Toleration out of respect?

Abstract

Under conditions of pluralism different cultures, interests or values can come into conflict, which raises the problem of how to secure peaceful co-existence. The idea of toleration historically emerged as an answer to this problem. Recently Rainer Forst has argued that toleration should not just be based on a modus vivendi designed to secure peaceful co-existence, but should be based on moral reasons. Forst therefore advances what he calls the ‘respect conception’ of toleration as an in itself morally desirable type of relationship, which is furthermore the only conception of toleration that avoids various so-called ‘paradoxes of toleration’. The paper first examines whether Forst’s respect conception can be applied descriptively to distinguish between actual patterns of behaviour and classify different acts of toleration. Then the focus is shifted to toleration out of respect as a normative prescription, which Forst presents as a requirement of justice. At both levels, it is argued that Forst’s respect conception is problematic since it presupposes that answers to very substantial normative questions, which are precisely what people tend to disagree on under conditions of pluralism, are already at hand. The respect conception therefore seems to be at best a theoretical idea belonging in ideal-theory, not a useful practical solution to actual conflicts under conditions of pluralism.

Keywords:

• Rainer Forst
• pluralism
• respect
• toleration

Notes

1. It might be objected that toleration cannot be a mere modus vivendi. This might be argued to be the case since toleration presupposes that people have the power to act intolerantly. If a modus vivendi tends to arise when people realize that they lack that power, this means that a modus vivendi cannot be a form of toleration. But a modus vivendi does not imply a lack of power to interfere. It is rather defined as a situation where several parties have enough power so that no one can dominate the others completely. So a modus vivendi is characterized by a reciprocal power to interfere – this is why it is an alternative to conflict (a way of securing peace).

2. Here I have a broad kind of reflexive equilibrium methodology in mind. The idea is that our reasons for accepting general normative principles depends on how well their implications cohere with what we take to be plausible normative judgements in particular cases. Part of this is that a normative principle should not demand what is impossible. But the main point is not that a plausible normative principle has to be realistic in some sense, but that the evaluations or prescriptions implied by it have to be normatively plausible, i.e. not contradict too many of our considered moral judgements. In order even to engage in such an assessment in relation to Forst’s respect conception of toleration understood as a normative prescription, we need to be able to pick out which acts are instances of toleration out of respect, i.e. to apply the respect conception in a classificatory way.