Religious Beef: Dalit Literature, Bare Life, and Cow Protection in India

Abstract

Arjun Dangle’s poem “The Cantonment has Begun to Shake” and Amitabh’s short story “The Cull” depict cow slaughter and beef-eating in Dalit communities. Both texts have assumed a renewed sense of political urgency in light of ongoing assaults by self-proclaimed “cow vigilantes” (gau rakshaks) on Muslims and oppressed castes accused of slaughtering cattle for beef consumption. To unpack the political relevance of these texts in light of the current crisis of cow vigilantism, this essay situates Dangle and Amitabh’s texts against the peculiar aporia of religion and secular legal theory embedded in Article 48 of the Indian Constitution, “Organization of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.” Following Shraddha Chigateri’s suggestion that the “secular garb” of Article 48 conceals and creates an ideological “chimera” that elides the entanglements of caste Hinduism, the secular state, and interspecies relationships, I investigate how the Article implicitly condones contemporary cow vigilantism while thrusting its victims into a political state of exception that complicates Giorgio Agamben’s formulation of bare life. The essay then positions Dangle and Amitabh’s texts as critiques of caste violence that speak from, and contest, the political state of exception that cow vigilantism exploits.

• Article 48
• bare life
• cow protection
• Dalit literature
• Dangle, Arjun

Notes

1 In “The Origins of Untouchability,” for instance, Ambedkar remarks that Hindu beef taboos most likely emerged shortly after the Vedic period, as caste Hindus and Buddhists struggled for sociocultural supremacy (Jha 2002, 68–72). The contemporary iteration of cow protection emerges from the revivalist uprisings of the late nineteenth century. Historians including Robb (1986), Freitag (1980), Adcock (2010), and Yang (1980) have unpacked the connections between late nineteenth-century religious revivalism, communalism, and cow protection in North India and Maharashtra.

2 Bharati (2002) reminds us that “Dalit” does not denote caste, and cannot account for the thousands of marginalized urban, rural, and tribal groups who fall under generalized political economic schemes such as the Scheduled Tribes/Castes Act.

3 Shibban Lal Saksena, meanwhile, moved to reword Article 48 from “prohibiting” to “prohibit.” The shift back to prohibit, Saksena argued, would reestablish the state’s power to impose a religious injunction he felt was the right of Indian Hindus.

4 Hunt’s (2014) observation that the “feudal” tenor of caste is at odds with the cosmopolitan aspirations of the Indian middle class signals the need for a rigorous historical analysis of how bare life and the sovereign shifted from the body of the king to civil society in the specific context of the subcontinent.

5 Ziarek goes on to argue Agamben’s formulation of bare life cannot take rape into account because bare life is exclusively defined as a life that can be killed with impunity.

6 Although the term “Dalit” remains invested in empowerment, self-assertion, and pride, Bharati (2002) notes that the movement should not be ascribed to other marginalized groups who might identify as untouchables, Otherwise Backward Castes, or Scheduled Tribes.

7 Justices A. K. Goel and U. U. Lalit, who wrote the decision, insist that the judgment does not dilute the law, but only protects those who have been falsely accused (TNM 2018). Khora (2018), however, has argued the justices relied on prior decisions that assumed oppressed castes would abuse the act without taking into account the possibility of misuse by upper castes who use the lower as a proxy.

8 Jaaware cites a longstanding opinion amongst Vedic interpreters that Shudras may neither study the Vedas nor perform Vedic rituals, even though they dwelled within the fourfold structure of varna (2001, 263).

9 An in-depth analysis of the possibilities and challenges of translation are beyond the scope of this essay. In a wide-ranging discussion, Mukherjee, Mukherjee, and Godard (2006) discuss the challenges of translating Omprakash Valmiki’s Joothan. Additionally, Thiara (2016) unpacks how syntax and vernacular might shift as translations strive to attract a global audience.

10 Limbale, for example, surveys disagreements between Buddhists and Marxists about how Dalits may best liberate themselves. He also touches on internal differences of opinion amongst the latter with respect to orthodox Marxism’s inability to account for the distinction between class and caste (2004, 63–64).