Parental compromise

ABSTRACT

I examine how co-parents should handle differing commitments about how to raise their child. Via thought experiment and the examination of our practices and affective reactions, I argue for a thesis about the locus of parental authority: that parental is invested in full in each individual parent, meaning that that the command of one parent is sufficient to bind the child to act in obedience. If this full-authority thesis is true, then for co-parents to command different things would be for them to contest one another’s authority. The only course that respects the authority of both parents is for co-parents to agree to command the same thing. Further, what is commanded must not result from a ‘capitulation’ by one co-parent, rather, it should result from a compromise. Parental authority involves a duty to deliberate about which commands it is best to give the child. If a command results from a capitulation, one parent will rightly think of themselves as not having fulfilled their parental duty. Parental compromises are not best understood as bargains or conflicts, but by the metaphor of gifts given by each parent out of respect for the other’s authority.

KEYWORDS:

• Compromise
• authority
• disagreement
• children’s rights
• family ethics

Acknowledgments

For their comments on earlier versions of this paper I would like to thank: David Archard, Gregory Robson, participants at the 2018 Florida Philosophical Association, and members of the Tulane Philosophy Club. My special thanks to the anonymous reviewer for their extensive comments. Thanks to my wife, Victoria, for forcing this philosophical problem to the forefront of my mind.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. A settlement or capitulation might allow a parent who is better at tracking the truth of ‘what command it is best to give the child’ and who knows they are (a rare person) to give a better command. However, although in an ultimate sense the practice of parenthood (as opposed to, say, a Platonic collective child rearing system) is perhaps justified by being the best means of giving children good commands, within the practice of co-parenthood each co-parent ought to respect the authority of the other even if one of them is worse at tracking ‘what command it is best to give the child.’ Cf. Rawls’ distinction between the practice and the summary concepts of rules (Rawls, 1955). Within the context of the parental practice each parent can justify their right to command simply by discharging their duty to deliberate about how best to command, even if as a matter of fact their deliberations are not highly truth-tracking. I remain neutral on whether parental rights are justified entirely, or only in part, by child-centered considerations (Shields, 2016).

2. A full account of why it is that we should sometimes respect the will of a dead person would take me beyond the bounds of this piece. I note simply that there are long and widely established practices of doing what dead people willed, and that these practices seem largely motivated by respect for the dead. Respect as an attitude does not seem to depend on any ongoing exchange with the person respected: respect can be offered unilaterally and be passively enjoyed. By contrast, the idea of bargaining with or contending with the will of a dead person seems confused, since bargaining and contending seem to involve the idea of an ongoing exchange, where these are activities two parties must take part in.

3. Further qualifications can be added if necessary: eats fish or drinks hot tea and asserts that doing so is morally or ritually permissible, or does these things openly, or without shame, and so forth.

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Marcus William Hunt

Marcus William Hunt is a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at Tulane University. His research interests include the ethics of the family, philosophy of mind, and epistemology.