What liberals should tolerate internationally

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on what liberal states should tolerate outside their borders. This requires definitions of `liberalism,´ `toleration,´ and `state.´ In the first section of this paper, I briefly indicate how I use those and other terms necessary to the discussion and introduce the normative principle I take liberals to be committed to. In the second section, I continue clearing the path for the rest of my discussion. In the rest of the paper, I draw conclusions about what liberals should tolerate outside their state that I believe follow from the proffered definitions and principles. I limit myself to interference aimed at providing humanitarian aid, but do so in a way that is meant to provide resources for thinking about other sorts of interventions. In the third section, I consider humanitarian interventions done with the permission of the other state and will point toward a toleration-based view; here we are really talking about non-toleration of suffering. In the fourth section, I consider humanitarian interventions done without the permission of the other state; here we are talking about non-toleration of a state that harms its residents. I consider an objection in section five.

KEYWORDS:

• Toleration
• international
• harm principle

Acknowledgments

I owe thanks to Andy Altman, Kit Wellman, Anurag Sinha, and Bas van der Vossen, all of whom read earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Johannes Drerup, Michael Kühler, and an anonymous referee for CRISPP for comments on the penultimate versions. I’ve discussed the ideas presented here with countless others and gave presentations based on some of the ideas here at the South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference. I appreciate all who contributed to my thinking, but cannot name them all. Finally, the view discussed here is part of the broader view of liberalism and toleration that I present in my Toleration and Freedom from Harm. I am grateful to Routledge (2018) for permission to reuse the argumentation from chapter 10 of that work here.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. My project here is similar to Michael Blake’s in his Justice and Foreign Policy, with two important differences: first, Blake takes autonomy to be the fundamental value underlying liberalism and assumes it must be promoted while I reject the latter claim; second, my aim here is more exploratory and suggestive than Blake’s (as befitting the length). The first difference means my substantive conclusions differ from Blake’s. Substantively, what I say here largely agrees with what Loren Lomasky and Fernando Teson say in chapters 8 and 9 of their Justice at a Distance. Like them, I take noninterference to be generally, but not always, required; here I seek to provide a way to determine the normative limits of toleration. Like Lomasky and Teson, I think permissible interference is about protecting persons; unlike them, I do not put this in terms of rights.

2. For a contrasting view, see Drerup (2019).

3. For different views about this, see Michael Kühler `Can a value-neutral state still be tolerant?´ (esp. §II and §III), Elisabetta Galeotti `Rescuing Toleration,´ in this volume and section 1 of Drerup (op cit). I offer an improved version of my definition in Cohen 2018.

4. I do not, though, mean to adopt the now-outdated Westphalian paradigm wherein states are the only international agents. The relevant agents might be states, but they might also be NGO’s, business corporations, and individuals who act in the global sphere.

5. For a different view – a modus vivendi account – see John Horton `Toleration and Modus Vivendi,´ this volume.

6. See Cohen 1999.

7. If all of the women in the community exercised this right (or otherwise exercised their autonomy), the community would have to change or cease existing, but that would not be due to our (outsiders’) lack of toleration. See Cohen 2007.

8. See Feinberg’s 1988.

9. Charles Beitz, for example, argues that Rawlsian liberalism requires an international difference principle. Rawls himself contests this. I agree with Rawls on this score, but differ from him on others. See Beitz 1979 as well as his 2000, esp. p. 688 ff. Also see Rawls, 1999.

10. Or something similar. Arthur Ripstein, for example, proposes a sovereignty principle in Ripstein 2006. See also Ripstein 2009. I am not persuaded by Ripstein’s arguments for the sovereignty principle over the harm principle, but won’t address that here (see Cohen 2018).

11. Larry May also defends international use of a harm principle (see chapter 5 of his 2005). My view differs from May’s. While I don’t deny, of course, that there are different morally relevant factors in the international arena, I don’t think those factors need alter the principle we use. The GHP also differs from attempts at rendering the harm principle large in my 2007. What I say here is closer to what I say in 2014 and, even more, Cohen2018.

12. I think sovereignty thus understood is weak enough to withstand the convincing assault launched on the concept by Christopher Morris in his 1998 at pp. 204–212. Allen Buchanan claims a `state is a persisting structure of institutions for the wielding of political power´ (2002, p. 691).

13. On this definition, there can be a government-less state (i.e., an anarchic state) so long as it has what can be considered law. I cannot here discuss what is necessary for that. The first contingent factor in the definition – geographic contiguity – is meant to recognize the contemporary condition and recognizes that `contiguity´ has to be taken loosely in order to allow that Greece, for example, is a state even though it is in part a collection of islands that are, in an obvious sense, not physically contiguous. The second contingent factor – shared norms – serves a conceptual purpose. It is meant to recognize that if territorial state A conquers territorial state B and allows no communication or transportation between the two territories such that no shared norms develop even though the government of A is the uncontested government of B, they may remain two states (with the sovereign governance structure for both headquartered in A). It nonetheless allows that people living in the middle of Kansas, having few if any norms in common with people living in NYC, are part of the same state.

14. On a strict version of the HP, only prevention or rectification of harm justifies interference; on less strict versions, other things – like offense or benefiting others – also justify interference.

15. See Paragraph 6 of Hume’s `Of the Original Contract.´.

16. Such a state is internally legitimate. Throughout, I intend to use `legitimate´ as A. John Simmons uses the term and distinguishes it from justification (see, for example, his 1999). It may be that a state with fully voluntary and informed consent of all its members is belligerent, refusing to respect its neighbor states, and thus not to be tolerated on those grounds – the state’s actions would be unjustified and warrant interference by others. (It would not be externally illegitimate.) It may also be that in the process of forming the state, territory was stolen from previous residents. This would not, on my view, challenge the legitimacy of the state (and not necessarily the justification), though it may well challenge the legitimacy of the state’s territorial rights.

17. We may need to reconceptualize sovereignty and its limits. I say more about this below.

18. The unfortunate consequentialist bent here is due to the nature of political entities and not a meta-ethical point. Even a moral deontologist can allow that if a state is to act, it should act to create the greatest good – or, better, to minimize moral costs.

19. It might seem that cases in box 2 are those where interference is required and cases in box 1 are those where interference is permitted but not required. This is, I think, the right view if only the agents making the decision about interfering would suffer the risks involved. Things are, of course, different when one agent makes a decision that creates risks for another. I can decide to risk my life to save another, e.g., but the president cannot decide to risk my life to save another (at least this latter requires further justification that the former does not).

20. Admittedly, the first response will not satisfy the simple consequentialist who might insist that (a) real and substantial risk to her state or any of its citizens makes interference morally impermissible and (b) the interpersonal case is not analogous since Sally risks only her own safety while the state risks the lives of others who do not consent (if they do, the situation is different).

21. See Nahshon Perez, 2010 for an argument that justification for a lack of toleration of illiberal groups does not amount to justification for interference.

22. This is just recognition that harm is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for interference if we abide by the HP and GHP.

23. If they are caused by harms, the GHP indicates intervention is warranted. Consider Thomas Pogge’s talk of international resource and borrowing privileges. Complicity in these privileges is, one may plausibly believe, doing harm. See Pogge 2008, esp. 118–122.

24. This assumes that the resources for the aid are voluntarily contributed. Coercively raising the funds, on the other hand, would seem to require an additional normative principle.

25. Consider, e.g., the Sudanese government’s use of foreign aid to massacre those in Darfur circa 2003.

26. The locus classicus of these arguments is in Lord Peter Bauer’s work. Recent work from economists supports Lord Bauer’s arguments. See, for example, Botero, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002.

27. It might not be, though, if it has the effect of hindering a nascent – or blossoming – industry that would better serve the region (via job creation, for example) than the donation. There are examples where charitable Americans and Europeans have inadvertently but effectively destroyed nascent industries in the Third World by donating what the industry was creating (clothing, for example).

28. This may be one of the first claims widely accepted in the field since the resurgence of interest in international political philosophy roughly four decades ago. For example, by Beitz op cit; see esp.136–143. Lomasky and Teson (2015) is the exception.

29. According to the World Bank, `Officially recorded remittances to developing countries amounted to $431.6 billion in 2015´ (http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/13/remittances-to-developing-countries-edge-up-slightly-in-2015, accessed 12/17/16).

30. Thus, even if Allen Buchanan is right that there is a natural duty of justice such `that each person has a limited moral obligation to help ensure that all persons have access to institutions, including legal institutions, that protect their basic human rights´ (2004, p. 74), it may be that such institutions should be our institutions (or those of other states).

31. See Avery Kolers, 2009, especially pages 52ff, for a view that might suggest this. (His view may have changed since.)

32. I do not intend here to imply (and do not believe) that human rights are mere social mores.

33. I take the terminology from Joel Feinberg. See, for example, his 1984. I modify this understanding of harm in Cohen 2018. At least one Rawlsian, Michael Blake, is unlikely to accept the limit I specify in the text. See his discussion of `Borduria and Syldavia, part 11´ (2013, pp. 115 ff). On the view espoused here, Syldavia (or anyone else) would only have warrant to interfere if the poverty in Borduria was caused by a harm – and Blake does not suggest that is the case in this scenario. Of course, on this account, Syldavia (and others) might seek to help as a matter of charity, but given lack of warrant to end toleration, this must not be forced (Blake does not indicate whether the recipient state welcomes the aid of not). (Even as a matter of charity, I think, costs of aid reduce the permissibility.)

34. I am assuming a moral conception of human rights. Human rights as legally construed are a different matter. According to Article 23 of The Declaration of Human Rights, for example, there are rights `to free choice of employment,´ `to equal pay for equal work,´ and `to form and join trade unions.´ It is easy to imagine a situation where such rights are unavailable (not legally instantiated) and where no harm occurs. Perhaps I am the only employer hiring in Smalltown and I am only willing to hire Joe if he takes a lower salary than I pay others for the same work and I do not allow unions. Joe has only one option for employment, it is not for equal pay, and he cannot join a union. Still, Joe wants the offered salary. I don’t think we could reasonably say I (or the state) harm Joe.

35. Strictly speaking, we are not discussing transgressions or violations of the HP or GHP, but harms that activate or make the harm principle relevant. The principle operates as a sort of warning indicating that when there is harm, toleration may end. When the warning is activated, we determine if there is an actual harm and, if there is, determine if the costs of interference are such that we should interfere.

36. I say much the same in Cohen 2007, 2004, and 2018.

37. For more on this view, see my 2015, p. 202.

38. I adapt what I say here from my 2007 (op cit), 501. Some will insist, of course, that it is reasonable for oppressed people to claim they have as much right to stay where they are as their oppressors. I do not deny this. The question here, though, is only about where interference to help them and what sort of help is permitted.

39. `Piercings´ is a term from Altman and Wellman, but they prefer (as do I) to jettison the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and thus allow for substantial limits to a moral right of sovereignty such that international interventions are permissible when a state transgresses those limits. See Altman & Wellman, 2004, p. 51.

40. We might say they have autonomy to choose given the background conditions, but not autonomy to set the background conditions. Of course, none of us can choose all of our background conditions, so if there is a difference in kind, it is because in the normal situation, no one chooses the background conditions we face, but in the worrisome situation, someone who should not chooses them for us.

41. Presumably, anyone emigrating will have unavoidable costs in leaving their home. What is important is that the state not itself impose (additional) penalties. A state’s sovereignty rights are limited by maintenance of exit rights.

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Andrew Jason Cohen

Andrew Jason Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University. He is the author of Toleration and Freedom from Harm (Routledge, 2018) and Toleration (Polity, 2014) as well as articles in journals like Ethics, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy and in new reference works like The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism. He is increasingly examining the role of toleration (or the lack thereof) in our system of criminal law and in business ethics.