Rethinking the Social–Political through Ibn Khaldûn and Aristotle

Abstract

Contemporary social theory largely operates on the assumption that the question of the social–political is endogenous to a European socio-historical trajectory, which misses alternative ways of thinking about the social–political relationship. The essay argues that juxtaposing Ibn Khaldûn’s Muqaddimah with Aristotle’s Politics presents such an alternative reading. The analysis of the texts reveals a relationship between the social and political along three main intersections: communication, membership and rule. The elements constitutive of these intersections show two forms of the social–political relationship: complementary and decisive. The interplay between the forms poses questions that are useful to scholarly understandings of the separation between the political and the social – of the ruler from the ruled – in the (post)colony.

• (post)colony
• Aristotle
• Ibn Khaldûn
• social theory
• social–political relationship

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Brain Singer for his comments and questions on an earlier draft of this essay. I also want to thank Mount Royal University's Writing Space Program for providing me with time and support to edit the essay. Finally, I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their critical comments and questions.

Notes

1 I use the Lord (2013) translation.

2 For a critical perspective on Agamben’s theory, see Huysmans (2008); for a comprehensive overview, see Watkin (2013).

3 For a critique of Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, see Finlayson (2010).

4 Feminist scholarship revealed and challenged the distinction between “natural life” and “political life” long before Foucault. Martineau ([1837] 1981), for example, illustrates the politicization of “natural life” and the included exclusion of women in her discussion of the “political non-existence” of women in American society.

5 Agamben uses “bare life” as opposed to “natural life” because the coincidence of natural and political life in the modern state means that modern individuals only understand bare life – a life that is exposed to death.

6 Others have read these works in those terms. For instance, Muhammad Rabī examines Ibn Khaldûn’s work in terms of the distinction between society and politics (Rabī 1967, 6); in addition to Agamben, Arendt (1958) reads Aristotle’s work in terms of the social and the political.

7 Ibn Khaldûn was likely more familiar with Aristotle’s writings on logic. He distinguished between a mystic Aristotle of metaphysics (which he opposed) and the true Aristotle, the logician (which he built upon) (Khaldûn 1958 III, 137–40, 246–58, 287; also see Mahdi 1957, 79–82, 109–12). For an overview of Ibn Khaldûn’s epistemological assumptions, see Alatas 2006a.

8 See Franz Rosenthal in the translator’s introduction to the Muqaddimah (Khaldûn 1958 I, lxxviii–lxxx).

9 Because of its ambiguity, I use the Arabic term.

10 Ibn Khaldûn’s major reference is the rise of Arab Muslim Bedouins, but he does discuss the rise of other “savage” groups who may not be conveniently categorized as Bedouins.

11 Though Ibn Khaldûn does not believe that religion is essential in the making of history (Rabī 1967, 43–6, 126–27).

12 See Marguerite Deslauriers’ analysis of how this lack of “authority” in the deliberative faculty relates to the forms of rule in Aristotle’s thought, whereby women are viewed as being both the same as men (political rule among free persons) and inferior to them (aristocratic rule) (in Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 47, 50–2, 55, 58–63).

13 While the polis is founded on the composition of households, it is the primary principle behind the coming together of individuals in the household (Pol. 1.2, 4–5; 1.3, 5; 2.1, 25; Pellegrin in Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 29–34, 44–5).

14 Terence Irwin (1999) translation.

15 This term can mean citizenship, citizen-body, constitution and regime (Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 5; Mulhern in Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 84–102). Following Lord (2013, 73, n. 35), I use it to mean “polity” – that is, as a specific type of regime – though I do not use the term “polity”, since it is best to maintain an allusion to the multifaceted meaning of politeia (Balot in Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 106, 113–14).

16 For Aristotle, there isn’t one form of rule that is universally suitable across all contexts (Samaras in Lockwood and Samaras 2015, 139–41).

17 I agree with O’Connor’s argument that in addition to his treatment of specific virtues, “Aristotle’s account of justice is … concerned with the proper orientation of a human life” (O’Connor in Lord and O’Connor 1991, 137; emphasis added).