Towards a non-ideal theory of climate migration

ABSTRACT

Anthropogenic climate change is inflicting serious loss and damage on some of the most vulnerable areas of the globe. In the future, a particularly vexing kind of that loss will be territorial. The continuously rising sea level is projected to submerge – or to otherwise make uninhabitable – not only large swaths of the territory of e.g. Bangladesh and the Netherlands, but also all of the island nations of e.g. Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and the Maldives. Therefore, we must adapt to climate change rather than merely attempt to mitigate it. In particular, territorial losses must be compensated. Noncompliance makes the ideal of territorial compensation elusive and grounds the need for non-ideal theory. Here, I seek to develop such a theory. Specifically, I (i) introduce background considerations, (ii) address challenges to compensatory liability, (iii) situate the paper within non-ideal theory, (iv) offer an ideal of territorial compensation to guide non-ideal theory, (v) discuss previous migration proposals, and (vi) argue for a non-ideal theory of collective climate migration.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate change
• territorial rights
• political self-determination
• migration
• non-ideal theory
• responsibility

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Rüdiger Bittner, Megan Blomfield, Paul Bowman, Frank Dietrich, Göran Duus-Otterström, Stephen Gardiner, Laura García Portela, Clare Heyward, Alex McLaughlin, David Miller, Julia Mosquera, Jörgen Ödalen, Edward Page, Rudolf Schüßler, Steve Vanderheiden, audiences in Dubrovnik, Düsseldorf, Hannover, Konstanz, and Stockholm, as well as the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. See e.g. Gardiner (2006, 2011)). The challenges of mitigation and adaptation are, of course, not only ethical challenges. They are also e.g. political and technical in nature.

2. See e.g. Jamieson (2014).

3. See e.g. Risse (2009), Nine (2010, 2012)), Kolers (2012), Vaha (2015), Dietrich and Wündisch (2015), as well as Wündisch (2018).

4. See Gemenne (2011b).

5. See Gemenne (2011a).

6. See e.g. MacAdam (2012, pp. 92–96, pp. 164–166).

7. Note that the debate regarding the causality of climate change often fails to capture the full extent of the complexity policy makers are confronted with. See Wündisch (2014).

8. Throughout I discuss emitters independently of whether they are individuals, firms, or states. In particular, I hold that the challenges to liability I address in this section are relevant to assigning liability to emitters of any kind. However, ultimately I argue that the primary compensatory liability lies with a particular subset of emitters, namely states. This specification is justified due to their (i) greater ability to understand and affect climate change and (ii) the fact that emission records are available for states but not for individuals. See Dietrich and Wündisch (2015, pp. 99–100).

9. See Wündisch (2017a, pp. 840–1).

10. For seminal discussions of the concept of excusable ignorance see, e.g. Smith (1983), Zimmerman (1997), and Rosen (2008). A classical reference is Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 3, ch. 1.

11. See also Wündisch (2017a, pp. 838–9).

12. Potential liability for historical emissions is prominently discussed by e.g. Shue (1999, p. 536), Neumayer (2000, p. 188), Singer (2002, p. 34), Gardiner (2004, p. 581), Caney (2010, pp. 208–210), and Bell (2011, pp. 394–396).

13. See, e.g. Shue (1999, pp. 535–536).

14. See Bell (2011, p. 397).

15. Note that even if such necessary conditions of the ethically defensible application of strict liability were fulfilled, it would remain unclear whether the activity of emitting greenhouse gases meets sufficient conditions for the application of strict liability.

16. See e.g. Shue (1999, p. 536), Singer (2002, p. 34), Gardiner (2004, p. 581), and Neumayer (2000, p. 188). Further discussion is offered by Caney (2010, pp. 208–210), and Bell (2011, pp. 394–396).

17. The empirical part of this claim has important philosophical pedigree. See Parfit’s (1984, p. 80) discussion of ‘The Harmless Torturers’. Also, see e.g. Sandler (2010, p. 172), Sandberg (2011), Cripps (2013), Maltais (2013), as well as Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018). For critical responses to Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) see Hiller (2011) and Andreou (2014, p. 222). For a critical response to Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) as well as Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) see Broome (2019). More generally, see also Vanderheiden (2018), Cullity (2019) and MacLean (2019).

18. Nefsky (2011), Galvin and Harris (2014), and Broome (2019) offer critiques. However, Broome (2019) agrees that all emissions increase expected harm.

19. Estimates of the impact of an individual’s emissions are offered by Nolt (2011a, 2011b)).

20. See also sources cited there.

21. See Revesz et al. (2014), Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, Schewe, Levermann, and Caldeira (2016), as well as Harrington and Otto (2019, p. 16).

22. See Dietrich and Wündisch 2015 (pp. 99–100). For details of the proposed liability distribution which augments the market share theory see section 7(b)iii. (pp. 21–22)

23. See MacAdam (2012, p. 5, pp. 60–61, pp. 123–127, pp. 196–197).

24. See Rawls (1999a, p. 8, pp. 215–217; 1999b, p. 4–6).

25. The question of how closely the assumptions of political philosophy should track the real world has since spawned a multi-faceted debate. See e.g. Stemplowska and Swift (2012) and Valentini (2012).

26. Deemphasizing questions of feasibility (except as they arise from limited political will) does imply neither (i) that feasibility should be of no concern globally nor that (ii) feasibility on an individual level does not importantly shape agents’ duties. On (ii) see e.g. Caney (2016b, pp. 17–18).

27. According to e.g. Rawls (1999a, p. 8), theories of compensatory justice belong to partial compliance theory. For an argument against the possibility of complete compensation for displacement and the corresponding duty to prevent such displacement, see de-Shalit (2011).

28. For a discussion of non-compliance and potential responses to it, see section 7 (pp. 17–24), especially 7c (pp. 22–23).

29. See e.g. Stemplowska (2008, p. 336).

30. See e.g. Simmons (2010, p. 35).

31. See Vallentyne (2009, pp. 86–87, p. 95) for a discussion of infringements and violations.

32. See Vallentyne (2009) and Wündisch (2017b).

33. For a distinction between property rights and territorial rights see e.g. Nine (2012, pp. 11–13).

34. See Miller (2012, p. 253) and Dietrich and Wündisch (2015, p. 85).

35. Throughout I focus on the rights to political self-determination of collectives but also briefly address individual rights to political self-determination in the context of comparing individualistic and collective resettlements.

36. See Dietrich and Wündisch (2015, p. 87).

37. See e.g. Tesón (2016, Introduction) and the sources cited there.

38. See Altman and Wellman (2009, p. 27) and Stilz (2016, p. 111).

39. See Dietrich and Wündisch (2015).

40. I assume that the construction of artificial territory of the relevant specification and size is either impossible or prohibitively expensive.

41. See Wündisch (2018). The distinction between total territorial loss, which requires in-kind compensation and partial territorial loss, which may lend itself to other forms of compensation, is necessarily vague. An interesting complication in this debate is presented by Ödalen (2014, p. 234) who raises the question of whether the measure of political self-determination which the territorially dispossessed could preserve by ‘continuing to exercise sovereign control over [their] abandoned territory and territorial waters’ might suffice as a solution to the problem of territorial loss. Ödalen (2014, p. 234) concludes that the proposal itself is unacceptable ‘even as a non-ideal solution’ but that supplementary compensatory measures may make it ‘more attractive’.

42. See e.g. Kolers (2012, p. 334) and Simmons (2001, p. 304).

43. See Dietrich and Wündisch (2015, pp. 92–94).

44. Heyward (2014) coined this term for the future victims of climate change who will become stateless due to territorial loss. See also Heyward and Ödalen (2016).

45. On the interdependencies between compensatory theories and the justifications of territorial rights as well as rights to political self-determination, see Wündisch (2018, p. 315).

46. For an in-depth discussion of a ‘sense of place’ and its connection to one’s identity see de-Shalit (2011).

47. See e.g. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2013): COP 18 Final Decisions.

48. As the rationale for offering territorial compensation derives from the requirement to compensate for losses in political self-determination, the above-mentioned conditions are proxies rather than prerequisites. In principle, free, prior, and informed consent – as an expression of political self-determination – to being compensated by means of a particular territory suffices. Nevertheless, the cultural identity condition and the appropriate size condition serve as good proxies for what territories will likely be able to reinstate the political self-determination of a particular people.

49. See MacAdam (2012, p. 151) and Tabucanon and Opeskin (2011, pp. 347–348). Proposals of this kind are more common than one might expect. In 2010 the African Union reportedly considered resettling Haitians in a newly created state (Hornack 2010). In 2014 Kiribati bought a plot of land on one of the Fiji islands for potential (partial) resettlement (Caramel 2014). Also, in 2015 a proposal was made to create a single new state for refugees (Betts, 2015).

50. In theory, a herculean effort by a small group of states endowed either with suitable territory or significant financial resources could suffice to implement the theory of territorial compensation outlined in section 5 (pp. 8–14). I disregard this solution here because implementing it (i) is too unlikely to happen and (ii) would come at the costs of displacing many local populations from one state which would in turn be greatly limited in their choice of where to resettle within their own borders. Therefore, such an approach would likely be overdemanding.

51. See e.g. Miller (2005, pp. 200–201).

52. See e.g. Stilz (2016, p. 114).

53. For theories of justice regarding greenhouse gas emissions from which dissenting positions may be derived, see e.g. Bell (2008) or Shue (1999). For a less restricted application of the market share theory, see Byravan and Rajan (2006).

54. By chance, different suitable territories could border on one another in such a way as to allow a group to resettle collectively while nevertheless settling within two independent states. I disregard such unlikely solutions here.

55. Paying other states to accept migrants may be viewed as problematic. For relevant considerations, see e.g. Gibney (2004), Kuosmanen (2013), and Himmelreich (2019).

56. To allow for compact exposition, I do not, throughout, abide by Caney’s (2016a) terminology. See also Caney (2016b).

57. See Shue (1988); Caney (2006, pp. 734–41); and Wündisch (2019).

58. The distinction between the first and the second approach is not clear-cut. Approaches that shift burdens of compliance to non-compliers may also be implemented with an eye towards incentivizing compliance.

59. See Stemplowska (2016) and sources cited there.

60. Here I am disregarding unconscionable responses that seek to reduce future compensatory duties by allowing climate victims to die today.

61. See Stemplowska (2016).

62. See Broome (2012, Ch., p. 3).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Joachim Wündisch

Joachim Wündisch is an assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany and affiliated with the Center for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld University. His current research focuses on political and social philosophy. Articles of his have been published by e.g. Philosophical Papers; Philosophical Studies; Journal of Applied Philosophy; Utilitas; Environmental Philosophy; and the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. His monograph is entitled ‘Towards a Right-Libertarian Welfare State – An Analysis of Right-Libertarian Principles and Their Implications’.