Two concepts of justice – and of its scope

Abstract

I argue that there are two concepts of distributive justice in play in debates on whether principles of distributive justice apply to the global sphere. Critics of the idea that the scope of distributive justice is restricted assume, without argument, a particular conception of justice in which justice-based evaluations apply to basic structural institutional actions only instrumentally, whilst applying intrinsically to distributive outcomes for people. I call these outcomes-focused views. I show that at least one view in the literature on global justice, the agency argument, appeals to a distinct concept of social distributive justice where the descriptors ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’, intrinsically apply to the actions of certain types of institutional agents, and only derivatively to the description of states of affairs such as distributive outcomes. This alternative view is treatment-focused and deontological. It focuses on special goods that are only available as a matter of how one is treated by political institutions: relational-goods. It is also sensitive to considerations of fairness in practical reason in ways that outcomes-focused views are not. I show why, on this agency-focused approach, the scope of principles of distributive justice is restricted to how people who are subject to special institutional authority are treated. My main aim in this paper is to demonstrate that on a competitor approach to justice the anti-scope restriction arguments fail, and that the competitor approach is not obviously incoherent. Thus, criticising scope restriction by assuming an outcomes-focused approach to distributive justice begs the question against agency-focused arguments. This shows the real dispute is at a more fundamental level.

Keywords:

• concept of justice
• scope of distributive justice
• global justice
• fairness
• relational justice
• teleology
• deontology
• equal respect
• equal concern

Acknowledements

I would like to thank Julio Montero, Chiara Cordelli, Ezequiel Monti, Carl Knight, Cecile Laborde, Jeff Howard, Avia Pasternak and two anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Notes

1. Viz. the claim that without a justified agent a principle is incomplete in the way that ‘a sentence without a grammatical subject is incomplete’ (Meckled-Garcia 2008, Barry and Valentini 2009, p. 496, Meckled-Garcia 2013, p. 111).

2. ‘Consider a world with two separate systems of interaction that have no contact but are aware of each other and suppose that one of them is prosperous whereas the other extremely impoverished. Compare, now, two individuals [one from each system] who are identical in their abilities and needs. The member of the prosperous system receives more. But it is difficult to see why – concentrating on any possible and reasonable criteria for entitlement – this is fair’. (Caney 2005, p. 111). Fairness (justice) here focuses on the state of affairs (outcome) of differential prosperity. Institutional actions that attempt to rectify such differentials would derive their justice or injustice from the justice/injustice of the distributive states of affairs they sought to bring about.

3. Rawls never mentions the possibility of non-basic structural background injustice, and in discussing the erosion of background fairness, he clearly refers to this only in the context of ‘social circumstances’ that ‘may be fair at an earlier time’ for ‘citizens’ relationships’ (Rawls 1993, p. 266).

4. I call it teleological because the view makes attributions of justice and injustice turn on the value and disvalue of outcomes, respectively, and actions are just or unjust in relation to these aims (teloi). I do not go as far as describing the view as ‘consequentialist’ (Cf. Anderson 2013, p. 2) because consequentialism implies a specific decision procedure for generating practical reasons and I am not sure the outcomes-focused approaches I have described have a clear account of corresponding practical reasons.

5. Note that here I accept a distinction between right to rule (legitimacy) and individuals’ duties to contribute grounded in reciprocity with the political community.

6. Compare this to views that model distributive justice on direct interpersonal reciprocity (Sangiovanni 2007, p. 26), assured interpersonal reciprocity (Lister 2013, pp. 87 ff.) or direct interpersonal cooperation (Quong 2011, p. 81).

7. Which specific circumstances trigger rescue duties is also a matter of contention. Authors holding outcomes views tend to see the triggers as people being in serious need plus our ability to help and then add disclaimers that the costs of rescue should not be excessive (Buchanan 2004, n. 11, p. 248). They do not distinguish the basis for rescue from that for distributive justice. Less outcomes-focused theorists see the triggers for rescue as involving distinctive features, such as ‘proximity’ to, or ‘confrontation’ with the plight of specific individuals (viz. Miller 2010, pp. 23 ff., Kamm 2007, p. 379, Dworkin 2011, p. 277 ff.), which would distinguish rescue from distributive justice.

8. Abizadeh claims that for Rawls the idea of social cooperation ‘includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation’ (Abizadeh 2007, p. 329). However, if ‘includes’ is supposed to mean ‘presupposes’, I have been unable to find any equivalent reference in A Theory of Justice, which is the text to which Abizadeh refers.

9. Legitimacy does not necessarily require a fully democratic order on these views (Meckled-Garcia 2014).

10. Note that this view can answer the objection that all those affected by a political decision should participate democratically in making it for the decision to be legitimate (Abizadeh 2010, p. 121). This view of legitimacy concerns the right to configure ongoing cooperation rather than merely affecting others, so long as equal respect is shown to all, which means basic rights are respected.