exclusion. Abdullah, a 30-year-old Yemeni migrant who had visited Yemen only once, described the gap between perceiving himself as a Qatari person on the one hand, and realising his non-Qatariness at the level of legal status on the other as the hard truth. Realising the gap between being familiar and embedded in the place and being exposed to different forms of exclusion in that place at the same time was discussed by several participants as the critical point at which they had to re-think their connectedness with Qatar.

Bounded belonging: exclusion and insecurities

One of the most recurrent themes of the participants’ narratives was their temporary status even after spending several decades in the country. Ali (2011) referred to this frame of mind as a ‘permanent impermanence’ status, which is caused by the kafala system. Moreover, the kafala system helps classify people into citizens and residents (foreign nationals) with unequal social and economic rights (Nagy 2006, 119). This formal differentiation appears in different social arenas, whether in education, employment or services. Such differentiation takes various forms and has been experienced by all research participants. This can be well illustrated by the experience of Mariam:

When I graduated from high school with a very high GPA, I received a call from someone telling me that I was nominated for an academic merit scholarship. At first sight, I was happy, then she asked me if I am Qatari or not, I told her that I am not, so she apologized for me telling me that this scholarship is only for Qatari students. (…) I felt being excluded for only not being a Qatari citizen, although I was born here. (Mariam, December 2021)

However, while some participants seem to understand this differentiation, especially given the demographic factors of Qatar as a rentier state, others indicated that there are some forms of differentiation by the state that are not justifiable despite the demographic factor:

I understand that the social contract here in Qatar is based on a rentier relationship (…), also I understand that as a muqim (resident) you benefit here from many services that are not available to you compared with other countries. But I do not understand why when I go to a primary healthcare center and take a ticket, the priority in ticket number is always for the Qatari, then for people with special needs, and lastly for muqim (resident) (…) Again, I do not have a problem that more economic and educational opportunities and priorities are given to the citizen, but healthcare service should be above this differentiation. (Omar, December 2021)

The gap between Qatari and non-Qatari, even those who were born in Qatar, was emphasised by all participants, although some pointed out that there are certain privileges that the second-generation migrants enjoy, including priority over other residents in employment and educational opportunities. This is expressed in the following extract by Ibrahim:

Nowadays, the priority of some governmental employment positions is first for Qatari citizens, second for non-Qatari sons of female Qatari citizens, and third for mawalid (residents who were born in Qatar). If you think about it, it is a good thing, it is right that we did not get citizenship, but there is an appreciation for us (…). Again, as mawalid we would not be treated as citizens, but we have a share. (Ibrahim, February 2022)

In fact, all participants indicated that they experienced some form of formal/official exclusionary boundaries that draw a distinct border between them and the Qatari citizens.

Other forms of threats/fears: recurrent insecurities

While all participants indicated that feeling of safety is one of the main advantages of living and/or being raised in this country, concerns were raised about their status as economic migrants alongside concerns about job insecurity and the fear of deportation.

For Abdullah, for example, renewing the residency permit is one example of such threat.³ As he further explained, maintaining a residence permit after the age of 25 is not easy in the case of not being employed. Such restriction made him feel that his right to live in this place that he feels attached to is always contingent, and a complicated issue overall. He feels that even if Qatari people consider him to be one of them, the official regulations and laws consider him as an expendable individual. The following quote from Shoa’a, a 29-year-old Yemeni migrant who works in a governmental sector, explains the complexity of this situation very well:

Even if I get a good salary here, this does not make me feel secure. Because, at any moment, I might be replaceable, for any reason. The reason may be that I am not qualified anymore in my manager’s opinion, or there is enough capacity in the workplace, or budget-cutting off, or a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and Yemen, like what happened with Egyptians recently⁴ (…). So, I am easily replaceable at any moment. (Shoa’a, December 2021)

Several participants indicated that having no right to stay in the country without having a kafeel (sponsor) contributes to their sense of vulnerability. Moreover, this vulnerability is magnified by job insecurity. This results in a sense of instability and insecurity and makes the migrants perceive themselves as what we call ‘deportees on hold’. This is described by Eman in the following extract:

What we feel is that we are endangered, in danger of your salary being reduced, in danger of being replaced by another worker because they have priority over you (…). So, day by day, you feel that you don’t have the stability in the place that you thought you have. (Eman, February 2022)

The vulnerable status in the job market has recently increased further due to introducing the Qatarisation policy aiming to increase the proportion of Qatari workers in the job market (Tok, Alkhater, and Pal 2016; Vora 2018). Salma, a 31-year-old Palestinian migrant, indicated that Qatarisation directly affects her sense of stability in her current job, as her current professional role is one of the ‘Qatarized’ positions.

To sum up, all participants indicated that they have been exposed to various forms of exclusionary policies that make them feel insecure as to their current and future status in Qatar and enhance/reinforce their experiences of temporariness. In what follows we discuss how they negotiate the gap between their sense of place-belonging and being exposed to such exclusionary policies is discussed.

Negotiating the gap

It seems that all participants face a similar gap between their sense of belonging on the one hand, and experiencing various forms of exclusion and insecurity on the other hand. However, they responded differently to situation of permanent temporariness and have utilised different ways while negotiating their sense of belonging in this situation. As these differences may stem from differences in terms of class, gender, country of origin, and other factors, it would be unreasonable to try to come up with a universal set of strategies for negotiating belonging by second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar. However, based on the participants’ accounts of staying or leaving the country, three general strategies were established.

On hold leavers

Participants who belong to this group have all expressed a sense of disappointment at being excluded by the politics of belonging due to being denied citizenship, despite their familial long-standing in the country. Moreover, in absence of a legal pathway to achieve citizenship, their frustration increased, strengthening the sense of unbelonging. As a result, they begin to seek ways to leave the country. However, their sense of unbelonging does not exclusively result from having been denied citizenship, and other factors are also at play. A female participant noted, for example, that having Qatari citizenship would not necessarily overcome her sense of unbelonging. She explains that rather than citizenship, it is also the ‘culture and ideas in this society’ that contribute to her sense of unbelonging:

I don’t want to continue my life in this country anymore. It is not suitable for me, not only in terms of material challenges but also in terms of society’s culture and tradition. This is something that I do not belong to (…) Even if I am a Qatari citizen, I would still be discriminated against as a woman, both on the legal level and culturally. Women are treated here as second class. (Mariam, December 2021)

It is clear from the above quote that a strive to acquire equal rights characterises the participants belonging to this group. This was also emphasised by another participant, who asserted that he is planning to migrate to a country where a more social justice system is available and equal rights could be attained:

Leaving Qatar? This is an obsession that I carried with me for long years (…) I think I started to think seriously about this during my last couple of years of undergraduate studies and till now. It is not a dream; it is an inescapable step that should be taken. Why is that? Because of the insecurity that surrounds me here. Despite all the good experiences that I had here and the good income that I have, I don’t feel secure (…) I will not migrate again looking for a place to belong to or searching for my identity there, but I want to migrate to a country where I could acquire its citizenship and demand my personal right. A place where more social justice and legal rights are accessible. (Shoa’a, December 2021)

Shoa’a’s stand illustrates the complexity of being faced with exclusionary policies, and how such policies create a sense of detachment not because of being denied Qatari citizenship, but also to question the kind of rights that are associated with it in terms of equality and personal rights. In sum, participants within this group have formalised some sort of unbelonging toward Qatar and would use the different forms of their capital in Qatar to achieve their goal to migrate to another country.

On short hold stayers

Participants in this cluster did not express disappointment of being denied Qatari citizenship. However, this is not to say that they did not experience a gap between their sense of place-belonging and encountering boundaries of belonging. They did, indeed, recognise this gap, which led them to perceive their relationship with Qatar as a ‘one-way relationship’:

I consider myself a person who is engaged in society, and interested in contributing to the Qatari society, but this interest/feeling is not mutual, so it is a one-way relationship. It is a complicated feeling. I understand why there are regulations and policies that distinguish between Qatari and non-Qatari, but still, it is hard for me to be recognized as a foreign and not have all the rights as a belonged person. (…) Part of me wants to stay in Qatar, this is my sense of belonging, and the other part admits that, in the end, this is not our country. (Mohammed, January 2022)

A similar view was expressed by Omar, who explained that this one-way relationship results in a certain ‘dilemma’:

It is a dilemma, especially when you have accomplished something. The idea that you see yourself as a son of the place, and you really care and work for the best interest of the place, but still all that you do is seen as not being an authentic contribution. Thus, it is a one-way relationship. (Omar, December 2021)

Rather than resulting in a sense of unbelonging, the above-described one-way relationship contributes to a kind of ‘belonging in crisis’. A state where participants within this group feel emotionally attached to the county they were raised in, Qatar, but at the same time, this attachment is not recognised by the state. Although it is a one-way relationship, participants within this group still maintain the sense of place belonging and recognise, at the same time, that the boundaries of belonging in Qatar are impermeable. As stated by Omar, living in Qatar is like to live in a Bubble that at some point will pop:

As I told you, I am attached to Qatar, but this attachment, this love, and this care is not conditioned based on my presence here in the country (…) you know; it is a bubble, and at some point, it is going to pop; we would leave. Would I stay here for a long-run future? Now, I don’t think so. I will always look for what is the best for my family, career, education, and new experiences. (Omar, December 2021)

Therefore, participants within this group affirm that their temporariness is undeniable, and the way to negotiate this is by trying to keep different available options in the future. However, their future plans are not contingent on the aim to have another citizenship, but rather on what is the best for their career, family, and educational opportunities. As a result, all participants in this group planned to stay in Qatar in the foreseeable future and did not report making efforts to re-migrate.

On long hold stayers

The participants in this cluster expressed affirmative attitudes towards belonging. They discussed the advantages of being raised, and living in Qatar, such as educational opportunities, sense of safety and the overall good standard of living. Although they had acknowledged that their sense of place-belonging is conditioned by boundaries of belonging, namely temporariness and deficient rights, the participants in this cluster do not perceive this gap to be intolerable. This is exemplified by the fact that these participants are the only segment who expressed their willingness to apply for the recently introduced permanent residency program. Indeed, some of them had already applied for this program.⁵ Leaving the country is seen as the last option to think about among this group. According to Dana, the day of leaving Qatar is the ‘Black Day’ for her and her family:

Look, regardless of how much you are happy and feel comfortable in this county, in the end, you are a resident. Whenever your employment contract ends, you have to think about leaving (…) this is our ‘Black Day’ that we are always thinking about (…) I want to stay here forever, but it is not allowed for us. When they tell us that we have to leave, we will do but against our will. (Dana, December 2021)

Even those who did consider leaving the country in the future stressed that this would be a temporary, rather than permanent leave:

Honestly, I don’t want my children to stay in Qatar for the same period I had with the same citizenship. I (…) even if I would leave, I would not leave forever but for a short time. And the main target of this leaving is my children, to have better opportunities for them. (Ibrahim, February 2022)

The above quotes demonstrate that neither the sense of unbelonging nor ‘belonging in crisis’ is experienced by these participants as a result of their temporariness. Quite contrary, they still see Qatar to be their home which they wish to remain in, and would use the different forms of their capital here in Qatar to stay in the country as far as they can. Since the decision of staying or leaving the country is not entirely stem from the agent of participants but is conditioned by structural factors, the term ‘On hold stayers’ signifies these structural boundaries, and the temporality (whether short or long) of such decision is where the agencies of participants are voiced.

Discussion

Findings in this study revealed that second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar exhibit a distinctive case in the way they perceive and negotiate their belonging to Qatar. On one hand, their long stay in the country, immersed memories and experiences, and social relationships make them develop a sense of place belonging. On the other hand, this sense of belonging is challenged by the fact that they are surrounded by formal boundaries that categorise them as ‘temporary people’.⁶ In light of this paradox, second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar employ different strategies to negotiate their belonging. Whilst some participants formalised some sort of unbelonging as a strategy to negotiate this gap, for example, other participants formalised partial belonging. Yet other participants still maintain a strong sense of belonging and perceive the gap to be tolerable.

Participants have expressed multiple, sometimes contradicting, points of view when narrating their attachment towards, and perceptions of Qatar. Such multiple positions confirm that to think of their (un)belonging in terms of direct links to a certain locality, that are being governed by the same legal framework for example, would be a major simplification. Although some form of exclusion has been experienced by all participants, this does not exclude the possibility of voicing a sense of belonging by some of them. Furthermore, just as having citizenship does not automatically lead to a sense of belonging, the lack of citizenship does not automatically hinder it (Soudy 2017; Vora 2013; Vora and Koch 2015).

Even though some participants had voiced their sense of detachment from Qatar, such sense arguably stems from more than just being denied Qatari citizenship. For example, the lack of access to political rights and gender inequality were both indicated to have been triggers to the sense of detachment from the country. Those participants, in turn, who had expressed a sense of partial belonging did not attribute it exclusively to their lack of citizenship, but also to a cultural and social unrecognition that prevented them from fully integrating into the society. In fact, these participants stated that having Qatari citizenship would not change the fact that they cannot be ‘real’ Qatari. Such point of view confirms Nagy’s (2006) and Vora and Koch’s (2015) observations that Qatari society is sharply stratified based on gender, tribal connection, geographical origin, sects, and history of settlement.

Some scholars (Akinci 2020; Hosoda and Matsukawa 2019; Babar 2017) suggested that non-Gulf Arab migrants’ daily life experiences are different from those of other migrants. Similarities in terms of religion, language, and cultural background are believed to benefit integration into the host society. Findings of this study have shown that such similarity may be perceived by the participants in two ways. On the one hand, some participants perceive these similarities as factors increasing their sense of place-belonging in the country and facilitating the mitigation of social boundaries, which, in turn, results in more social integration. On the other hand, some perceived such similarities, along with their long stay in Qatar, as grounds for their entitlement to full formal membership. As this membership had been denied, however, they perceive cultural proximity and social integration to be irrelevant to their sense of belonging to Qatar. Overall, while cultural proximity certainly seems to be a factor that benefits the daily life interactions with the local population, such multiple positions signify that this commonality barely goes beyond that.

While cultural proximity, relative similarities in religion and language, and daily performative interactions with the host society may serve as the basis for granting recognition and acceptance at the social level, the rigid criteria of such recognition and acceptance in terms of claiming equal rights, equal treatment, legal and economical protections are based ultimately on citizenship in the world we live in today. Despite the growing body of literature that calls for transcending the national boundaries when thinking of belonging in the contemporary globalised, interconnected, and hybrid world citizenship remains at the heart of the relationship between the sovereign modern state and individuals (Babar 2014, 5).

In practice, such relationship is the main determining criteria for inclusion and exclusion in the contemporary world. If not so, all regularity frameworks and practices of permitting and preventing access to certain citizenship/nationality would not mean anything. However, this does not imply to reduce the notion of citizenship to its legal dimension and ignore the other cultural, social, economical, and emotional dimensions of citizenship, but rather to indicate how these dimensions become meaningless in the absence of a formal legal standpoint (Ali 2011; Fenster 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006). In absence of any legal recognition of permanent settlement in the context of Gulf countries, second-generation migrants’ belonging would inevitably be coupled and fluctuated with uncertainties and ambivalence.

Conclusion and limitations

This study has investigated belonging formation among second-generation Arab migrants in Qatar. The aim was to understand the extent to which the migrants consider Qatar to be their ‘home’, and how boundaries of belonging, as well as their legal temporary status are perceived and negotiated.

The study offers three main contributions to the literature. First, the findings revealed that the long-immersed living experiences in a place generate a sense of place-belonging despite being exposed to exclusionary policies. Second, it was demonstrated that this sense of place-belonging faces several barriers which are not exclusive to the legal status factor. Instead, they were found to also relate to other cultural and social factors. However, the temporary legal status that subjects all migrants in Qatar is still the main ground on which they experience exclusion and insecurities. Third, the findings revealed that migrants’ complex narrations of belonging should be approached by considering how the relational and situational interplay between the different social locations they hold would result in a similar, not identical, expression among the spectrum of belonging–unbelonging. In doing so, the contradicted and contextual nature of participants’ narrations of belonging is highlighted, prevailing over any dichotomic perspective on these narrations. For instance, our findings showed that two participants may have exhibited similarity in their social locations but expressed contradicted narrations of (un)belonging. Therefore, the similarity in negotiation strategies that was expressed by participants in this study could not be attributed to one of their demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, class, country of origin) but to how the interplay between these characteristics generated similar positions of (un)belonging.

Despite the above contributions of our study, several limitations should be considered. First, the sample size is very small and not fully representative of the second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants population in Qatar. Second, participants in this study could not be treated as a representative sample of all segments of second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants in terms of class, since all of the participants are middle-class or upper-middle-class migrants. Thus, more research to explore how the experiences of migrants from other classes may differ is needed. Third, participants in this research come from particular countries of origin in the Arab world. Therefore, the findings of this study could not be generalised to all segments of second-generation non-Gulf Arab migrants in Qatar. Fourth, all participants in this study had the opportunity of completing higher education, therefore, their experiences are limited, and do not represent other experiences where such opportunities are absent. Lastly, while this study has emphasised how migrants who share similar respects (second-generation, non-Gulf Arab, resident, governed by the same legal framework) expressed different views of belonging and negotiation strategies, the exact weight of other social features (such as gender, class, level of employment … etc.) in producing these views and strategies was not a primary focus of this study. Therefore, future studies can expand our understanding by focusing exclusively on each of them in relation with belonging. Future research should look to overcome these shortages, utilising diverse other theoretical and methodological tools.

Acknowledgements

Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The fieldwork of this study was supported by Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

Notes

1 For detailed numbers of registered live births by nationality please see: Table No. (3) at (Planning and Statistics Authority 2021). For the number of educational attainment for population (10 years and above) by nationality as well as the number of total population please see: Table No. (3) & Table No. (5) at (Planning and Statistics Authority 2020).

2 While most migrants’ resident permit visas are sponsored by their employers in Qatar, other types of sponsorship exist such as having dependent’s visa. For instances, most second-generation migrants are dependent on their family’s residence permits. However, at the age of 25 years, male migrants, on one hand, are required to get separate residence permits from their families, which is usually through being employed. Otherwise, renewing their residence permits would face obstacles. On the other hand, female migrants could be dependent on their father’s, or husband’s residence permits for a longer time.

3 Most second-generation migrants used to be dependent on their father’s residence permits. However, at the age of 25 years, male migrants, on one hand, are required to get separate resident permits from their families, which is usually through being employed. Otherwise, renewing their residence permits would face obstacles. On the other hand, female migrants could be dependent on their father’s, or husband’s, residence permits for a longer time.

4 On 5th of June 2017, a diplomatic dispute has occurred when Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain announced the suspension of diplomatic relations with Qatar. Such event affected the lives of the nationals of these countries in different ways. The diplomatic crisis lasted for several years and came to its end on 5th January 2021.

5 In 2018, a new regulation was introduced, namely, the article No.1 of Law No.10 of 2018 on Permanent Residency. Under this regulation, the State of Qatar may grant permanent residency to non-Qataris if they meet certain criteria. However, no official numbers are available on how many persons have received it. Among all participants in this study, only two have indicated that they applied for permeant residency program, and none of them have received it yet. For more, see: https://bit.ly/3hPeTDS.

6 Temporary people is a title of a story collection by the writer Deepak Unnikrishnan, in which he delves into the experiences of labor migrants in UAE.