‘It’s not about the information, it’s about the situation’: understanding the misalignment between EU deterrence messaging and migrants’ narratives

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the narratives of young people in the Gambia and of Afghan migrants in Turkey on the themes of migration and Europe as a place of destination. Based on extensive focus group and interview data, we show that these narratives (1) have a high degree of similarities across different contexts and (2) appear incongruent with, and largely unaffected by, the EU’s messages of deterrence in information campaigns. We explain this misalignment by referring to a classic sociological distinction between impressions ‘given’ and those ‘given off’. When the EU seeks to give an ‘impression’ in third countries (such as to be an unattractive place for irregular migrants), their messages compete with positive images of Europe provided through a myriad of other channels and information sources. To a large extent, perceptions of Europe among migrant communities are defined by positive impressions ‘given off’ through Europe’s history as a destination area and social media accounts of individual ‘success stories’ of diaspora members. The social and material rewards associated with migration further inform migrants’ narratives, as do the circumstances of both groups, which often push them towards leaving regardless of the risks this step involves.

KEYWORDS:

• Afghan migrants
• the Gambia
• EU
• information campaigns
• migration narratives

Introduction

When the number of migrants irregularly crossing the European Union’s (EU’s) external borders increased by 64 percent in 2022 (Frontex 2023), the EU’s heads of state and government organized a special summit on how to curb arrivals. The European leaders highlighted the role of strategic information directed at migrants to dismantle the business model of smugglers (European Council 2023). This demonstrates the widespread belief that more, or different, information can convince migrants not to come irregularly (Pagogna and Sakdakpolrak 2021; Pécoud 2010). The potential migrants are usually exposed to strategic information concerning the opportunities in their home countries, the dangers of irregular migration, and the often-harsh reality of life as an undocumented migrant residing in Europe (Brekke and Beyer 2019; Cham and Trauner 2023). These information campaigns are part of the EU’s increasing efforts to deter irregular migration by enforcing border controls, cooperating closely with third countries, and reaching out to migrants directly (Bisong 2020; Van Dessel 2021).

Many scholars interested in the EU’s external migration policies have tended to investigate issues such as the available tools and the decision-making dynamics (e.g. Hampshire 2016). In recent years, more researchers have been explicitly examining the ‘receiving side’ of these policies by looking at how non-European actors and migrants react to the EU’s externalization efforts (e.g. Adam et al. 2020; Mouthaan 2019; Natter 2018). We subscribe to this line of research and investigate the narratives of migrants on the themes of migration and Europe as a destination. We also analyse the congruence of these narratives with the main messages typically promoted in EU-funded information campaigns. With this lens, we seek to contribute to understanding the causes and consequences of migration narratives (see Garcés and Pastore 2022)

The study looks at the narratives of young people in the Gambia and Afghans in Turkey. The work builds on in-depth interviews and focus groups with 106 Gambians and Afghans. In view of the debate on ‘categorical fetishism’ (Crawley and Skleparis 2018), we refrain from characterizing Afghans in Turkey as ‘transit migrants’ and Gambians as ‘potential migrants’. Yet, we know that the Gambia is a country in West Africa with an above-average rate of people departing irregularly towards the EU (Bah and Batista 2019). We also know that Turkey has been both a destination and a steppingstone for Afghans fleeing the country after the Taliban take-over in the summer of 2021. The two groups have therefore very distinct migratory experiences and situations. The same phenomenon is hence studied across two different cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008).

The article is structured in three parts. In the initial section, we engage in a conceptual discussion regarding migration narratives and the role of information campaigns. This is followed by an outline of our methodological approach in the Gambia and Turkey. The subsequent section presents our empirical findings on migratory narratives and their (non-)alignment with the messages of EU-funded migration information campaigns. The article sheds light on the resilience of local narratives vis-à-vis the messages promoted by the EU. Put differently, information campaigns struggle to compete with local migration narratives, especially if their messages are detached from the realities of the concerned individuals.

Conceptualizing migration narratives

The work of migration scholars on narratives can be broadly categorized into two main groups: narratives about migrants, and narratives told by migrants (Boswell et al. 2021; De Fina and Tseng 2017). In the first category, studies look at the role narratives about migrants or migration play in media coverage (Benson 2013; D’Amato and Lucarelli 2019), including as part of political strategies (Jones and McBeth 2020; Teye 2022) and in the formation of public attitudes (Manieri 2019). In the second category, the focus is on elements such as personal narratives of the migratory experience, migration journeys, and factors shaping migration decisions, as well as stories of adaptation, doubt, and suffering. Typically, migrants are cast as the heroes or victims in these narratives, either as individuals or as groups (De Fina and Tseng 2017).

In the current study, we subscribe to the second category and see the social world from ‘below’ through the lens of individual refugees and migrants. We seek to grasp how the different stories of individuals converge into an overarching narrative conceptualized as a ‘master narrative’ (Fraser 1990). By doing so, we transcend the divide between individual migration narratives and master narratives at the group level (McLean and Syed 2015). Such group-based master narratives may serve to guide individual and collective behavior (Dunlop, Harake, and Wilkinson 2018). These organically produced master narratives held by migrants can be contrasted to narratives instrumentally produced by organizations or states (Beyer, Brekke, and Thorbjørnsrud 2017).

As our study shows, the master narratives held by (aspiring) migrants center on the opportunities enabled by migration to Europe. These master narratives tend to be resilient when confronted with the messages of EU-funded migration campaigns. We explain the resilience of migrants’ narratives by referring to a classical text in sociology. In the late 1950s, Ervin Goffmann (1959) distinguished between impressions given and those given off. The concepts were originally used to categorize the dual nature of self-presentation in social encounters. Impressions ‘given’ pointed to the intentional image that individuals try to convey to others, while impressions ‘given off’ referred to the unintentional signals and cues that others pick up from an individual’s behavior, appearance, or demeanor (Goffmann 1959). There is a key contrast between the two aspects of impression management. While individuals are expected to have a degree of control over the impressions they give, the impressions they give off are largely outside their control.

Extrapolated to EU-funded information campaigns, these concepts help understand the challenges for EU authorities when seeking to portray Europe as an unattractive destination. When the EU or individual member states seek to give this impression, their messages compete with positive images of Europe provided through a myriad of other channels. These include impressions given intentionally in other policy fields, such as the tourism industry, trade relations, or humanitarian policies. To a large extent, perceptions of Europe will also be colored by impressions ‘given off’ through its history as a destination area as well as through individual stories of ‘successful migrants’ told on social media or cultural outlets. This highlights the complex nature of perception management, where impressions ‘given off’ often outweigh controlled and intended messaging.

The sources of information available to people with migration aspirations are rich and (usually) diversified (Brekke and Beyer 2019). Migration narratives have often evolved over generations and are now perpetually reinforced by migration networks and online media platforms (Dekker et al. 2018; Zijlstra and Liempt 2017). It is difficult for state actors to counter this flow of information, even with correct information about asylum procedures and examples of migrants who have had a difficult life in Europe. The master narrative of migrants corresponds, to a large extent, to this image given off. In essence, EU-funded information campaigns compete with grand historical narratives of Europe as ‘developed’ – and other places in the world lagging behind (Bhambra 2007).

It is not only the competing information landscape influencing migrants’ master narrative. The aspirations for, and experiences of, migration also feed into the narrative. According to Carling (2017, 3), ‘the origins of migration lie in the conditions of states, communities, and individuals that underlie a desire for change, which, in turn, produces migration aspirations’. The reasons can relate to survival, the avoidance of repression or to the prospect for improved socio-economic conditions. Aspirations tend to always exist, even in ‘contexts of displacement and highly constrained mobility’ (Müller-Funk, Üstübici, and Belloni 2023). Wider societal dynamics also impact how people view and talk about migration. Social or material rewards may be associated with migration (to Europe or elsewhere). It is often seen as a tool to improve a person’s life trajectory and is deeply rooted in a country’s social and economic fabric. Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud (2007, 1685) identify the existence of a ‘migration culture, in which migration becomes a socially structural and normative behaviour’.

One may also assume that a migrant forced to leave has a different narrative compared to a migrant leaving voluntarily. Indeed, Afghans in Turkey face a very different situation compared to the Gambians participating in this study as they are not in their ‘home country’. This may affect their (risk-benefit calculations of) migratory decisions and the way they talk about the it. Most Afghans in Turkey may be seen as ‘forced migrants’ whereas Gambians leaving after the 2016 democratic change are often seen as ‘voluntary’ or ‘economic’ migrants. However, the migratory groups under this study exhibit only nuanced differences in their master narratives. This is another empirical testimony supporting to the conceptual argument that the categorization of individuals as (potential, voluntary, forced, or economic) ‘migrants’ has many downsides (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2018). In line with Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2018), we suggest seeing individual migratory situations as ‘continuums of experience’, in which a primary migratory decision may be forced but a second one can be voluntary (or vice versa). Indeed, the master narrative of Afghans in Turkey largely mirrors their self-understanding as ‘forced migrants’, even if they have stayed for months or years in Turkey. By contrast, young Gambians often feel material and social pressures to leave, resulting in migratory decisions that cannot be characterized as fully voluntary. This is reflected in their narrative, which tends to emphasize a lack of alternatives (on the issue of alternatives within different choices, see Olsaretti 2004).

These theoretical implications form our foundation for understanding the role of narratives. They include elements like a normative and instrumental migration culture, the blurring of distinctions between forced and voluntary migration, and various facets of EU-influenced migration narratives. As we will see, unintentional and indirect messaging (impressions ‘given off’) often has more influence than intentional deterrence communication (impressions ‘given’).

Data and methodology

The fieldwork in the Gambia and Turkey was conducted by two different research teams that closely coordinated their activities, including using common interview guides, coordinated coding, and ethical clearance procedures. In the Gambia, the fieldwork took place in March and April 2022 and consisted of interviews and focus groups with 60 young men and women in four out of the six Gambian regions known for high emigration rates. A local partner, the National Youth Council, helped to organize the fieldwork and recruit study participants. The team that conducted the interviews consisted of three co-authors of this paper (one Gambian working in Europe and two Europeans), as well as one local Gambian research assistant and a migration officer of the Gambian Youth Council. The participants selected were young people from the age of 18–35, an age group most likely to emigrate.

The fieldwork in Turkey took place in two city districts in Istanbul with a particularly high density of Afghan migrants. The Istanbul office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided a team of two Afghan assistants and interpreters, along with one team leader. The local team had different ethnic backgrounds and covered five Afghan languages (Pashto, Dari, Tajik, Uzbek, and Urdu) in addition to Arabic, Turkish, and English. Most of the 46 respondents were recruited on the streets, shops, and restaurants in the two city districts, and some were recruited through the local team members’ networks.

In both settings we started our focus groups and interviews by asking for informed consent. We then investigated the dominant – and local – narratives on migration and Europe by collecting information on how Gambians and Afghans view migration and Europe, how they talk and are informed about these subjects, and how they make decisions on migration. This part of the fieldwork allowed us to establish the master narrative and the dynamics contributing to its dominance. At a second stage, we looked in more detail at how the study participants react to and perceive the messages conventionally put forward in EU-funded information campaigns.

Information campaigns seek to influence views and behavior by discouraging potential migrants from leaving their countries irregularly (Oeppen 2016). Such campaigns can range from billboards, face-to-face conversations, ‘Migrants as Messengers’, to video campaigns and artistic performances. In terms of strategies, information campaigns have also shifted towards involving local civil society actors and returnees as trusted information sources (Dunsch, Tjaden, and Quiviger 2019; Marino, Schapendonk, and Lietaert 2022). According to Vammen (2021, 1410), many campaigns also include ‘affective borderwork’ that cultivate certain emotions and a kind of ‘inner, self-regulating border in the minds and bodies of people’. It goes beyond our research to take into account these emotional aspects; we have only focused on the ‘discursive’ dimension of information campaigns.

Based on prior research analysing the content of different campaigns (see Brekke and Beyer 2019), we know that they tend to convey three core messages: (1) Life in Europe is difficult (‘do not come’); (2) The route is dangerous (‘do not go’); and (3) There are local opportunities in your country (‘stay’). These are also the three messages that we took into account in our empirical analysis of the Gambia. We showed them videos and pictures reflecting each of these messages and discussed them in detail.

Regarding Afghan migrants in Turkey, we concentrated only on the first two messages, for obvious reasons (i.e. a lack of ‘local opportunities in your country’). In the years prior to the Taliban takeover, several information campaigns have been conducted by EU member states in Afghanistan (Oeppen 2016). Australia also ran campaigns in the country with the aim of discouraging outward migration (Watkins 2017). There was no targeted information campaign conducted at the time of our research for the Afghan community in Turkey. Indeed, we did not make it a selection criterion as to whether study participants had been exposed to information campaigns back in Afghanistan (or in the Gambia prior to our research). Therefore, the responses relate to the campaign videos and images shown directly by the research team. Our research did not intend to evaluate the actual impact of a given information campaign, but rather the constitution and resilience of migrants’ master narratives. We conducted an inquiry into the responses of Afghan participants when presented with a news article and an image related to a planned Greek-led deterrence campaign targeting migrants residing in Turkey (Ansa 2022). The picture showed an armed guard patrolling the border wall between Turkey and Greece. We then asked the study participants what their response to such a campaign would be by discussing the two EU inherent deterrence messages of ‘do not come’ (message 1) and ‘the route is dangerous’ (message 2).

After transcription, the interview data was coded and analysed using NVIVO software. The thematic coding was done as a combination of deductive and inductive processes, i.e. both inspired by the research questions, and by patterns emerging from the data itself. The codes were discussed within and across the two research teams covering the Gambia and Turkey. This secured comparability and synchronized analysis of the two data sets.

The master narratives

During our fieldwork, we first sought to establish the migrants’ dominant narratives by posing the question of what connotations come to mind when hearing ‘migration’ and ‘Europe’ (and then discussing the different associations in more depth).

The groups’ master narratives on migration

In both settings, the Gambia and Turkey, the respondents highlight that migration may lead to a positive life change. They clearly have a positive master narrative on migration. Migrants who made it to Europe are perceived as successful individuals who are safe now (in the Afghan case) and/or able to improve the situation of their families and communities (primarily in the Gambian case).

In the Gambia, migration is framed as providing a solution to an often-difficult life situation characterized by poverty and a lack of prospects (in terms of advancing professionally or financing a marriage). Individuals who manage to migrate are seen as gaining the opportunity to advance their education or obtain a job and salary that would be more profitable than in the Gambia. This is in line with what other researchers have written on the highly positive views of migration in West Africa and how migration has historically served as family strategies in case of drought (e.g. Fall 2013; Pelican and Tatah 2009; Tandian 2015).

When I hear migration, I think my life is about to change. I am about to experience something that I have not experienced before – be it in education or any other thing … It is about change; it is about going to another level. (Gam, male, 17)

Migration is hardly ever a decision made by and for individuals alone. The narrative includes a ‘family’ and/or ‘community’ dimension, where migration is perceived as improving the lives of the family and community members left behind in the Gambia. Remittances sent back by migrants are an important source of income for many families, contributing to a perception and narrative that migrants have a positive effect on society:

All the good structures, infrastructures, etc. are made by these people who migrate abroad … in fact, in order to build our mosque, our health centers, or our churches, we depend on people outside. So … the people outside there are doing great work for the development of this country. (Gam, male, 30 s)

The master narrative of Afghans in Turkey regarding migration is also positive. Many Afghans see onward migration as their only option. They believe that a better future would be achievable in Europe or the US. Most want to go given that they are struggling in Turkey. The conditions in Turkey have disappointed them.

All Afghans would like to leave Turkey; everyone hopes to get a better life somewhere else. Life in Afghanistan is stressful, especially for Afghan girls. In Afghanistan, I was always ashamed to talk. Girls in Afghanistan are not encouraged to talk and be independent. Before I went to Turkey, I thought that it would be different here. … I thought that Turkey was like Europe regarding living conditions for Afghans. I have changed my mind. Turkey is maybe good for Turks but not for Afghans. (Tur, woman, 20 s)

The Afghans’ narrative is overwhelmingly one of forced migration due to the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Life in Turkey has now become increasingly challenging and even dangerous due to the risk of being forcibly returned to Afghanistan. This risk of deportation is real. During the first eight months of 2022, more than 43,000 Afghan nationals were reportedly deported from Turkey to Afghanistan (Dawi 2022). Moreover, in May 2022, the Minister of the Interior announced that Istanbul was one of the areas to be considered closed to asylum seekers, thus preventing opportunities to apply for protection (Hurriyet 2022). Most Afghans participating in this study have lost hope of finding a safe haven in Turkey and are looking for possibilities to move on. For the time being, they are stuck in transit, as conveyed by this woman:

I have a son in Frankfurt, and a daughter in London. My husband and I are stuck here, we can’t go back, and we can’t move on. […] I want to join my children in Europe, but only God can help us. Or the EU governments. They can help us to get there. (Tur, female, 60 s)

This master narrative encompasses the sad history and fate of Afghanistan. Many interviewees describe the profound shock and a feeling of disbelief when the Taliban suddenly returned. They endured extremely repressive and harsh conditions under their regime. This shock has been followed by a deep disappointment, as expressed by a young female interviewee: ‘We all carry this deep sadness in our hearts’ (Tur, female, 20 s).

In both settings, the master narrative primarily relates to irregular migration. Trying legal migration channels and visa applications for the EU is largely seen as futile because of high visa rejection rates and the lack of legal pathways. The following quote of a young Gambian is a case in point for this line of argument:

Some say that applying for a visa is costly; you can apply for it but in the end, you don’t get it, and you lose your money. So, most of them have this fear, so they don’t want to apply for a visa. (Gam, male, 20 s)

While the belief in a better future in Europe is comparable in the master narratives of both groups, there are also differences, notably regarding the risk-benefit calculation. Several Gambian respondents are unsure whether it is worth taking the risks involved in migrating irregularly to Europe and will only go if they find an opportunity to migrate regularly. Irregular migration would have too many negative side effects for the concerned individuals and Gambian society.

Afghan migrants in Turkey are in a different situation. They increasingly perceive, and are told by Turkish politicians and media, that they are unwanted in Turkey. Onward migration is seen as a solution to a difficult or even life-threatening situation in Turkey (due to the risk of being deported back to Afghanistan).

The master narrative on Europe

In the Gambia, Europe is associated with (professional or educational) opportunities and a probability of obtaining high(er) living standards. Europe is often linked to the word ‘hustling’ (a colloquial term frequently used for working or making it). For example, as one respondent explained, ‘when I think of Europe, basically I think of hustling’ (Gam, male, 20 s). Other statements put to the forefront the high living standards that people in Europe are supposed to enjoy. Social rights are emphasized by referring to a health care system and welfare state widely seen as functioning, where poor people are not left behind and they have an easier life because state or private institutions take care of them. The opportunities in Europe are often contrasted with a perceived lack of these institutions and rights in the Gambia.

When I hear Europe, I think it is the place where you can succeed easily, because you can be here, and it can be difficult for you to succeed here especially if you don’t know other people. (Gam, male, 20 s)

The narrative on Europe is also largely positive among the Afghans. Many interviewees are ready to go ‘anywhere’ as long as they can leave Turkey. However, reaching ‘Europe’, meaning the EU, is perceived as the most realistic alternative for most. In Europe, they believe that they can secure residence, have a future (support, education, work), and earn respect. These reasons are summarized in the following quote:

We are eager to get out. We have a good impression of Europe. We hope that our children will have a good education and that we can find a good job with a good income to support our families. We also hear that governments in Europe and Canada are supporting families, like providing a house, giving a kind of salary, and paying for the education for the children. Because of all this, we want to go to Europe. Here it is not like this, we have no hope for the future. The people in Europe see us as humans, here they don’t. (Tur, male, 20 s)

None of the 46 Afghan respondents pointed to negative information about life in Europe or other Western destination countries. We also did not find interviewees with detailed knowledge about how European governments have processed applications for Afghan asylum seekers since the Taliban takeover: ‘There is no exact information about this, but people are hopeful that their cases will not be rejected’ (Tur, male, 20 s).

Overall, the discourse on Europe is more nuanced in the Gambia than in Turkey. While Europe is still seen as a place of opportunity, participants in this study also put forward more critical statements, whether regarding Europe’s colonial past or a perceived ill-treatment of Gambian migrants in Europe.

They are not fair to us, because looking at the history of Africa, Europeans were allowed to come here during the colonial period. They were here; they looted our economy, our resources, and now I think it also our turn to go there and tap something from them – and come and develop Africa [ourselves]. (Gam, male, 30 s)

Other problems, such as racism in Europe, are also present. Such critical statements are largely absent in the interviews with Afghans. The Afghan refugees and migrants also assume they will be treated more fairly in Europe than suggested by potential migrants in the Gambia (or compared to Turkey, where they currently live). By contrast, the Gambian narrative often includes the necessity of fighting against the odds and overcoming hardship en route and upon arrival.

The impressions ‘given’ in EU-promoted messages

In this part of our research, we discussed how the messages of EU-funded campaigns were seen and received by young people in the Gambia and by Afghan migrants in Istanbul. These campaigns usually highlight opportunities ‘at home’ and the risks of an irregular migratory journey. They also suggest life in Europe would be difficult for (undocumented) migrants and be characterized by economic hardship, precariousness, and frequent encounters with law enforcement authorities.

The reception of EU-promoted messages on migration

In the Gambia, the idea of ‘opportunities at home’ mostly refers to the existence of training programs or skills centers. Indeed, such programs and centers are often known by the Gambian respondents and actively promoted by the EU. Overall, the young Gambians tend to partially endorse the message that there are ‘local opportunities’, although they often challenge this idea or put it aside on closer inspection and reflection.

They often question the scope and pervasiveness of these opportunities and pinpoint challenges such as the content of the training programs, regional disparities in access to them, nepotism, and corruption. Most interviewed Gambians also argue that the opportunities for training programs do not make people stay in the country due to the difficult economic circumstances. A Gambian may be trained, but he or she may still not find a job. A person can create a small business but still struggle to win customers and become financially viable. For example, a respondent reacts to a campaign video highlighting opportunity by stating the following:

This video is true, but for people living in the Gambia here, it is not easy. … Nepotism overtakes everything. Like when your father is working there, or your relatives, you have easier access to some of these things than someone who doesn’t have anybody working there. You can be with your correct documents and the person is with his or her correct documents – but you will [still] have easy access to it because your parents are working there. And money also; if you have money, you can pay some people … and they will help you to have this job. (Gam, male, 17)

The largest match between locally dominant and EU-promoted narratives concerns the issue of risks during the migratory journey. The Gambians participating in this study are aware of the risks and dangers of irregularly traveling to Europe. Independently of, or alongside, migration information campaigns there has been increasing public and private discourse about people suffering or dying on the route.

I have interacted with victims – people that went and then they were back. Even those who succeeded, they will tell you how difficult, how dangerous, how unsafe the journey is. They will tell you that the journey is very difficult. They have encountered a lot of problems. I have one of my friends who spent almost a year or two in Libya. He was working to earn money so that he could move. [He tried it] three times. Sometimes they forced him to work, and then he was not paid. He would tell me that he has seen people that were killed in their camps. You know, a lot of things happen on their way to Europe. (Gam, male, 30 s)

EU-funded campaigns potentially feed into and reinforce these dynamics. They may contribute to the relevance of these narratives by emphasizing risks, thereby reinforcing the doubts that some people already have. Still, more and better knowledge about the risks of the journey does not necessarily persuade people to stay. It is included in a personal risk–benefit analysis. The risk is weighted against the potential ‘gain’ of arriving in Europe and ‘succeeding’ as a migrant. Moreover, trust in religion and predestination (Thornton et al. 2020) is an oft-chosen strategy for coping with risk. For example, a young man puts it as follows:

I believe like whatever happens along the way, the same thing can happen to you in the Gambia. The example I will give to you is: If you go to Mile 2 [Gambia’s central prison], people are jailed there for no reason. People get locked up for crimes they did not commit … So, it’s like this – it is just destined to be. (Gam, male, 30 s)

In the case of Afghans in Turkey, there is no reference to religious faith or the role of predestination in the interview data. For this group, the conditions and ability to safely stay in Turkey is viewed as hardly possible (especially in view of the risk of being deported back to Afghanistan). The risk of a migratory journey must therefore be accepted. As a young Afghan puts it: ‘Yes, they know of the dangers, they will make it or die. They know this’ (Tur, male, 20 s).

The reception of EU-promoted messages on Europe

The EU-promoted messages that ‘life is difficult for (irregular) migrants in Europe’ is met with skepticism by both Gambian and Afghan respondents, albeit with nuances. A few Gambians also endorse it, mostly those who personally know someone in Europe facing problems or challenges.

Oftentimes, especially young people who migrate using the backway, they will not tell you the realities in Europe. They will act big, go stand behind a very nice building, take photos and send it or upload it on other social media sites for people to believe that they are doing very well in Europe. [In fact] they are living in camps or other consignment or detention centrers. (Gam, female, 20 s)

Yet these types of statements endorsing the EU-promoted narrative on the difficulty of life in Europe tend to be the exception. In general, the dissuading message on Europe is met with disbelief. Most contest it with arguments that a difficult life in Europe would still be easier than life in the Gambia or that ‘successful migrants’ indicate the many opportunities that life in Europe offers.

Once you get into Europe, you are greeted with opportunities. And then the money in Europe is different from the money in Gambia. Like 20 Euro today, you can send 20 Euro to your family member. That’s some money here. That is compelling many people to leave Africa and go to Europe; because of the currency: the pound, the euro, the dollar. The money is powerful, the European money is powerful. Once you get the money and send it to the country, that is a lot of money in certain African countries, especially in the Gambia here. (Gam, male, 30)

Afghan migrants do not convey negative perceptions of Europe; nor do they provide alternatives to the dominant ‘Europe-is-good’ narrative. Either they do not have a sufficiently nuanced knowledge of the situation for asylum seekers and migrants in the EU and other European countries, or they compare the situation in Europe with that in Afghanistan and in Turkey. If the latter, they do not agree that life in Europe is so difficult.

Those who went already, they send their stories, they tell us that they get residence permits, and they are well received. Here, people don’t have work and they want to leave. (Tur, male, 20 s)

Explaining migrants’ narratives

A key factor for explaining the master narratives of migrants – and their resilience – is to understand the impressions ‘given off’ about ‘Europe’ within the information landscapes of migratory groups. This constitutes the real challenge for the impressions ‘given’ in EU-funded information campaigns.

The impression given off about Europe

Our empirical work highlights that social media has become by far the most important information source for young Gambians considering migrating. It has become standard for young Gambians to follow migrants on Facebook, Instagram, or other social media outlets. People share ‘stories’, videos, and photos of Gambian migrants in Europe, reinforcing the master narrative that it is possible to get there and succeed. Not all messages on social media are considered trustworthy, though. The stories of personal friends, acquaintances and ‘successful’ migrant friends inspire more trust than campaigns or stories posted by unknown people or authorities.

Concrete migration intentions impact the information sources which a Gambian may consult. If an individual develops precise plans to migrate, he or she will particularly consult information from other migrants who have made it, most often on social media. Official sources, or sources believed to come from national or international governmental actors, are rarely taken seriously at this stage:

I believe most of the people who go to the “backway” never consult government agencies or the right channels. They follow the smugglers and friends to go. They get more information from smugglers and peers who have successfully embarked on the journey. (Gam, male, 30 s)

The sources of information that Afghan migrants in Istanbul use are comparable to some extent, but also have several notable differences. The respondents have had their own experience of fleeing Afghanistan and living under precarious conditions in Turkey. Many have even tried but failed to reach Europe. As such, they themselves are primary sources. They have the status of witnesses in the stories they convey. That said, the master narrative has developed over time and become interwoven with related stories and different sources of information originating from Afghanistan. Other information comes from migrant networks in Europe. The shared master narrative is so dominant among our informants because it is a mix of personal experiences, stories heard, and bits and pieces of information from various sources.

Starting from this general observation, the interview data from Turkey allows us to zoom in on the information sources that are most relevant for possible onward migration. Of particular importance are family, friends, and other migrants. They are usually mentioned first, before a range of traditional and social media are listed. Many have family members who have already made it across the Turkey–EU border:

People get information from their families. I have family in Europe, I even have two cousins in Norway. They are my uncle’s sons. I get information from their families and from Facebook. (Tur, male, 20 s)

The Taliban takeover made it challenging for Afghans in Turkey to obtain reliable news about the situation in their home country. The interviewees maintain that they no longer trust the national media in Afghanistan and must obtain updates through private channels. Some also have networks in the neighboring countries which allow them to follow the situation closely and spread information:

The news channels in Afghanistan are fully controlled by the government. We have some former colleagues who are now based outside Afghanistan. Somehow, they manage to get the most accurate news. [They then spread it] through social media, mostly on Twitter and Facebook. (Tur, male, 40 s)

All the Afghan interviewees in Istanbul have smartphones. A list of social media platforms, often starting with WhatsApp, Facebook, and TikTok, is used to gain information on the situation for migrants in Turkey and aspects related to onward migration.

The impact of the migratory situation

The master narratives of Gambians and Afghans are similar even if Gambians tend to be more critical in some respect (e.g. by voicing some post-colonial criticism). We suggest understanding this by, firstly, considering the social and material rewards associated with migration and, secondly, looking at the dynamics fostering migration. Gambians and Afghans in Turkey often perceive that they do not really have the choice to decide ‘voluntarily’ about whether or not to stay – their circumstances push them towards leaving.

In the Gambia, the migration of a family member to Europe can be a household strategy to deal with a difficult situation and a lack of livelihood opportunities. Gambians with family members in Europe (or elsewhere) have often developed a higher living standard than their peers thanks to the remittances sent back. This situation creates a societal dynamic in which social and material rewards are increasingly associated with a successful migratory experience. The ‘social rewards’ are related to the higher prestige of a successful migrant and include increased chances of finding a husband or a wife or providing support for loved ones. The social and material rewards of leaving are often contrasted with the lack of opportunities when staying. The (structural) conditions of the employment and housing market are disadvantageous and difficult for many young Gambians, notably those living outside urban centers.

Furthermore, the pressure exerted by a family (and the social environment) can be considerable, bringing up the question about the extent to which migration from the Gambia is a ‘voluntary’ decision taken by an informed individual who can weigh different options. Staying implies acquiring the stigma of failing to live up to one’s potential and expectations:

Some people prefer to die there than to stay with their families. It is the family pressure. You see these young people, some of them, the problems at home are so severe that they cannot withstand them. So, they even prefer going through the backway, die on their way going, or make it to Europe, rather than stay in their homes. Some people know that most of the things they are seeing on social media are actually fake, concerning the pictures that their friends take and send them. Some of them already know that, but staying in their compounds, staying in a society where they are jobless, and the treatment they receive is a problem. (Gam, male, 30 s)

A key intervening variable in the cost–benefit analysis is the risk associated with an irregular migratory journey. Yet the risk rarely prevents a person from leaving. Several Gambians who personally know a person who has suffered or died on the route are still pursuing the intention to migrate irregularly to Europe (see also UNDP 2019). The risks are widely known, yet this information and knowledge per se do not change the life situation of potential migrants. As a man in his 30 s succinctly put it: ‘It is not about the information, it is about the situation’ (Gam, male, 30 s).

Regarding Afghans, populist leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán spearhead a political debate in the EU that Afghans (and other migrants) forced to flee from their own country should remain in their first ‘safe’ country and no longer be allowed to come to Europe. These people would then become ‘economic migrants’ instead of refugees (Crawley and Skleparis 2018; Kuschminder and Koser 2016). Our research contributes to understanding as to why these categorizations simply miss the reality experienced by most of our Afghan respondents in Turkey. In their day-to-day life in Turkey, Afghan migrants risk exposure to the Turkish authorities, which may lead to deportation to Afghanistan. There were reportedly around 42,000 deportations of Afghans from Turkey to Afghanistan in the first eight months of 2022.

Being deported back is a worst-case scenario for the Afghan people we interviewed in Turkey. The people feel that there is no going back to their country. Among the female interviewees who had gone to school, attended university, or entered business or the civil service, the situation in Afghanistan is a nightmare. Male respondents also share the grim fate of having to give up their aspirations and way of living, regardless of their educational background. Many had lost their houses and their jobs. Those with even a slight connection to the allied NATO forces (e.g. providing basic cleaning services) had been persecuted, gone underground, and then fled the country.

Hence, a return to Afghanistan implies a high probability of being persecuted or even killed. Those who were not connected to the pre-Taliban regime, or the Western allies face lesser risks, but return remains unviable. Going back implies pledging allegiance to the Taliban and all their strict rules regarding clothing, growing a beard, and how to keep a family household where wives and daughters are deprived of the most basic freedoms. Moreover, business opportunities are meager. Those who have built companies based on import and export from countries such as Turkey see few, if any, viable avenues to make a decent income.

The dangers of onward migration are hence weighed against the risk of staying (while keeping in mind the impossibility of going back to Afghanistan). Rather than knowledge of the dangers, it is the differences in legal status which are a determining factor in Afghan migratory plans. No one contests that the journey is highly dangerous, but only those who have acquired Turkish citizenship can refrain from considering such a high-risk project. The others see themselves as being in a more precarious situation. A residence permit gives individuals a kind of temporary security and predictability. These people hesitate more before they embark on an irregular journey by boat, but they do not rule it out. People without proper documentation are the most vulnerable. Accordingly, they are also the keenest to reach a place where they have better prospects.

Conclusions

This article has examined the narratives of different migratory groups (young people in the Gambia and Afghan migrants in Istanbul) on the themes of migration and Europe. It also analysed how these migration narratives interact with the messages typically promoted in EU-funded information campaigns.

The article demonstrates that the master narratives of both groups highlight the opportunities created by a migratory journey to Europe. Gambians focus primarily on the prospects for personal advancement or support for the family/community they leave behind. Most Afghan migrants in Turkey also believe reaching Europe implies more opportunities and a better life. They experienced stigma and discrimination in Turkey and do not foresee such challenges once they enter the EU. The messages put forward in EU-funded information campaigns (such as that life is difficult for irregular migrants in Europe) do not align with these master narratives. Most Gambians suggest that a difficult life in Europe would still be easier than life in the Gambia and that ‘successful migrants’ demonstrate the opportunities on offer if they make it to Europe. In comparison, the narratives of Afghan migrants in Turkey do not include negative perceptions of Europe; nor do they provide alternatives to the dominant ‘Europe-is-good’ narrative.

Differentiating between impressions given and those given off, we use a classic sociological distinction to explain the resilience of migrants’ narratives. In both the Gambia and Turkey, the migrants’ perception of Europe as a destination has been mainly shaped by the impressions given of Europe and the EU in other policy areas and cultural outlets, which portray the EU as a prosperous economy, a key development and humanitarian actor, or as a destination for tourism. Importantly, the migrants’ narratives are also influenced by peer-to-peer communication, notably the stories and messages of successful migrants on social media. This may be seen as other impressions intentionally or unintentionally ‘given off’ about Europe. The EU-promoted messages about the downsides and dangers of irregular migration provide little counterweight or relevance to migrants’ pre-established narratives. The only point where there is alignment between locally held and EU-promoted narratives concerns the issue of risks during the migratory journey, in particular in the Gambia. Independently of, or alongside, migration information campaigns there is also growing public and private discourse about people suffering or dying on the route.

Another contribution of this research concerns the debate about whether it makes sense to categorize people into ‘voluntary’, ‘economic’ or ‘forced’ migrants (Crawley and Skleparis 2018). Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2018, 982) speak of an ‘impossibility of describing someone’s decision to migrate as entirely voluntary or entirely forced’. This is confirmed in our work. The situation of young people in the Gambia considering migrating and Afghans, who have been forced to flee and now reside in Turkey, is obviously very different. Yet, both groups face circumstances and pressures that often push them towards leaving regardless of the risks involved. This is reflected in their narratives, which exhibit strong similarities in terms of focus on opportunities and the perceived need of having to accept the risks involved in irregular migration.

Acknowledgements

The research was conducted in the framework of the H2020 project BRIDGES. We would like to thank our BRIDGES partners, notably Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Ferruccio Pastore, Virginie Guiraudon and Ismaila Cessay. The comments of the anonymous reviewers and of Nik Ostrand were also of tremendous help. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Rosangela Caleprico and Hannah Sattlecker. We would also like to thank the participants in the Gambia and Turkey who shared their insights as well as the local teams of research support while doing our fieldwork (notably Mustapha Sonko, Musa Cham, Mehrijan Rahimoglu, Benazir Matahar Latifi and Enayatullah Amin). The article is a substantially revised version of the BRIDGES Working Paper 17, March 2023.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This project has received funding from the EU's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101004564.