A non-normative theory of power and domination

Abstract

Despite the variety of competing interpretations of domination, a common feature of the most influential analyses of the concept is their reliance on a normative criterion: the detrimental effect of domination on those subject to it. This article offers a non-evaluative, non-consequence-based definition of domination, in line with the perspective on power developed by the theory of the social exchange. Domination, it is argued, should be seen as a structural property of a power relation, and consists in an extreme inequality in the social distribution of power. It is contended, accordingly, that the postulation of a society in which domination is avoided (or minimized) should rely on the ideal of the minimization of inequality, and, more specifically, that it should be based on a distributional pattern of maximally equal social resources.

Keywords:

• domination
• power
• social exchange
• equality
• Pettit

Acknowledgments

I thank Francesco Battegazzorre, Boudewijn de Bruin, Peter Morriss, Daniele Porello, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am particularly indebted to Ian Carter for his constant support as well as for his challenging and invaluable critical remarks.

Notes

1. A structural interpretation of domination, though different from the one proposed here, has been offered by Lovett (2010). I shall offer below a clear account of the difference between Lovett’s and my understanding of domination.

2. For the distinction between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, see King (1998) and Pansardi (2011).

3. The literature on the role of intentionality in the definition of power is vast. This paper follows the classical Weberian position (Weber 1978, p. 926) in reserving the term ‘power’ for those instances of social causation in which the intentions of the initiating actor play a substantial role. However, I agree with Stoppino in suggesting that intentionality could be too strong a requirement for distinguishing between power and a mere instance of social causation. Stoppino introduces another criterion, that of the interest of the power-wielder, in order to explain those instances of power that are not intentionally caused but are still not cases of accidental causation (Stoppino 2007, p. 3).

4. Baldwin (1978) points out four different interpretations of the notion of asymmetry in the analysis of power relations: ‘asymmetry of causation, imbalance of influence, unequal benefits, and uneven distribution of power’ (p. 1235). In defining power as an asymmetrical relationship between two individuals, I endorse the notion of causational asymmetry, adding, as already specified, that the kind of causation implied by a power relation is to be considered intentional. Following Dennis Wrong, I assume that ‘asymmetry exists in each individual act–response sequence’ even in the case in which the two actors involved in the power relation find themselves in a situation of reciprocal interdependence (Wrong 1968, pp. 673–674). Unlike in the case of power, however, I shall argue that domination is necessarily asymmetric also in the fourth sense mentioned by Baldwin.

5. The salience of a resource, accordingly, cannot be stated in general terms. However, certain kind of resources (most noticeably, resources of violence) tend to have a more universalistic value.

6. Notably, Lovett does not give an account of cases of interdependence.

7. It is worth noting that this case also satisfies Lovett’s third condition for domination, namely arbitrariness: a mother might indeed act for the benefit of her child, but she could also do otherwise.

8. In other words, no ‘better strategy’

9. Take the case of a master–slave relationship, in which the master (credibly) threatens to kill the slave if she ever attempts to escape. The slave’s exit cost in this situation is represented by her certain death. As a consequence, unless she chooses to die, this relationship is likely to continue over time.

10. That is, in all the cases except those in which it is the power-holder herself who decides to terminate the relationship.

11. The distinction between negative and positive sanctions roughly corresponds to the distinction between ‘threats’ and ‘conditional offers’. Accordingly, it does not imply any substantive claim about the sort of resources on which the sanction is based. Resources of violence, for example, no less than economic resources, can, in various situations, work as both negative and positive sanctions.

12. Under Pettit’s republican conception, freedom is equated with the absence domination (assuming, of course, his own definition of domination). He describes freedom as ‘security against interference, in particular against interference on an arbitrary basis’ (Pettit 1997, p. 51). He claims that freedom on this conception is different from freedom on the liberal conception – freedom as the ‘absence of interference’. This last claim has been strongly contested by some liberal thinkers, among whom Carter (2008) and Kramer (2008).

13. It is worth noticing that Lovett (2009, 2010) seems to endorse (although implicitly) a similar position in his formulation of the conception of justice, which he calls ‘justice as minimizing domination’ (2010, p. 159). He seems to suggest that a republican society, in order to guarantee the absence (or minimization) of domination, needs to produce policies that satisfy certain principles of distributive justice (2010, p. 156). In clear accordance with this claim, I suggest that my proposal of a social exchange theory of domination better allows one to give evidence to the role of equality in the pursuit of avoiding (or minimizing) domination.