Normative political theory, democratic politics and minority rights

Abstract

In Equal Recognition, Alan Patten argues that in a proper relationship between normative political theory and democratic politics, we must make a clear distinction between two questions related to cultural rights: (a) authority (who should decide?) and (b) the substance of deliberation. The question he wants to explore, however, is not the authority question but the substantive question. The aim of this article is to show that an account of equal recognition cannot bracket out the democratic element. It argues, first, that Equal Recognition does not live up to its initial promise, as it contains a number of reflections and recommendations (on language rights, on secession, on the rights of migrants’ cultures) that either explicitly or implicitly include the democratic element. Second, it points at other important areas of political decision-making – such as electoral system design, districting, referendums, quotas – in which it is quite clear that in order to extend equal recognition to minority cultures, we are obliged to take decisions related to the design of democratic institutions.

Keywords:

• democracy
• proceduralism
• language rights
• institutions
• direct democracy
• electoral systems

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge incisive comments from Sergi Morales-Gálvez, Eldar Sarajlić and an anonymous reviewer on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes

1. This echoes Carens (2000, p. 6 ff.) who also stresses the difference between what liberalism morally requires and what is morally permissible under liberalism. Also, to avoid confusion, notice that Patten’s use of the term ‘substantive’ does not refer to the substance of outcomes but only to the substantive principles that should guide our reasoning at the level of the procedure.

2. Within the realm of democratic proceduralists, we can distinguish between minimal proceduralists, for whom democracy is nothing more than competitive election of leaders (Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 250–283) or a simple ‘conjunction of universal suffrage and majority rule’ (Van Parijs, 1993), and more comprehensive accounts (e.g. Dahl, 1979).

3. This said, it is not easy to find countries that are ‘just’ but undemocratic. Carens (2000, p. 45), for example, remarks that ‘[he] cannot think of a single actual case where the absence of democracy is not unjust’.

4. We should be careful, however, when drawing parallels between these two strands of literature. Notice that Rawls (1993), in his reply to Habermas, ‘holds that the division between the justice of procedures and the justice of outcomes cannot be maintained, and that theories of justice that claim to be procedural and not substantive are in fact reliant on substantive values to define fair procedures’ (Meshelski, 2016).

5. This second remark is in contrast with other influent accounts of multiculturalism. Consider, for example, the ‘territorial imperative’ argument in Van Parijs (2011) or of the ‘context of choice’ argument in Kymlicka (1995).

6.

Look now instead at the ethnographic and political map of an area of the modern world. It resembles not Kokoshka, but, say, Modigliani. There is very little shading; neat flat surfaces are clearly separated from each other, it is generally plain where one begins and another ends, and there is little if any ambiguity or overlap (Gellner, 1983, pp. 139, 140).

This said, I am aware that this picture does not apply to all (Western) societies. In places like South Tyrol, Estonia or Catalonia the linguistic groups are still quite intermixed.

7. This problem can be fixed, or at least alleviated, via special procedures that ensure a more than proportional say to minorities, or by applying supermajority rules.

8. So, for example, if a person answered that German is her primary language, that she speaks exclusively German at work, but that she uses Romansh to address her grandparents, then she will be considered as Romansh (and Romansh only!) for the purposes of the 40 and 20% rules mentioned above.

9. In the U.S. context this situation is known as ‘racial vote dilution’.

10. But note that Laitin and Reich (2003, p. 100) do not think that the principles of liberal justice can or should guide our decisions on boundaries: ‘Liberal democrats need not decide, as a matter of justice, what the precise boundaries of internal sub-units are before democratic politics get off the ground’.

11. On this point, see Beitz (1989, pp. 147–148 ):

Because the spatial distribution of interests is not usually random – it may be a function, for example, of factors such as income class, ethnicity, or race – facially ‘impartial’ districting criteria will not normally be interest blind in the sense required for genuine impartiality.